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ABSTRACT 
As a special contractual term, warranties in marine insurance policy are 
crucial for risk assessment purpose. Warranty in marine insurance law has 
survived for centuries. Despite its long period of existence, the current 
warranty regime has been criticised by a number of scholars and the Law 
Commission. The main criticism is that it operates unfairly against the assured.  
Due to the existing problem of the current warranty regime, the main aim of 
this research is to critically analyse the law of warranty in the English Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. Where necessary, some law reform proposals will be 
introduced into the Marine Insurance Act 1906. Moreover, a critical 
comparison between the law of warranty in the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 
and the law of warranty in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 will be made. Due to 
the simple provisions of Article 235 of the Maritime Code which deals with the 
issue of warranty, some new law proposals will be introduced into this Article 
for clarification purpose. 
In order to achieve these merits, this thesis concentrates on the critical 
examination as to the law of warranty under the relevant provisions of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the Maritime Code 1993. Some law reform 
proposals made by other scholars will be critically analysed. In particular, the 
historical development of English and Chinese marine insurance will be 
provided in Chapter 1 and 3 respectively. The research on the issue of 
warranty consists of 4 Chapters, namely Chapter 2, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. Chapter 2 provides the nature of warranty under section 33 and 34 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and some relevant law reform proposals. 
Chapter 4 consists of the discussion as to the statutory rules of warranty under 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code. Chapter 5 specifies the statutory rules for the 
creation of express warranty. Chapter 6 deals with the critical review as to the 
different types of implied warranty in section 39 and 41 of the Marine Insurance 
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Act 1906, and the author will also introduce some new statutory rules as to the 
implied warranties to replace the present law. Additionally, as there is no 
implied warranty under the Maritime Code, in this Chapter, the statutory rules 
as to implied warranties will be introduced and inserted into the Maritime Code. 
Finally, Chapter 7 provides the general conclusion of this thesis for the law of 
warranty in England and China. 
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Introductory Chapter 
Background of the study 
Marine insurance, as one of the oldest form of protection against the loss 
of the ship and cargo, has a significantly long history. The practice of marine 
insurance started to develop into a global level from the 13th century in Italy.1 
Since then the law has started to develop on a local level. It is for this reason 
that the Law Merchant emerged to cover commercial law and the law of marine 
insurance. Marine insurance was introduced into England in the 13th century. 
In those early days, marine insurance disputes were settled in accordance with 
merchant’s customs. The common law rules of marine insurance in England 
were finally codified into the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The term ‘warranty’, 
which is regulated under sections 33 to 41 of the 1906 Act, is a special term of 
the contract of marine insurance, due to its promissory nature. However, some 
of the statutory rules in respect of warranties in the 1906 Act should be 
modified to bring this area of law in line with the modern world.  
In contrast, the history of Chinese marine insurance is relatively short. Until 
the 19th century, the business of insurance was mainly controlled by foreign 
businessmen. Subsequently, a number of domestic insurance companies 
were set up. However, the law of marine insurance in China did not develop 
into its mature state until 1993 when the Chinese Maritime Code came into 
force. Although the provisions governing marine insurance contracts are 
closely modelled on the English Marine Insurance Act 1906, the provisions 
governing warranties in Article 235 of the Maritime Code 1993 may cause 
uncertainty due to its simple wording. Thus, the statutory rules as to warranties 
in the Maritime Code 1993 are also in urgent need of modification. Relevant 
                                                        
1
 Baris Soyer, Warranties in Marine Insurance, 2006, 2nd ed., p 5. 
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law reform proposals would enable the assured to understand the importance 
of the term ‘warranty’. 
 
Objectives and scope of the study 
The English Marine Insurance Act 1906 has survived for more than one 
hundred years. With regard to the issue of warranty, some previous common 
law principles have been codified into this Act. Despite the codification, some 
statutory rules in respect of warranties in the 1906 Act have received criticisms 
from legal professions and scholars, on the basis that these statutory rules in 
the 1906 Act are unfair and out of date. Therefore, one of the main aims of this 
study is to critically analyse the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 which deals with the issue of warranties. It is hoped that this study can 
make a significant contribution to the improvement of the relevant provisions of 
the 1906 Act concerning warranties.  
Warranty in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 can be divided into present 
warranty and future warranty. While a present warranty relates to the 
statement of fact given by the assured, a future warranty relates to the promise 
made by the assured that some something will or will not be done. Research 
will be conducted in respect of both types of warranty, especially present 
warranties. Some scholars suggest that due to the harsh legal consequence of 
the breach of warranty, all warranties should be replaced by the concept of 
alteration of risk. This view will be critically examined to reveal whether this 
view is appropriate. The term ‘warranty’ set out in section 33 and 34 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 has certain statutory and common law features 
which render it special in marine insurance contracts. These features are: a 
promissory warranty must be exactly complied with;2 a warranty does not 
                                                        
2
 Section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.  
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have to be material to the risk; 3  the statutory defence for a breach of 
warranty;4 a breach of warranty cannot be remedied;5 no causal connection 
between a breach of warranty and the loss; a breach of warranty automatically 
discharges the insurer from liability6 and a breach of warranty can be waived.7 
The crucial issue would arise as to whether these legal features have been 
appropriately established. 
The statutory rules as to the creation of express warranty are stipulated in 
section 35 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. In particular, an express warranty 
can be created with any form of words from which the intention to warrant is to 
be inferred.8  Another statutory requirement in respect of the creation of 
express warranty is that an express warranty must be included in, or written 
upon, the policy, or must be contained in some document incorporated by 
reference into the policy.9 A detailed law reform proposal should be made in 
respect of section 35 of the 1906 Act to provide fairness for both the insurer 
and the assured. 
In contrast, the statutory rules as to Chinese marine insurance warranties 
are only set out in Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 which 
requires the assured to notify the insurer in writing immediately where he has 
not complied with the warranties under the contract. The insurer may, upon 
receipt of the notice, terminate the contract or demand an amendment to the 
terms and conditions of the insurance coverage or an increase in the premium. 
Obviously, the simple provision of this Article may cause uncertainty and 
confusion. In particular, the shortcomings of this Article are that it lacks a 
                                                        
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Section 34(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
5
 Section 34(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
6
 Section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
7
 Section 34(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
8
 Section 35(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
9
 Section 35(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
16 
 
statutory definition of warranty, it is unclear as to whether or not a breach of 
warranty can be waived and the way by which a warranty can be created and 
so on. Therefore, relevant law reform proposals in respect of this area of law, if 
introduced, are expected to bring the Chinese Maritime Code in line with 
international standard.  
Unlike express warranties, implied warranties are deemed to apply by the 
operation of law. Under the Marine Insurance Act 1906, there are 4 types of 
implied warranty, namely the warranty of portworthiness, the warranty of 
cargoworthiness, the warranty of legality and the warranty of seaworthiness. In 
English marine insurance law, the most important type of implied warranty is 
the warranty of seaworthiness. Apart from the examination of the warranties of 
portworthiness, cargoworthiness and legality, the main objective of this part of 
the thesis is to concentrate on the discussion as to the warranty of 
seaworthiness as appears in section 39 of the 1906 Act. In the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, there are generally two types of policies, namely voyage 
policy and time policy. While the warranty of seaworthiness applies directly to 
voyage policy, it has limited application in relation to time policies. In particular, 
as far as voyage policy is concerned, research will be conducted in respect of 
the statutory definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’, the application of the 
warranty of seaworthiness and the doctrine of stages. The warranty of 
seaworthiness generally has no application in time policies. But where, with 
the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness.10 It follows 
from this aspect of law that the issue as to the privity of the assured and the 
phrase ‘attributable to’ must be deeply analysed to determine whether section 
39(5) of the 1906 Act is in need of reform. However, the current section 39 of 
the 1906 Act has failed to address the issue as to whether the warranty of 
seaworthiness should apply to mixed policies. Therefore, as a final point, the 
                                                        
10
 Section 39(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
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target of this part of the study is to introduce a detailed common law rule in 
respect of the application of the warranty of seaworthiness in mixed policies. 
In contrast, the implied warranties of seaworthiness and legality have not 
been recognised under the Maritime Code 1993, although unseaworthiness is 
treated as an exception to the liability of the insurer. As seaworthiness is 
crucial for the safety of the ship and the cargo, the purpose of this part of the 
study is to determine whether the implied warranty of seaworthiness should be 
introduced into the Maritime Code. Similarly, other types of implied warranty 
that are recognised under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should also be 
analysed to determine whether it is appropriate to insert these implied 
warranties into the Maritime Code. 
Importance and justification of the study 
Due to the existing problems of the statutory and common law rules of 
warranty in English law, the current warranty regime has failed to protect the 
contracting parties’ legitimate interests. It is for this reason that the current 
warranty regime is in urgent need of modification in order to make it fairer for 
both the assured and the insurer. The need for reform is also announced by 
the Law Commission, as it has made a number of law reform proposals in 
respect of insurance warranty. Therefore, it is necessary for the author to 
provide a detailed law reform proposal in respect of the current English 
warranty regime in this study. 
The only provision governing the law of warranty in the Chinese Maritime 
Code 1993 is Article 235 of the Maritime Code. This provision only sets out the 
legal consequence for the breach of warranty. It did not provide a statutory 
definition of the term ‘warranty’. Nor did it set out whether causal connection 
should play a role between the breach and the loss. In addition, it is unclear as 
to whether there is any defence for a breach of warranty. In more specific 
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terms, Article 235 of the Maritime Code provides that the assured shall notify 
the insurer in writing immediately where the assured has not complied with the 
warranties under the contract. But this part of Article 235 of the Maritime Code 
has also failed to take into account the situation where the assured fails to give 
notice to the insurer as to the breach of warranty. These shortcomings render it 
necessary to introduce some new statutory rules, so that any existing gaps in 
this Article would be filled. Conversely, in the absence of these new statutory 
rules, it would be rather difficult for a particular marine insurance dispute to be 
settled. Thus, some new statutory provisions concerning warranties should be 
introduced into the Maritime Code in order to prevent any uncertainty in the 
existing law.  
Research Questions 
1. What are the shortcomings of sections 33 and 34 of the English Marine 
Insurance Act 1906? 
2. Are there any room for the reform of these two sections? If so, how will the 
reform proposal be carried out? 
3. Should warranties be replaced by the concept of alteration of risk? 
4. As far as the statutory rules of express warranties are concerned, what are 
the differences between Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 and 
section 33 of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906? 
5. What are the problems in Article 235 of the Maritime Code 1993, and how 
will these problems be resolved?  
6. Should section 35 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 be regarded as the 
appropriate statutory rule for the creation of express warranties? If not, can the 
statutory rules in section 35 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 be replaced by 
another statutory rule? 
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7. Should a new statutory rule concerning the creation of express warranty be 
introduced into the Maritime Code 1993? 
8. Should the implied warranties of portworthiness, cargoworthiness, legality 
and seaworthiness be modified to improve the current sections 39 and 41 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906? 
9. Should different types of implied warranty be incorporated into the Maritime 
Code 1993? 
Research Methodology 
This study is undertaken by a comparative approach. This study will follow 
the methodology commonly adopted in comparative law research. By adopting 
a comparative approach, the similarity and differences between English and 
Chinese law of marine insurance warranty will be discovered. But as the title of 
the thesis comprises the phrase ‘critical comparison’, the main aim of this 
study is to discover the weakness of the existing law of both English and 
Chinese marine insurance warranty, and thereby introduce some new law 
reform proposals where necessary. This is because the purpose of introducing 
relevant law reform proposals is to improve the law of marine insurance 
warranty for these two countries.  
In this study, as far as the law of English marine insurance warranty is 
concerned, before any law reform proposal is introduced, the existing law, 
which consists of both statute law and common law, will be critically evaluated 
to figure out whether the existing law has appropriately been established. In 
case that the existing law has proven to be unfair or unsatisfactory, law reform 
proposals will be made in order to improve the existing law. 
Due to the simple provision of Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code 
1993 which regulates the issue of warranty, the first task in this part of the 
study is to figure out whether some of the relevant statutory rules of the 
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English Marine Insurance Act 1906 can be appropriately adopted into the 
Maritime Code 1993 to fill the existing gap. The second task is to identify the 
existing problem in Article 235 of the Maritime Code in order to find a suitable 
solution to replace the existing law. 
Literature survey is the method used to conduct the research. The main 
sources of the literature survey include the Law Commission Consultation 
Paper, statutes, textbooks on insurance and marine insurance law, relevant 
articles in law journals and other PhD theses on insurance and marine 
insurance law. Through the research of these resources, relevant cases and 
the arguments put forward by other scholars in respect of the law of marine 
insurance warranty, the strength and weakness of the existing law of warranty 
will also become obvious.  
The introduction of new law reform proposals begins with the analysis of 
the existing law. Each aspect of law is examined by reference to relevant 
cases and court decisions, as well as examples. Through a critical comparison, 
the strength and weakness of both English law and Chinese law will be 
revealed, and the rationale for the strength and weakness of the law will also 
be provided at the end of each section. 
Finally, after a critical evaluation of the existing law and relevant cases 
concerning marine insurance warranties, a better solution for a legal or 
practical problem will be introduced with a logical reason behind it for the 
recommendations of the amendment of both English and Chinese marine 
insurance warranty. 
Structure of the study 
This study can be divided into 7 Chapters. Chapter 1 provides the 
historical background of marine insurance law and warranty. It begins with the 
origin of marine insurance law and the historical development of marine 
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insurance practice. It also discusses Lord Mansfield’s approach in respect of 
warranties in the 18th century and the fact that the common law principles in 
relation to marine insurance warranty have been codified into the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. 
Different legal features of marine insurance warranty are covered in 
Chapter 2 of the study. In particular, this Chapter analyses different types of 
promissory warranty and other statutory and common law features of warranty. 
The statutory features of warranty can be found in section 33 and 34 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906. Recommendations will be introduced in relation to 
the current warranty regime for the purpose of improving the existing law of 
warranty. 
Chapter 3 concerns the historical review of Chinese marine insurance law. 
This Chapter can be mainly divided into two parts. The first part concerns the 
historical development of Chinese marine insurance law before the 
establishment of the PRC. The second part concentrates on the historical 
development of Chinese marine insurance law after the establishment of the 
PRC, including a brief introduction as to the Insurance Law of PRC 1995 and 
the Maritime Code 1993. The Chinese court system is also briefly stipulated at 
the end of this Chapter to provide the readers with a better understanding of 
the Chinese judicial process of dealing with marine insurance cases. 
Chapter 4 deals with the statutory rules of warranty under Article 235 of the 
Chinese Maritime Code 1993. A detailed discussion will be made in this 
Chapter to determine whether law reform proposal should be introduced for 
the purpose of replacing the existing law. 
Chapter 5 discusses the statutory rules of the creation of express warranty 
under section 35 of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906. In particular, 
section 35(1) and (2) is critically examined in order to figure out a suitable law 
reform proposal. In the absence of the statutory rules as to the creation of 
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express warranty in the Maritime Code 1993, a new set of rules should be 
introduced into the Maritime Code to cover the issue as to the creation of 
express warranty.  
Chapter 6 provides a detailed critical examination as to the different types 
of implied warranty. It starts with the discussion of the implied warranties of 
portworthiness, cargoworthiness and legality as can be found in the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. Some suggestions for the reform of these three types of 
implied warranty will be offered in this Chapter. Most importantly, this Chapter 
provides a detailed analysis as to statutory rules of the implied warranty of 
seaworthiness as appear in section 39 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
These statutory rules include the definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’, the 
application of the warranty of seaworthiness in voyage policy, time policy and 
mixed policy, the doctrine of stages. Apart from these aspects of law, the issue 
as to the burden of proof in unseaworthiness allegations, as a common law 
principle, will also be considered in this Chapter to reveal whether the current 
law on this issue is satisfactory. As the implied warranty of seaworthiness is 
not recognised in the Maritime Code 1993, it is also necessary, in this part of 
the study, to consider the issue as to whether section 39 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 should be adopted into the Maritime Code as an implied 
warranty.  
Finally, the general conclusion for the whole study will be drawn in Chapter 
7 for the purpose of completing the study. 
Contribution to the field of knowledge  
In this study, the author will make some contribution as recommendations 
for the existing law of warranty. As far as section 33 of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 is concerned, a new statutory definition of warranty will be introduced 
to replace section 33(1) of the 1906 Act. The statutory rules that a warranty 
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must be exactly complied with and a warranty does not have to be material to 
the risk will also be challenged by the author on the basis that these two 
statutory rules may create unfairness. Recommendation will be made in 
respect of the common law rule that there is no causal connection between a 
breach for warranty and the loss, such a recommendation would ensure that 
the assured’s commercial interest is well protected. A new statutory rule as to 
the defence for a breach of warranty will be introduced in this study. A law 
reform proposal will be made in respect of the legal consequence for a breach 
of warranty. The statutory rule in relation to the waiver of a breach of warranty 
will be altered to prevent uncertainty.  
The statutory rule as to the creation of express warranty in section 35 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should also be modified to make the law fairer 
for both the assured and the insurer.  
With regard to implied warranties of portworthiness, cargoworthiness, 
legality and seaworthiness, the current statutory rules in sections 39 and 41 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 will need to be modified in order to balance the 
conflicting interest between the assured and the insurer. The common law rule 
as to the burden of proof in unseaworthiness allegations will also be modified, 
so that it would be easier for both parties to discharge the burden of proof. 
As far as Chinese marine insurance law is concerned, Article 235 of the 
Maritime Code 1993 is the principal provision governing the issue of warranty. 
In this part of the study, a statutory definition should be introduced into the 
Maritime Code 1993. Under this Article, the assured should notify the insurer 
for a breach of warranty, but it is suggested by the author that the assured 
should also take reasonable steps to avoid or minimise the loss of the subject 
matter insured. If the assured fails to do so, the contract will be automatically 
terminated. 
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With regard to the legal consequence for a breach of warranty, a 
distinction should be drawn between innocent breach and intentional breach. 
Accordingly, the legal consequence for these two types of breach should be 
different. In order to ensure that various situations are covered in Chinese 
marine insurance law, it is suggested by the author that some of the amended 
version of the legal features of warranty stipulated in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 should also apply to the Maritime Code 1993 for the purpose of clarifying 
some legal issues.  
The implied warranty is not recognised in the Chinese Maritime Code 1993. 
Therefore, in order to bring Chinese marine insurance law in line with 
international standard, it is suggested by the author that the amended version 
of the implied warranties of portworthiness, cargoworthiness, legality and 
seaworthiness, as can be found in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, should all 
be introduced into the Maritime Code 1993. 
Literature review 
 This study provides a critical analysis of the statutory rules of marine 
insurance warranties as appear in the English Marine Insurance Act 1906. As 
far as English marine insurance law is concerned, discussion will be based on 
section 33, 34, 35, 39 and 41 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. It also 
provides a critical examination as to the law of marine insurance warranty in 
the Chinese Maritime Code 1993. Due to the existing uncertainty of Article 235 
of the Maritime Code 1993 which regulates the issue of warranty, some 
suggestions for the modifications of this Article will appear in this study. Where 
necessary, some law reform proposals will be introduced by the author in order 
to improve the existing statutory provisions. The literature review of this study 
is mainly based on some relevant textbooks, articles and thesis completed for 
the area of marine insurance warranty. Some cases concerning the issue of 
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marine insurance warranty will also be cited in this study to emphasize a 
particular point of law.  
The main contribution and innovation in respect of English and Chinese 
marine insurance warranty appear in Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the study. The 
main aim of this study is to discover the weakness of the existing law of both 
English and Chinese marine insurance warranty, and thereby introduce some 
new law reform proposals where necessary. Through the research of relevant 
resources, cases and the arguments put forward by other scholars in respect 
of the law of marine insurance warranty, the strength and weakness of the 
existing law of warranty will also become obvious.  
Chapter 2 of the study deals with the statutory and common law feature of 
English marine insurance warranty. The statutory features of warranty appear 
in section 33 and 34 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The research in this 
area of law is mainly based on some cases and textbooks written by Baris 
Soyer, Susan Hodges, Howard Bennett, and so on.11 Additionally, some of the 
views expressed by the Law Commission12 in respect of the current warranty 
regime have been challenged in this part of the study. By way of example, 
according to the Law Commission’s proposal, all present warranties should be 
replaced by representations. But the author’s view is that this proposal may not 
solve the problem as to the harshness of warranty, because some statements 
of past or existing facts given by the assured should be regarded as crucial for 
the risk assessment process, whereas others may be less important for the 
insurer. The common law feature of warranty that there is no causal 
connection between a breach of warranty and the loss has been criticised by 
the Law Commission. According to the Law Commission, the common law rule 
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that a causal connection between the breach and the loss does not have to be 
shown may cause unfairness from the point of view of the assured, so that the 
view expressed by the Law Commission is that the insurer cannot rely on a 
breach of warranty if the assured proves on a balance of probability that the 
loss in respect of which he seeks to be indemnified was not caused or 
contributed to by the breach.13 A detailed discussion in this study will reveal 
that such a law reform proposal may not be appropriate in all cases, because it 
may be unfair for the insurer, so that a different law reform proposal should be 
introduced. Research in the current warranty regime also includes Dr 
Derrington and Dr Jing’s suggestion14 that all express warranties should be 
replaced by the concept of alteration of risk, so that the harshness of the 
existing law of warranty can be mitigated. Due to the problem of uncertainty, 
the discussion on this part of the study will prove that such a recommendation 
cannot be justified.  
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the statutory rules as to warranties in 
Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 and the concept of alteration of 
risk. Relevant research is conducted in respect of some Chinese journals, 
such as those written by Qingzhen Sun,15 Lei Zheng16 and Yuquan Li.17 In 
particular, it has been argued by Qingzhen Sun that the Maritime Code should 
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set out the rule as to the time of which the contract is deemed to be terminated 
upon a breach of warranty, and this aspect of law, if introduced by the Chinese 
law drafters, should follow the legal consequence of a breach of warranty as 
stated in section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. This argument will be 
critically evaluated by the author in this part of the study to reveal that this is an 
unconvincing view due to the difference between 235 of the Maritime Code 
and section 33(3) of the 1906 Act. With regard to the issue of alteration of risk 
in Chinese insurance law, the author conducts research by looking at a 
textbook jointly written by Baoshi Wang and Fan Yang.18 This book provides a 
detailed discussion in respect of the case of Mr Feng Liao v Ping An Insurance 
Co Ltd Shenzhen Branch which will be used by the author in this part of the 
study to figure out whether the concept of alteration of risk has appropriately 
been introduced in non-marine insurance law. Due to the fact that there is no 
statutory definition of the term ‘warranty’ in the Maritime Code 1993, some 
Chinese scholars have introduced a statutory definition of warranty. This 
definition reads: ‘the assured promises that some particular thing shall or shall 
not be done, or promises the existence or non-existence of a particular state of 
facts under the contract.’19 But in the opinion of the author, this may not be the 
best statutory definition, so that a different statutory definition should be 
introduced into the Maritime Code 1993.     
Chapter 5 concerns with the statutory rules as to the creation of express 
warranty in section 35 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the statutory 
recommendation of the rules as to the creation of express warranty in the 
Maritime Code 1993. Section 35(1) and (2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
will be critically evaluated by the author through the assistance of some 
relevant textbooks. For instance, in the textbook jointly written by John Lowry, 
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Philip Rawlings and Robert Merkin,20 it has been provided that if two possible 
interpretations of an express term existed, one being favourable to the assured, 
and one being favourable to the insurer, the words will be construed narrowly 
against the insurer who has drafted the wording and sought to rely on it, so that 
the words will be construed in favour of the assured. This section clearly 
provides that an express warranty can be created by any form of words. But 
neither section 35 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 nor legal scholars have 
discovered the problem that some absurd or unreasonable terms may be 
converted into express warranties by the insurer. Such a problem will need to 
be resolved in this part of the study. Apart from the standard forms, a warranty 
can be created with the words of the contracting parties.21 The general rule 
that when construing a particular warranty, the relevant commercial 
background should be considered is expressed in the journal written by N B 
Rao.22 This point will also be considered in this part of the study. As a general 
rule, an oral statement or a representation subsequently incorporated into the 
policy in written forms may be construed as a warranty provided that the 
parties’ intention to warrant is clear. This common law rule will need to be 
critically examined in this part of the study to reveal whether this aspect of law 
is satisfactory.   
Finally, Chapter 6 of the study provides a detailed discussion as to the 
statutory rules of the implied warranties in section 39 and 41 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. In addition, it also introduces some suggestions for the 
statutory rules of the implied warranties into the Maritime Code 1993. As far as 
the implied warranty of legality is concerned, Baris Soyer’s view23 is crucial for 
the purpose of the research, as he specifies the issue as to whether a violation 
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of a particular statute or regulation would constitute an illegal marine adventure. 
With regard to the implied warranty of seaworthiness, the term ‘seaworthiness’ 
is defined by both section 39(4) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and common 
law. Under common law, the general proposition expressed by one of the 
academic scholars in Hong Kong is that in order to be considered seaworthy, 
the ship concerned and its equipment needs only to be reasonably fit to enable 
the ship to reach the intended destination.24 The issue as to whether the 
carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy ship has been breached appears in 
a PhD thesis written by Ahmad Hussam Kassem.25 Although the first part of 
section 39(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that the warranty of 
seaworthiness does not apply in time policies, the second part specifies the 
role the issue of unseaworthiness plays in time policies. As such, the insurer is 
not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness if the ship is sent to sea 
in an unseaworthy state with the privity of the assured. The situation where 
both unseaworthiness and perils of the sea constitute the cause of loss has 
been dealt with by Meixian Song.26 As far as mixed policy is concerned, it is 
suggested by Baris Soyer that while the voyage part of the cover is subject to 
the warranty of seaworthiness, it should have no application in the time part of 
the cover.27 Although this view has gained academic support, according to the 
author’s view, it may not be the most satisfactory solution.  
In Chinese marine insurance law, unseaworthiness is considered as the 
exclusion to the liability of the insurer under Article 244 of the Maritime Code 
1993. The legal standard of seaworthiness in Chinese marine insurance law 
can be found in Wenhao Han’s thesis which also specifies the way by which 
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the issue of illegality of the marine insurance contract is dealt with. 28 
According to the author’s view, in this part of the study, the issues of 
unseaworthiness and illegality should be introduced into the relevant 
provisions of the Maritime Code 1993 as two types of implied warranty, so that 
the insurer’s commercial interest would be protected in a fair manner. 
Overall, having consulted all the above textbooks, journals and theses that 
are relevant to this study, a critical analysis of the law of English marine 
insurance warranty and Chinese marine insurance warranty will be made in 
this study followed by some relevant law reform proposals, such that the 
existing law could be improved for the benefit of the English and Chinese 
marine insurance market.   
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Chapter 1 
The historical review of English marine insurance warranties 
1.1 Introduction  
It is a widely acknowledged fact that marine insurance law plays a 
significant role in international trade transactions. In fact, it is worthwhile to 
note that the body of rules governing international trade in the 21st century 
derives from medieval commercial laws known as the lex mercatoria29 and the 
lex maritima. 30  But it has generally been accepted that English marine 
insurance law was developed as a dominate source of law on an international 
basis. In other words, the legal principles adopted by other countries, including 
civil law countries, in relation to marine insurance warranties were closely 
influenced by English law. The reason for this being that the British marine 
insurance market has traditionally been considered and accepted as one of the 
most important and dominant marine insurance market on an international 
level. The British market consists of insurers primarily located in a number of 
major cities of which London was the most important. The London insurance 
market has been known as the ‘Lloyd’s of London’. This is an association with 
private individual insurers of over 14,000 in total. As a result of the historical 
development of marine insurance, it is not surprising that the law, policy 
conditions and practices developed in England are the most commonly 
accepted components of marine insurance contracts throughout the world.31  
However, there have been numerous criticisms on the English law of 
marine insurance warranties developed by academics and legal professions 
for many years. 32  Under the current English marine insurance warranty 
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regime, the term ‘warranty’ refers to a promise or undertaking made by the 
assured and which must be strictly complied with by the assured. In the event 
of a breach of warranty, the liability of the insurer will be automatically 
discharged as from the date of the breach.33 According to English law, a 
warranty has traditionally been regarded as a condition precedent to the 
attachment of the risk.34 However, the legal principles of marine insurance 
warranty have been regarded as out of date and extremely harsh from the 
point of view of the assured. As a result, the law relating to the warranty regime 
should be brought into line with acceptable practice. It is therefore suggested 
by the Law Commission that the law of marine insurance warranty should be 
reformed in order to provide fairness and balance the conflicting interests as 
between the assured and the insurer.35 It is clear that the doctrine of marine 
insurance warranty has existed for over 300 years. It is therefore worthwhile to 
examine the historical development of marine insurance law and the concept 
of warranty and consider the issues as to the initial purpose of marine 
insurance warranty and how the law has developed into its current position. 
The question as to what the law of marine insurance warranty was in ancient 
times will also become obvious through a historical review. 
 
1.2 The origin of marine insurance practice and law 
From the very earliest times of maritime trading, it was acknowledged by 
merchants that maritime risks constituted a greater hazard than those 
encountered for land transportation. Marine insurance, as one of the oldest 
forms of protection against maritime losses relating to ship and cargo, has a 
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long and colorful history of great significance. Originally, merchants’ vessels 
and goods were protected by the earliest contracts in which the burden of the 
happening of unexpected events was transferred to another at a fixed price. 
These contracts were an extended facility of the maritime loan developed by 
the Babylonians in the 3rd millennium BC. Evidently, the earliest form of marine 
insurance emerged and developed in Europe from the Middle Ages. During 
this period of time, the ancient Phoenicians, the Greeks and the Romans were 
all in the interest of guarding themselves against some types of the risk of 
maritime loss by various systems of insurance, whether in the form of loans or 
mutual guarantee.36 It is suggested that the practice of marine insurance have 
been developed by Lombard merchants in Medieval Northern Italy in the late 
12th and early 13th centuries and subsequently spread to Northern Europe.37 
The law and practice of marine insurance were subsequently imported to 
England, as Lombard merchants were forced to migrate to England in the late 
13th century by the Kaiser of Germany. 38  In addition, it was the Italian 
mercantile community and the international commercial transactions 
developed by Italian trade usage that influenced England, like the rest of the 
European countries, to introduce its own instruments of commerce, such as 
the bill of exchange and the bill of lading.39 After the 15th and 16th centuries, 
maritime trading activities were internationalised to a great extent.   
Significantly, the use and practice of marine insurance came to be codified 
in a number of different ordinances and early maritime codes. In this respect, 
the medieval lex mercatoria was developed by merchants as a spectacular 
example of transnational private ordering in respect of commercial 
transactions in Europe during the medieval times. The northern cities of Italy 
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played a crucial role in the development of the lex mercatoria.40 It follows from 
this perspective that the doctrine of lex mercatoria,41 which was also known as 
the ‘Law Merchant’42 in England, was originally a medieval set of rules and 
customs set up by merchants voluntarily to regulate their business dealings 
and develop commercial relations, including the business of marine insurance, 
among them. With the emergence and development of the medieval lex 
mercatoria, it is thought that in ancient times, cases concerning commercial 
issues were generally adjudicated before merchants themselves who relied 
heavily on reputational enforcement without the interference of public courts. 
While these rules were self-referential and self-enforcing, these rules were 
gradually incorporated into national laws by established court systems.43 By 
way of example, the medieval lex mercatoria was absorbed into English 
common law after the 17th century and codified into various statutes at the end 
of the 19th century, such as the Bills of Exchange Act 1882, the Partnership Act 
1890 and the Sale of Goods Act 1893.  
As far as the trading activity in the 21st century is concerned, the lex 
mercatoria has been regarded as the international law of commerce. Similar to 
the medieval lex mercatoria, the modern lex mercatoria, developed by the 
international business community, is a set of trading rules consisting of trade 
usages, model contracts, standard clauses, general legal principles and 
international commercial arbitration. Thus, there is no doubt to say that the 
modern lex mercatoria has a strong connection with the medieval lex 
mercatoria. It has been pointed out that ‘international law is still largely 
independent of nationalised legal systems, retaining many of the basic (though 
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modernised) institutional characteristics of the medieval Law Merchant.’44  
Furthermore, the doctrine of lex maritima, which was developed as part of 
the doctrine of lex mercatoria for customary mercantile law, was the general 
maritime law governing the law of marine insurance in all Western Europe until 
the late 15th century, although the existence of the lex maritima dates back to 
the Rhodian law of the 8th or 9th century which was an unwritten body of sea 
law originated from the Island of Rhodes.45 The principal source of early 
maritime law in Europe was an oral, customary lex maritima which directly 
applied to commercial transport of goods by sea. In particular, the doctrine of 
lex maritima refers to a specialised body of oral rules, maritime practice, 
maritime customs and usage in respect of navigation and maritime commerce 
and was accepted and administered by merchant judges in medieval Western 
Europe. Besides, the lex mercatoria and the lex maritima are both ius 
commune46 which applies in a particular state as a source of law, unless there 
is a specific statute limiting it. Typical examples of the lex maritima include the 
attachment, maritime liens, general average, the hire of the ships and their 
services under charterparties, marine insurance and so on. Furthermore, the 
lex maritima was gradually codified in early maritime law compilations under 
the laws of Wisby in the 16th century.47 Today, the existence of the lex maritima 
can be found in the United States, the United Kingdom (UK), Canada and 
many of the world’s shipping nations as the general maritime law.  
 The practice of marine insurance was introduced into England (London) 
and the cities of the Hanseatic League from as early as the middle of the 13th 
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century.48 It is worthwhile to note that the first form of marine insurance in 
Britain had been carried out by a group of Hanseatic merchants.49 While the 
practice of marine insurance was first started by foreigners, at the 
commencement of the 17th century, the business of marine insurance had 
started to fall into national enterprise. By that time, marine insurance was 
operated to require people who wished to insure their ship or cargo to find a 
number of insurers who were able to accept maritime risks, and ask them to 
sign a policy embodying the transaction.50 As a result, in the early 18th century, 
the entire business of marine insurance was conducted by two insurance 
companies, these are the Royal Exchange Assurance and the London 
Assurance.     
At the outset, insurance disputes were heard in the Assurance Chamber 
which was established in London in 1577. 51  During this period of time, 
disputes concerning marine insurance were still settled based on merchants’ 
customs rather than on points of law. In England, from the 16th century, the law 
merchant was absorbed by the common law courts. A typical example would 
be the King’s Courts of Common Law. As a result, marine insurance was not 
extensively litigated in England until the 16th century, although there was no 
English legislation regulating marine insurance at that time. Instead, marine 
insurance cases were decided by the Court of Admiralty52 and local maritime 
courts located in seaport towns on the basis of the use and customs of 
domestic merchants within the mercantile community. It has generally been 
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accepted that ‘the Court of Admiralty had an ancient jurisdiction in respect of 
offences committed on the high seas. From these origins it commenced 
hearing civil disputes connected with the sea.’53  
From the 16th century, the Court of Admiralty had power to deal not only 
with domestic cases, but also disputes concerning oversea trading matters. 
Legal disputes concerning marine insurance were generally decided by both 
the Court of Admiralty and the court of common law.54 Due to the fact that the 
value of English overseas trade significantly increased during the 17th century, 
different set of rules concerning export trade was established by English courts. 
As a result, a clear distinction was drawn between English and European 
marine insurance systems from the 17th century.55 At the outset, the existence 
of marine business in England was primarily concerned with the insurance of 
ships engaged in the trading of slaves,56 although underwriting was carried 
out solely by private individuals who agreed to share potential marine risks 
among themselves rather than by insurance corporations. 57  Significant 
development in relation to marine insurance law and practice appeared in the 
late 18th century where the law of marine insurance was accepted as a 
separate branch of English common law. 
 
1.3 Legal history of marine insurance warranty in English law 
As the practice of marine insurance developed throughout the Europe, 
certain contractual terms were introduced by the merchants in order to 
circumscribe and control the risk. A number of contractual provisions 
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incorporated in the early marine insurance contracts aimed at requiring the 
assured to do or refrain from doing something during the currency of the policy. 
In English marine insurance law, such provisions have been regarded as 
warranties, although it is believed that the term ‘warranty’ was introduced into 
marine insurance contracts by laymen rather than by lawyers.58 The doctrine 
of warranty has been established in England for more than 200 years. The 
approach adopted by English law was that the insurer’s promise of cover 
would depend on the assured’s fulfillment of the warranties. During the early 
period where the issue of warranty has received judicial attention, the most 
common type of warranty was the undertaking that the ship would sail in 
convoy. The commercial purpose of a marine insurance warranty is to assist 
the insurer to assess and circumscribe the initial risk in an accurate way and 
ensure that the assured takes precautions that will reduce the maritime risk 
exposed to the insurer. Without the undertaking made by the assured, the 
insurer will not be bound to assume the risk of the goods in sea transit.  
The first reported English case in respect of marine insurance warranty is 
the case of Jeffries v Legandra.59 The case concerned an insurance policy 
which sought to protect the assured from perils of the sea, pirates, enemies, 
etc, from London to Venice. The policy also contained a term which read as 
‘warranted to depart with convoy’. The ship initially complied with this term 
when she first set sail, but she was subsequently separated from the convoy 
as a result of severe weather and was then captured by the French. The court 
construed the words ‘to depart with convoy’ to mean sail with convoy for the 
entire voyage. However, the fact that the ship was forced to separate from the 
convoy for reasons other than the willful misconduct of the master or the 
assured did not mean that this undertaking had been breached by the assured. 
In reaching the decision, the court ruled that compliance with this undertaking 
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was a condition precedent to the liability of the assured, but due to the fact that 
the master did not intend to separate the ship from the convoy, this 
undertaking was held not to be breached. The courts had used a similar 
principle in two subsequent cases to conclude that according to the doctrine of 
de minimis non curat lex, even minor discrepancies in relation to 
non-compliance of warranty should not prevent the assured from recovering 
the loss.60 However, it is regrettable that in those early days, there was no 
unique legal definition as to marine insurance warranty in England, due to the 
fact that the term ‘warranty’ was only used customarily by merchants and 
insurance brokers as a device to regulate their insurance contracts.61 In 
addition, during this period, the law of marine insurance was rather unsettled 
as a result of the competing jurisdictions between the Court of Admiralty and 
the court of common law, as well as the frequent use of marine insurance 
arbitration by the parties.62 
 
1.4 Lord Mansfield’s approach in the 18th century 
Until the 18th century, English commercial law was still based upon the old 
doctrine of lex mercatoria. In the 18th century, the rapid growth of export trade 
between England and other countries had made a great influence on the 
business of marine insurance. Furthermore, the growth of the British Empire 
provided English law with a prominence in this area which it largely retained 
and formed the basis of almost all modern practice.  
By the middle of the 18th century, the law of marine insurance had been 
further developed and settled as a separate branch of English common law by 
Lord Mansfield63 who had read widely amongst the work of European jurists in 
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the field of mercantile law and who was considered as the leading proponent 
for the incorporation of the doctrine of lex mercatoria into common law. In order 
to remove the inconsistency between English commercial law and the law of 
other European countries, Lord Mansfield had made a great effort to bring 
English commercial law up to the same standard as that of other European 
countries.64  More specifically, ‘striving to implement a realistic system of 
commercial law in England, Lord Mansfield argued for a system of commercial 
law which gave due regard to business custom and trade usage.’65 During this 
period, Lord Mansfield, as well as Lord Chief Justice, decided a number of 
important commercial and mercantile cases with the assistance of experienced 
merchants, insurance brokers, adjusters and insurers.66 More specifically, 
cases in relation to the various features of express warranties had received 
judicial attention. Lord Mansfield’s method of dealing with marine insurance 
cases was to refer to Continental ordinances and codes, such as the Marine 
Ordinance of 1681, and the business practice of domestic merchants to find 
legal principles applicable to marine insurance, due to the fact that the rules 
relating to marine insurance contracts were mainly based upon mercantile 
practices. After a careful examination of each case, Lord Mansfield took major 
steps towards rationalising legal principles of insurance in general and 
introduced a detailed set of rules on the nature of express warranties, the legal 
consequence of the breach and the well-known principle of utmost good faith67 
which were regarded as the foundation of the law on English marine 
insurance. 
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1.5 Legal features of express warranties in the 18th century 
1.5(1) A warranty does not have to be material to the risk 
In 1756, Lord Mansfield became the Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. The 
various legal features of warranty were ultimately established by Lord 
Mansfield in the court of common law. For Lord Mansfield, the term ‘warranty’ 
should be construed according to merchants’ customs and the parties’ 
intention. It should be noted that the approaches adopted by Lord Mansfield in 
relation to warranties are still fundamental and relevant to English law in the 
21st century. At the outset, the issue as to whether or not the warranty must be 
material to the risk was dealt with in the early case of Woolmer v Muilman.68 
The fact of the case was that under the insurance policy, the insured ship and 
cargo were warranted to be neutral, but they were in fact the property 
belonging to Britain. The underwriter refused to pay the assured for the loss 
after the ship sank during the sea voyage on the ground that the warranty was 
breached by the assured. Despite the assured’s contention that the warranty 
was not material to the risk, it was held that the underwriter was not liable for 
the loss, and that the contract would be terminated. Therefore, it is clear that 
according to Lord Mansfield, there was no materiality between the warranty 
and the risk, and that the legal consequence for a breach of warranty would be 
termination of the insurance contract as a whole because of the importance of 
the term ‘warranty’, and non-compliance with the warranty could also 
adversely affect the insurer’s opportunity to evaluate the risk in a proper 
manner.  
1.5(2) The distinction between ‘warranty’ and ‘representation’ 
In the view of Lord Mansfield, the term ‘warranty’ has a special legal status 
in marine insurance law. This point is graphically illustrated in the case of Bean 
v Stupart69 where Lord Mansfield defined a warranty to mean a condition on 
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which the contract was found. Due to this special feature, a clear distinction 
had subsequently been drawn by Lord Mansfield between the term ‘warranty’ 
and the term ‘representation’. Thus, in the case of Pawson v Watson,70 it was 
agreed that the insured ship was to have 12 guns and 20 men on board. But in 
fact the ship had sailed with only 9 guns and 12 men, but such an agreement 
was not included in the insurance policy. During the voyage, the ship was 
captured by an American privateer. The insurer asserted that the warranty had 
been breached by the assured and therefore refused to indemnify the assured 
as to the loss. However, Lord Mansfield rejected this argument and made a 
distinction between a warranty and a representation by holding that as the 
statement of fact was not inserted into the insurance policy, it must be 
construed as a representation rather than a warranty. On the contrary, Lord 
Mansfield did appreciate the significance of the term ‘warranty’ by stating that 
‘Where it is a part of the written policy, it must be performed: as if there be a 
warranty of convoy, there it must be a convoy: nothing tantamount will do, or 
answer the purpose; it must be strictly performed, as being part of the 
agreement …’ 71  This means that in order to constitute a warranty, the 
statement itself must be written or inserted into the insurance policy. 
In contrast, in the case of De Hahn v Hartley,72 the clause written in the 
margin of a policy of marine insurance stated that the ship would sail from 
Liverpool to its destination port in the British West Indies with ‘14 six-pounders, 
swivels, small arms, and 50 hands or upwards; copper-sheathed’. In fact, the 
ship had sailed with only 46 hands, even though the ship subsequently 
resumed her voyage with 52 hands in Anglesey. But the ship was then 
captured and lost near the coast of Africa. The insurer denied liability following 
from the breach of this undertaking on the part of the assured, even though the 
warranty was subsequently remedied by the assured. This time, Lord 
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Mansfield construed this clause as a warranty on the ground that this clause 
was written into the insurance policy. In addition to this rule, Lord Mansfield 
also stressed the importance of the term ‘warranty’ by stating that ‘it is perfectly 
immaterial for what purpose a warranty is introduced; but being inserted, the 
contract does not exist unless it be literally complied with’. Similarly, Mr Justice 
Ashhurst took the same view and stated that ‘the very meaning of a warranty is 
to preclude all questions whether it has been substantially complied with: it 
must be literally so.’73 Conversely, according to the court, it would be sufficient 
if a representation was substantially complied with. This exact compliance rule, 
which influenced the drafter of the marine insurance legislation, is indeed one 
of the most important legal features of warranty. Furthermore, in this case, the 
fact that the warranted number of crew had been recruited before the vessel 
sailed on the leg of the voyage during which the accident took place did not 
influence the court’s decision, because the proposition established by Lord 
Mansfield was that in the event that a warranty was not complied with, it was 
immaterial whether it was remedied later. 
1.5(3) No excuse for a breach of warranty    
Having considered the issue of exact compliance, different situations may 
also arise where the assured has innocently breached a warranty without any 
fault on his own part. Therefore, the issue may then arise as to whether or not 
a breach of warranty can be excused in such a case. This issue was brought 
into discussion in the case of Bond v Nutt74 where a ship was warranted to sail 
on or before a particular date. The ship in fact sailed before that date from the 
port of lading to the other port to join the convoy. However, the ship was 
subsequently detained by an embargo beyond the date of sailing warranted by 
the assured. When the case reached the court, the underwriter contended that 
compliance with the warranty formed the basis of the insurance policy, so that 
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the underwriter would not be liable for any potential loss if the warranty was 
breached by the assured, and there should be no excuse for not complying 
with the warranty regardless of whether the breach was committed deliberately 
or by accident. Unlike the decision reached in the case of Jeffries v 
Legandra,75 this time, Lord Mansfield accepted the underwriter’s argument 
and held that a breach of a warranty could not be excused even if the assured 
was not at fault. Therefore, it is not surprising that the court in this case had 
adopted a new approach which differed from the rule established in Jeffries v 
Legandra.76 The same issue was again considered in the case of Hore v 
Whitmore.77 In this case, the insured ship was detained by an embargo and 
thus prevented from sailing on or before the warranted sailing date. The 
assured’s defence was that the insurance policy contained a clause which 
expressly excused the breach of warranty. In particular, the clause stated, in 
relevant part, that ‘free … from all restraints and detainments of kings, princes, 
and people of what nation, condition or quality whatsoever’. Nevertheless, this 
argument was rejected by the court, and it was therefore held that there was 
no excuse for not complying with a warranty. 
 
1.6 The introduction of the implied warranties in the 19th century 
In order to facilitate the great demand of export trade, England entered into 
a large number of treaties of commerce and navigation in the 19th century, 
such as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation entered into between 
England and other countries. The significant increase of export trade in the 
19th century has also led to the further development of marine insurance law in 
England.78 By way of illustration, the purchase of liability insurance from the 
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protection and indemnity clubs79 began to emerge in the 19th century. Beside 
this fact, by the middle of the 19th century, the British insurance market was 
wholly controlled by the Lloyd’s of London as the central leading insurance and 
reinsurance market place, which was opened by Edward Lloyd80 originally as 
a Coffee House in the Tower Street of London in the late 17th century81 and 
which had a remarkable influence on the business and practice of marine 
insurance. The rationale for this is that historically, London has been regarded 
as an international trading centre from the Anglo-Saxon times.82 Due to the 
growth of export trade with other countries, at the begining of the 19th century, 
implied warranties, as distinct from express warranties, were introduced and 
firmly established by the courts. Implied warranties are different from express 
warranties in the sense that implied warranties are deemed to apply by the 
operation of law without the need for parties to make specific provisions for 
such, although the legal consequence of the breach of these two types of 
warranty is the same. There were two types of implied warranty introduced in 
the 19th century, namely warranty of seaworthiness and warranty of legality. 
1.6(1) Warranty of seaworthiness 
Until the start of the 19th century, the implied warranty of seaworthiness 
was first introduced by the courts in connection with voyage policies. That is to 
say, apart from the express warranties, the assured was also required to 
comply with the implied warranty of seaworthiness. It is self-evident that the 
commercial purpose of introducing the warranty of seaworthiness in those 
early days was that in order to protect human lives and property, the shipowner 
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was under a duty to provide a seaworthy ship which must be fit for its purpose 
to encounter a particular maritime adventure. The issue as to the warranty of 
seaworthiness was considered in the case of Wedderburn & Others v Bell,83 
Lord Ellenborough placed emphasis on the term ‘seaworthiness’ and pointed 
out that the warranty of seaworthiness was a condition precedent to the liability 
of the underwriter, and that in the event of breach of such a warranty, the 
underwriter would not be liable for any loss. Nine years later, Lord Eldon set 
out the crucial factors which must be considered for complying with the 
warranty of seaworthiness and expressed his view that ‘there is nothing in 
matters of insurance of more importance than the implied warranty that a ship 
is seaworthy when she sails on the voyage insured … both a view to the 
benefit of commerce and the preservation of human life …’84  
The definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’ and the legal nature of the 
warranty of seaworthiness can be found in the case of Dixon v Sadler85 where, 
according to Baron Parke, the warranty of seaworthiness would apply only at 
the commencement of the voyage, and there is no continuing warranty of 
seaworthiness for the entire voyage insured. Moreover, in the same case, 
Baron Parke also set out the legal definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’ by 
stating that ‘… it is clearly established that there is an implied warranty that the 
vessel shall be seaworthy, by which it meant that she shall be in a fit state as to 
repairs, equipment, crew and in all other respects to encounter the ordinary 
perils of the sea of the voyage insured, at the time of sailing upon it.’86 
Nevertheless, when determining the issue of seaworthiness, various factors 
must be taken into account. By way of example, in the case of Foley v Tabor,87 
Chief Justice Erle pointed out that ‘seaworthiness is a word which the import 
varies with the place, the voyage, the class of ship, or even the nature of the 
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cargo.’88 This means that the nature of the term ‘seaworthiness’ is relative and 
flexible. Likewise, as far as the historical origin of the warranty of 
seaworthiness is concerned, it is clear that in order to be considered seaworthy, 
the ship must also be fit to carry the cargo to the intended destination. This is 
because ‘the concept of seaworthiness first appears in the customs and 
regulations dealing with the shipment of cargo by sea and the chartering of 
vessels to carry cargo and concurrently in the law of marine insurance.’89  
1.6(2) Warranty of Legality 
Apart from the warranty of seaworthiness, another type of implied warranty 
was introduced during the 19th century, that is, the implied warranty of legality. 
In general, due to the notion of public policy, the warranty of legality denotes 
not only that the adventure insured must be legal, but also that the adventure 
must be carried out by the assured in a lawful manner. The general rule that 
the adventure must not be tainted with illegality can be found in the case of 
Redmond v Smith,90 where Chief Justice Tindal stated that ‘A policy on an 
illegal voyage cannot be enforced; for it would be singular, if, the original 
contract being invalid and incapable to be enforced, a collateral contract 
founded upon it could be enforced. It may be laid down, therefore, as a general 
rule, that, where a voyage is illegal, an insurance upon such voyage is 
illegal.’91 In addition to this rule, in the case of Pipon v Cope,92 the crew 
members had intentionally committed acts of barratry on three consecutive 
voyages on several occasions. As a result, the court held that the shipowner 
was not entitled to argue that the matter was beyond his control, because the 
warranty of legality also requires the performance of the adventure to be legal. 
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1.7 The statutory codification of case law – the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 
As mentioned earlier, the customary commercial usage and case law with 
regard to marine insurance warranties survived during the 18th and 19th 
century.93 However, the rules relating to warranties were further clarified and 
settled at the begining of the 20th century by the enactment of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 which repealed the Marine Insurance Act 1745.94 At the 
outset, by the end of the 19th century, the Bill called the ‘Marine Insurance 
Codification Bill’, which later became the Marine Insurance Act 1906, was 
introduced to the House of Lords by Sir Mackenzie Dalzell Chalmers who was 
the drafter of the first Bill of the Act and who was chairing in the Law 
Commission. The Marine Insurance Act 1906, which preserved the old 
doctrine of lex mercatoria,95 came into effect on the 1st January 1907. This 
piece of legislation was intended to provide certainty to those seeking marine 
insurance and those providing it, and it has been relied upon by numerous 
countries as the basic legislative regulation of marine insurance contracts. It 
should be noted that most of the rules established by previous case law and 
other accepted practices as to marine insurance warranties, as well as 
warranties in the collective body of ordinary insurance law, had been retained 
and incorporated into the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The Act has been 
regarded as a codification of around 200 years of more than 2000 previous 
judicial decisions and opinions. Evidently, section 91(2) of the 1906 Act clearly 
preserves the historic sources of marine insurance law which was introduced 
by merchants and judges. For this reason, it is obvious that the lex mercatoria 
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continues to play an important role in this area of maritime law.96 Despite its 
statutory name, the general principles have been applied widely to all non-life 
insurance. Most of the principles introduced by Lord Mansfield during the 18th 
century were adopted into the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906. Nevertheless, the legal consequence of the breach of a warranty 
adopted by Lord Mansfield had been altered after the 1906 Act was put into 
effect. Furthermore, the 1906 Act also deals with the legal effect of the breach 
of warranty in a different way from other European countries. Despite the fact 
that the Act has covered all the relevant issues in relation to general insurance, 
sometimes it is still necessary for the courts to refer to some pre-Act authorities 
in order to reach a particular decision.97 This is because where a particular 
point is absent from the relevant provision of the Act, it will be complemented 
by common law principles.   
In general, the statutory rules and legal features of warranties, whether 
express or implied, were set out in section 33 to 41 of the Act. The statutory 
definition of a warranty was expressly stated in section 33(1) of the Act.98 But 
the well-established common law rule that a causal connection between the 
breach of warranty and the loss suffered by the assured does not have to be 
shown was not spelt out in the 1906 Act. Unlike the common law rule 
established by Lord Mansfield regarding the legal consequence of breach, the 
insurer’s liability, according to section 33(3) of the Act, would be discharged if a 
warranty was breached by the assured, although a breach of warranty can 
subsequently be waived by the insurer,99 except the warranty of legality. For 
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the interests of the assured, there are two statutory excuses available to the 
assured for the breach of warranty, namely, a change of circumstances or 
when compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent 
law.100 By virtue of section 35(1) of the Act, an express warranty can be 
created by any form of words, provided that it is possible to draw inference 
from the parties’ intention to warrant. As far as the types of implied warranty 
are concerned, the 1906 Act has introduced another two types of implied 
warranty, namely, warranty of portworthiness 101  and warranty of 
cargoworthiness. 102  These provisions may, in turn, be displaced by the 
express agreement of the parties in their contract. However, some aspects of 
the law in relation to the warranty regime were clarified and confirmed by the 
courts in some landmark decisions even after the enactment of the 1906 Act. 
These court decisions would require further elaboration in subsequent 
Chapters.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
Overall, this chapter has provided a historical review as to the law of 
marine insurance in England. It is clear that marine insurance had been 
introduced in northern Italy from the 12th century. During the medieval period, 
the doctrine of lex mercatoria, which has been regarded as the international 
law of commerce, was widely used by merchants to regulate their business 
dealings. Marine insurance was introduced into England in the 13th century, 
although the practice of marine insurance was carried out by private 
individuals rather than corporations. Litigation concerning marine insurance 
started from the 16th century, and these cases were generally dealt with by the 
Court of Admiralty and the court of common law. 
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In England, marine insurance warranty had received judicial attention from 
the 17th century. The term ‘warranty’ was introduced to regulate the statement 
of fact and the promise made by the assured. The first reported case 
concerning warranty is the case of Jeffries v Legandra103 where it was ruled 
that the assured would not lose the cover if he had innocently breached the 
warranty.  
Legal principles relating to marine insurance warranty have been 
developed by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century by way of case-law. In 
particular, it was established that there was no materiality between the 
warranty and the loss, and a breach of a warranty could not be excused. Lord 
Mansfield had also drawn a clear distinction between a warranty and a 
representation. 
The warranty of seaworthiness and the warranty of legality, as two types of 
implied warranty, were established by the courts in the 19th century. With 
regard to the legal nature of the warranty of seaworthiness, it was settled in the 
case of Dixon v Sadler104 that the warranty of seaworthiness would only apply 
at the commencement of the voyage. In this case, the term ‘seaworthiness’ 
was defined by Baron Parke to mean that the vessel ‘shall be in a fit state as to 
repairs, equipment, crew and in all other respects to encounter the ordinary 
perils of the sea of the voyage insured, at the time of sailing upon it.’105 
The warranty of legality, as another type of implied warranty established in 
the 19th century, requires the adventure insured to be legal, and the adventure 
must also be carried out in a lawful manner. 
Legal principles relating to marine insurance warranty were finally settled 
in the 20th century with the enactment of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 which 
was drafted by Sir Mackenzie Chalmers. This piece of legislation has 
preserved most of the previous common law principles established by the 
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courts. The statutory rules of express and implied warranty appear in section 
33 to 41 of the Act. But some new statutory rules were incorporated into the 
Act. Relevant provisions of the Act and cases will be critically examined 
accordingly in the next Chapter.              
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Chapter 2 
A critical analysis as to the nature of English marine insurance 
warranty 
2.1 Introduction 
The principal aim of this chapter is to examine the current law of English 
marine insurance warranty as appears in the Marine Insurance Act 1906. In 
particular, it will examine the different features of marine insurance warranty, 
and thereby critically evaluate the problems of the current warranty regime. 
More importantly, this chapter will seek to introduce some law reform 
proposals as to the current law of warranty. The research will mainly be based 
upon case-law as well as the relevant provisions of the Act. As stated in the 
previous chapter, significant development of the law of marine insurance 
warranty appeared in the 18th century where important legal principles as to 
the nature of marine insurance warranty were established by Lord Mansfield. 
These legal principles have been incorporated into the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 and have been regarded as good law even in the 21st century. The critical 
analysis as to the nature of warranty in Chapter 2 will be based upon a number 
of cases decided by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century, as well as some recent 
cases. In consequence, Chapter 2 of the thesis will therefore concentrate on 
the discussion of the different features of marine insurance warranty and the 
question as to whether the law in this area is in need of reform.  
 
2.2 Conceptual clarification of contractual terms in marine 
insurance law  
The term ‘warranty’ in marine insurance law, whether express or implied, 
has certain features which render it entirely distinct from warranty encountered 
in ordinary contract law. Thus, a warranty in ordinary contract law is, as 
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opposed to a condition, a less significant term, the breach of which will only 
entitle the innocent party to claim damages rather than to terminate the 
contract as a whole.106 A warranty in marine insurance law, on the other hand, 
is a promissory warranty either expressly or impliedly made by the assured to 
the insurer, and thus becomes a fundamental term of the contract with legal 
strength and importance binding on the assured. It follows from this point that 
in the absence of such a promise made by the assured, the insurer would not 
undertake to be bound by the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. 
This means that a warranty ‘will invariably affect the risk to which the insurer is 
subject.’107 In the event of a breach of warranty, the liability of the insurer will 
automatically come to an end. This is because a warranty in marine insurance 
contracts is a very important term which forms the essence of the insurance 
contract. The significance of the term ‘warranty’ has been appreciated since 
the 18th century case-law. By way of illustration, in the case of Bean v 
Stupart,108 Lord Mansfield defined a warranty to mean ‘a condition on which 
the contract is founded’.109  
The issue may also arise as to whether or not a warranty in marine 
insurance law is assimilated to the term ‘condition’ in ordinary contract law. 
Similar to a marine warranty, ‘a condition is a term to which the parties, when 
making the contract, attribute such importance that it can truly be described as 
being of the essence of the contract.’110 In the general law of contract, a 
breach of a condition entitles the innocent party to elect to terminate the 
contract.111 In the law of marine insurance, the insurer’s further liability will be 
discharged upon a breach of warranty, but the insurance contract as a whole 
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remains unaffected. This is because the retention of the contract has the 
purpose of providing the insurer the opportunity to waive the breach.112  
 
2.3 Different types of promissory warranty  
In addition, according to section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, 
there are two major types of promissory warranty, namely present warranty 
and future warranty (continuing warranty). As far as present warranty is 
concerned, the assured confirms that certain facts, either past or present, exist 
or do not exist. With regard to future warranty, the assured makes a true 
promise which pertains to the future. This type of warranty ‘concerns the 
assured’s future conduct and require him to do or not do a particular thing, or 
fulfil some condition at some point after the attachment of the risk’.113 The 
characteristics of present warranty can be found in the relevant part of this 
subsection which provides that ‘… he affirms or negatives the existence of a 
particular state of facts.’114 In addition, present warranties can be further 
divided into warranty of fact and warranty of opinion. The assured’s cover will 
be lost as soon as a warranty of fact is breached. In contrast, a warranty of 
opinion relates to the assured’s honest belief as to a certain statement of fact, 
and the insurer’s liability will not be affected if a warranty of opinion is 
breached, provided that the intention of the assured is honest. The same 
subsection also sets out the specific feature of future warranty by stating that 
‘… a warranty by which the assured undertakes that some particular thing shall 
or shall not be done, or that some condition shall be fulfilled’.115 There is no 
doubt to say that both types of warranty must be exactly complied with by the 
assured. In the event of breach of warranty, the legal effects of the breach are 
slightly different as between these two types of warranty. If a present 
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warranty116 is breached by the assured, the liability of the insurer will come to 
an end with regard to the entire policy, as the cover simply never commences 
and the risk never attaches. But in the event of a breach of a continuing 
warranty, the further liability of the insurer will be discharged as from the date 
the breach takes place.  
However, although it is straightforward to distinguish between a present 
warranty and a representation which does not have to be inserted into the 
insurance policy, the insured may find it difficult, though not impossible, to 
comply with the present warranty. This is because the assured may sometimes 
answer the question in the proposal form in perfectly good faith without 
realising that he has in fact made a false statement. This situation may arise 
where a ‘basis of the contract’ clause is inserted into the policy, so that the 
assured’s answer and declarations in the proposal form will be converted into 
express warranties. In such a case, any false statement given by the assured 
would constitute a breach of warranty, and as a result, the assured may simply 
lose the cover.  
This aspect of law can be supported by the case of Dawsons Ltd v 
Bonnin117  which is a non-marine case. In this case, a furniture removal 
company in Glasgow took out insurance for one of its removal lorries. The 
following clause was inserted in the proposal form which read: ‘which proposal 
shall be the basis of this contract and be held as incorporated herein.’ This 
clause had the effect of converting all statements on the proposal form into 
warranties. One of the questions in the proposal form asked where the lorry 
would normally be parked. The assured answered this question by giving its 
business address in central Glasgow. However, in fact, the lorry was usually 
parked in the outskirts of Glasgow. When the lorry was destroyed by fire, the 
assured sought to recover the loss from the insurer. The assured’s argument 
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that the mistake as to the address did not increase the risk but arguably 
decreased it was rejected by the House of Lords, and the insurer was therefore 
entitled to refuse to pay the claim. In this case, it is fair to say that the breach 
was not sufficiently serious as to justify the termination of all liability of the 
insurer, and it is undisputable that there is no material distinction between 
central Glasgow and the outskirts of Glasgow, because the outskirts of a city 
form part of the city itself.  
In order to limit the draconian effect of warranties, such a problem was 
addressed by the Law Commission with regard to warranties in a non-marine 
field. Accordingly, the proposal introduced by the Law Commission was that a 
statement made by the assured in respect of a past or existing state of affairs 
should be treated as a representation rather than a warranty. 118  If the 
representation made by the assured is incorrect, the remedy for the insurer 
would depend on whether the statement was made honestly, negligently, 
deliberately or recklessly. But it could be argued that this may not be the best 
way to resolve this problem in the context of marine insurance, because in 
contracts of marine insurance, some statements of past or existing facts given 
by the assured should be regarded as crucial for the risk assessment process, 
whereas others may be less important for the insurer. For this reason, in order 
to address this problem and ease the performance of this obligation for the 
protection of the assureds’ interest, it is proposed by the author that all present 
warranties should be replaced by innominate terms119 as created in ordinary 
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contract law.  
Unlike any other contractual term, an innominate term is known as an 
intermediate term between ‘condition’ and ‘warranty’, and the legal 
consequence of a breach of such a term would depend on the nature of the 
breach in question. The remedy for a breach of an innominate term will depend 
on the question as to whether the innocent party has substantially been 
deprived of the whole benefit of the contract. If he has been so deprived, he 
will be entitled to treat the contract as repudiated. If not, he will only be entitled 
to claim damages. Therefore, marine insurance law, as part of general contract 
law, should follow the general principles established under contract law, and 
such a proposal is indeed necessary to bring conformity into this area of law. 
The ultimate effect of this replacement would be that if such a contractual term 
is breached by the assured, the issue as to whether this particular breach is 
sufficiently serious to provide the insurer with a suitable remedy should be 
considered by the courts. If the breach is sufficiently serious, the insurer will be 
entitled to terminate the insurance contract as a whole, and premiums paid to 
the insurer should be returned to the assured. Conversely, if the breach is not 
sufficiently serious or does not relate to the risk, the only available remedy for 
the insurer will be damages for breach of contract. It follows from this 
perspective that introducing the test of seriousness into this area of law would 
prevent this problem and provide the courts with a degree of remedial flexibility. 
Consequently, in this part of the thesis, it is suggested that this part of section 
33(1) of the Act should be modified to read as follows:120  
A warranty, in the following sections relating to warranties, means a 
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promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the assured 
undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or 
that some condition shall be fulfilled. But the statement of past or 
existing facts given by the assured is an innominate term. Breach of 
such a term may, depending on the seriousness of the breach, lead 
to either the termination of the insurance contract or the insurer’s 
right to claim damages. 
It is clear that present warranties and continuing warranties are generally 
connected with the risk. However, there are certain types of warranty which do 
not relate to the risk. A typical example is the warranty requiring the assured to 
pay the premium instalments within the specific time limit. That is to say, the 
breach of this warranty has the same legal effect with the breach of present 
and continuing warranties. But it has been argued that the premium warranty 
can be easily removed from the current warranty regime, because the payment 
of the premium is the consideration given by the assured in return for the 
insurer’s promise to undertake the obligation to pay for the loss of the subject 
matter insured on the occurrence of an insured event.121 Nevertheless, in the 
opinion of the author, it is unreasonable to say that this is a convincing 
argument. This is because it would be difficult for the assured to understand 
the importance to pay the premium within the specific time limit if the 
agreement on the payment of the premium is not converted into an express 
warranty. In consequence, it is suggested by the author that the payment of 
premium warranty should be retained in the current warranty regime, on the 
basis that paying the agreed premium is an important obligation on the part of 
the assured.       
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2.4 A critical analysis as to the proposal that warranty should be 
replaced by alteration of risk 
Apart from the concept of warranty, the concept of alteration of risk is 
another mechanism for the management of risk during the insurance period, 
and the statutory rules as to the current warranty regime will become more 
obvious through a detailed discussion of the concept of alteration of risk. This 
concept, which can be regarded as equivalent to the concept of insurance 
warranties, has been commonly applied in civil law countries concerning 
marine and non-marine insurance policy, whereas the doctrine of warranty 
developed in civil law countries is commonly used to protect the insurer in case 
of the change of risk. However, in general, the concept of alteration of risk has 
no effect on the insurer’s obligation in English insurance law. But there are two 
exceptions to this rule, these are where there have been material changes in 
the circumstances which have increased the risk and where the claim falls 
outside the scope of the insurance agreed by the insurer.  
Under English law, the terms of the policy may permit the insurer to alter 
the terms of the insurance contract and to charge a higher premium in the 
event of an increase of risk. Alternatively, the insurer will also be entitled to 
terminate the policy if the risk is increased on a material basis 
. The common law rule in respect of the increase of risk has been 
developed under English law. The concept of alteration of risk has been 
considered in the recent case of Qayyum Ansari v New India Assurance Ltd122 
where a policy term stated: ‘this insurance shall cease to be in force if there is 
any material alteration to the premises or business or any material change in 
the facts stated in the proposal form or other facts supplied to the insurer 
unless the insurer agrees in writing to continue the insurance’. The proposal 
form also stated that the premises insured were to be protected by an 
automatic sprinkler system. But during the currency of the policy, the sprinkler 
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system was not operative. The Court of Appeal held that the disabling of the 
sprinkler system amounted to a material increase of risk on the ground that the 
purpose of the sprinkler system was to protect the building. In particular, the 
Court of Appeal defined the term ‘material increase of risk’ to mean changes of 
the kind that take the risk outside that which was in the reasonable 
contemplation of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract. But 
according to the Court of Appeal, the term ‘material’, when used in alteration of 
risk clauses, does not have the same meaning as it does in respect of the facts 
and circumstances that must be disclosed to the insurer as required by section 
18 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. The Court of Appeal also ruled that the 
issue as to a material alteration should be whether or not the changed 
circumstances had a significant bearing on the risk. Ultimately, it was held that 
the insurer could only be discharged from liability if the risk had in fact altered 
in nature.  
Indeed, it can be seen from the decision of this case that a clear distinction 
should be drawn between cases where the risk changes in degree and cases 
where the risk changes in nature. In the former case, the policy is not affected 
by the increase. On the other hand, in the latter case, the new risk should be 
regarded as a fundamental change which is outside the cover afforded by the 
policy.123  
In addition to the common law approach in relation to the concept of 
alteration of risk, it is undisputable that section 42 to 49 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 has also been introduced on the basis of the concept of 
alteration of risk, because these provisions deal explicitly with the issues as to 
the change of voyage and deviation. But in order to constitute a change of 
voyage, the voyage must have changed voluntarily, and the change must also 
be made after the commencement of the voyage.124 The application of the 
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alteration of risk clause also extends to the Institute Cargo Clauses which 
cover the insured goods only if they remain in ‘the ordinary course of transit’.125 
For instance, matters relating to the termination of the contract of carriage126 
or a change of voyage127 will need to be notified promptly to the insurer. The 
function of the alteration of risk clause is to ensure that the risk that the insurer 
agrees to cover does not change significantly from the terms of the policy. 
Otherwise, the assured will be required to alert the insurer by giving notice to 
the insurer for such a change, and different remedies will be available to the 
insurer depending on the nature of the increase, provided that a causal 
connection can be established between the loss and the increase of risk. So in 
general, three remedies are available to the insurer for an increase of risk, 
namely, charging a higher premium on a reasonable basis, changing the terms 
of the policy and terminating the insurance contract, provided that the increase 
of risk is material.  
However, the rules derived from the concept of alteration of risk, such as 
the degree of the increase, the insured’s duty of notification, the insurer’s 
remedy for the increase of risk and the legal consequence for the insured’s 
failure of notification, vary from one jurisdiction to another. By way of 
illustration, under the German Insurance Contracts Act 2008 (GICA), the 
policyholder must disclose the aggravation of the risk to the insurer without 
undue delay, and the insurer may terminate the contract subject to a notice 
period of one month.128 A slightly different statutory rule has been provided in 
the Norwegian insurance law which requires the insurer to terminate the 
insurance contract by giving 14 day notice if an alteration of the risk occurs.129 
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To this end, it is submitted that the notification of alteration of risk can be 
described as one of the assured’s post-contractual duties of utmost good 
faith.130  
In reality, there are certain situations in which the assured is obliged to 
notify the insurer as to an increase of risk. Thus, an increase of risk must be 
material, and an immaterial increase of risk does not have to be notified to the 
insurer, and it is the insurer who must bear the burden of proof to show that the 
increase of risk is material. The obligation to notify for a material increase of 
risk is triggered where the increase of risk is caused by the assured himself.131 
The assured must be aware of the increase of risk before he can perform his 
duty to notify the insurer, and the knowledge of the assured refers to actual 
knowledge.132 Another situation in which the assured must notify the insurer 
as to an increase of risk arises where the clause requiring the assured to give 
notice in the event of a material increase of risk is incorporated into the policy 
in written forms. This means that oral agreement does not place the assured 
under the duty to give notice for an increase of risk.  
In addition, an increase of risk must be permanent before the assured is 
required to give notification to the insurer. This rule suggests that an 
occasional or one-off increase of risk does not change in nature, so that it does 
not provide the insurer any statutory remedy for such an increase. This aspect 
of law was highlighted in the old case of Shaw v Robberds133 where the 
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policyholder insured his kiln which was agreed to be used only for drying corn. 
Such an agreement was inserted into the policy as an alteration of risk clause 
which required the policyholder to notify the insurer as to any increase of risk. 
On one occasion, the policyholder allowed his friend to dry bark in the kiln. 
Such a practice caused fire. The insurer refused to indemnify the loss on the 
basis that there was a material increase of risk on the part of the policyholder. 
However, the court held that the insurer was liable. The rationale for such a 
decision was that even though drying bark was a more hazardous activity than 
drying corn, the use of the kiln to dry bark was a one-off event and did not 
change the fact that the normal use of the kiln was for drying corn.    
Due to the fact that insurance warranty and alteration of risk have a similar 
function for the purpose of risk management, it has been suggested by 
Professor Clarke that the legal consequence of a breach of insurance warranty 
should be replaced by the legal consequence of a material alteration of risk in 
order to mitigate the harshness of the existing law of warranty, because under 
the current warranty regime, the assured will lose cover as soon as a warranty 
is breached, and the assured may suddenly be left with no cover at all without 
being aware of it. According to Professor Clarke’s view, even in the case of a 
substantial breach of warranty, the assured should be given a reasonable time 
to negotiate with the insurer or seek an alternative cover.134 For the benefit of 
the trade, it is justifiable to say that this is a cogent argument, because it 
effectively ensures that the subject matter insured is well protected against the 
immediate loss of cover. On the other hand, in such a situation, the loss 
occurred between the notification and the insurer’s decision on either charging 
a higher premium or terminating the contract should be borne by the insurer, 
because before the insurer makes a decision after being notified of an 
increase of risk, the contract should be treated as being unaffected by such an 
increase. This means that the insurer is required to bear the risk of the loss 
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caused by the increase of risk for which the assured should be personally 
liable. This is clearly unfair for the insurer who has done nothing wrong.  
Some academics went even further to suggest that the concept of 
warranty should be replaced by the concept of alteration of risk. By way of 
illustration, as suggested by Dr Jing, the doctrine of warranty should be 
replaced by the doctrine of alteration of risk on the basis that the doctrine of 
alteration of risk offers fairer solutions for breach than the doctrine of warranty. 
In addition, according to Dr Jing’s view, the doctrine of alteration of risk is not a 
new concept in English law on the basis that a number of cases concerning the 
issue of alteration of risk have been decided by English courts, so that 
adopting the concept of alteration of risk would not cause much uncertainty.135  
A similar point of view was also expressed by Dr Derrington who criticised 
the current law of warranty as being uncertain and unfair and suggested that 
the concept of warranty should be replaced by the obligation on the assured to 
notify the insurer as to any change in the circumstances which forms the basis 
of the contract of insurance and which alters the risk. In more specific terms, 
under this proposal, in the event that an alteration of risk occurs, the insurer 
would be entitled to escape liability in circumstances where the loss is 
attributable to the alteration of risk but only where the insurer would not have 
entered into the contract on any terms had the assured known of the alteration 
of risk at the time of the conclusion of the contract and the assured either 
intentionally caused or agreed to the alteration of risk, or failed to promptly 
notify the insurer of the alteration.136  
Nevertheless, in the view of the author, these two reform proposals may 
not be appropriate to solve the problems in relation to the current warranty 
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regime. This is because in the absence of clear contractual wording, while the 
insurer may argue that a particular increase of risk is material, the assured 
may deny such a view, and as such, it is difficult for the courts to determine the 
issue as to what constitutes material increase of risk, so that the problem of 
uncertainty may squeeze into the law. Furthermore, under the doctrine of 
alteration of risk, the assured is required to give notice to the insurer for any 
material increase of risk even if the increase has caused no loss or damage to 
the subject matter insured. There is no doubt to say that this would impose an 
onerous continuing duty on the assured, because it would be unreasonable to 
impose an obligation on the assured to notify every material increase of risk, 
and sometimes, the assured may be unable to recognise whether or not a 
particular increase of risk is material.  
Last but not least, it is clear that according to the doctrine of alteration of 
risk, the assured is under an obligation to give notice to the insurer in the event 
that a material increase of risk occurs during the currency of the policy. But the 
problem is: in what way can the assured fulfil his duty of notification in the 
event of an increase of risk, by telephone, in person or in writing? Such a 
problem was not even dealt with by those civil law countries which applied the 
concept of alteration of risk into their judicial practice. Thus, the law is unclear 
on this issue and may cause inconsistency. In consequence, it is suggested by 
the author that it would be inappropriate to adopt Dr Derrington or Dr Jing’s 
proposal. Instead, it would be more appropriate to retain the current law as to 
warranty. However, this does not mean that the concept of alteration of risk 
should have no role to play in English insurance law at all. In the view of the 
author, the concept of alteration of risk should apply to consumer and life 
insurance as opposed to business insurance.                          
 
2.5 The distinction between warranty and suspensive condition 
Furthermore, it is worthwhile to make a distinction between a warranty and 
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a clause which merely and temporarily suspend the operational effect of one 
party’s liability or obligation. These clauses have been known as suspensive 
conditions. A typical example of such a clause would be a geographical one: 
‘No cover in the Bermuda area’. This type of clauses applies to the situation 
where, following a breach of a suspensive condition, the liability of the insurer 
is suspended during the currency of the breach, but the policy will not become 
voidable. If the breach is subsequently remedied by the assured, any 
subsequent loss will be indemnified by the insurer. Thus, in the case of Farr v 
Motor Traders Mutual Insurance Society,137 the assured took out insurance for 
two taxi-cabs. It was agreed that they were only driven for one shift every 24 
hours. But within a short period of time, one of the cabs was driven for two 
shifts while the other one was repaired. After completing the repair, the cab 
was used in the normal way as agreed by the parties. A few months later, it 
was damaged in an accident. The crucial issue in this case was whether or not 
this clause should be regarded as a warranty. The Court of Appeal held that 
the clause was descriptive of the risk, so that if the cab was driven for more 
than one shift per day, the risk would no longer be covered, but as soon as the 
cab was used for one-shift working, the liability of the insurer would be 
restored.  
However, it can be seen from this case that the distinction made by the 
court as between a warranty and a suspensive condition is not clear and may 
cause ambiguity as well as uncertainty. In order to prevent the ambiguity and 
uncertainty, it is proposed by the author that if a suspensive condition is to be 
inserted into the policy, the word ‘suspense’ or ‘suspensive’ and the legal effect 
of the breach of such a term should also be inserted into the relevant sections 
of the proposal form to assist the assured to make a distinction between a 
suspensive condition and a warranty. 
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2.6 Different features of express warranty                     
The various legal features of marine insurance warranty, whether present 
or future, are set out in section 33 and 34 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
These features are that a promissory warranty must be exactly complied with; 
a warranty does not have to be material to the risk; there is no defence for a 
breach of a warranty; a breach of a warranty is irremediable; a causal 
connection between the breach and the loss does not have to be shown; a 
breach of warranty automatically discharges the insurer from liability and a 
breach of warranty may be waived by the insurer. These legal features will be 
examined in turn with reference to case-law examples.   
2.6(1) A promissory warranty must be exactly complied with 
In the law of marine insurance relating to warranties, the principle that a 
promissory warranty must be exactly complied with is probably the most 
significant feature. Its significance lies upon the wording in section 33(3) of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 which provides that a warranty is a condition which 
must be exactly complied with. Indeed, the exact compliance rule, as one of 
the most demanding characteristics of marine insurance warranty, has long 
been established by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century. By way of illustration, in 
the case of De Hahn v Hartley,138 Lord Mansfield observed the legal position 
in respect of the compliance of warranty by stating that ‘There is a material 
distinction between a warranty and a representation. A representation may be 
equitably and substantially answered: but a warranty must be strictly complied 
with.’139 However, it should be borne in mind that in some cases, the court 
would adopt a reasonable interpretation in respect of a particular warranty, 
rather than keep its literal meaning. So in the case of Provincial Insurance Co 
Ltd v Morgan & Foxton,140 the assured had warranted that his vehicle would 
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only be used for a specified purpose. But it was held that an occasional use for 
the purpose other than the one specified in the policy did not constitute a 
breach.  
The rule of exact compliance is strict in the sense that when considering 
any particular breach, even minor defect141 cannot be accepted as a defence. 
This point is best illustrated in the case of Overseas Commodities Ltd v Style142 
where a cargo of canned pork was insured from France to London under an ‘all 
risk’ policy which contained a warranty: ‘warranted all tins marked by 
manufacturers with a code for verification of date of manufacture’. But a 
number of the tins of pork butts were not marked with the code. When the tins 
were delivered to London, some of them were found to be broken and had no 
commercial value for sale. The assured claimed under the policy, but the court 
rejected the claim and accepted the insurer’s argument that there was a 
breach of warranty. The assured’s argument that the warranty should be 
applied separately and thereby rendering the insurer liable for those tins which 
were properly marked was also rejected by the court. In particular, Mr Justice 
McNair ruled in this case that there was only one policy for the whole 
consignment of the cargo and that it was not possible for the warranty to be 
read distributively, as this would require the insurer to rewrite the warranty, in a 
form such as ‘underwriters are exempt from liability in respect of any tins not 
marked’. The reason for this decision means that ‘as exact compliance is 
required, any difference, however negligible or insignificant, is unlikely to be 
considered as inconsequential.’143 
However, it can be argued that the exact compliance rule is too rigid, as 
well as unfair, from the point of view of the assured. This is because any 
breach of warranty, no matter how minor it is, will be fatal and thus discharges 
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the insurer from further liability. The problem of unfairness can be found in the 
case of Yorkshire Insurance Co v Cambell.144 In this case, a horse was 
insured against marine perils and risks of mortality during a sea voyage. The 
horse was described in the proposal form as ‘Bay gelding by Soult out of St 
Paul (Mare) 5 years’. But in fact, the pedigree of the horse insured was not ‘by 
Soult out of St Paul mare’. According to its construction, the Privy Council held 
that the description of the horse was a true warranty. As the horse died during 
the voyage, the assured was held not to be entitled to claim the loss under the 
policy as a result of the breach of warranty.  
In this case, it is clear that the incorrect description of the horse as a 
breach of warranty was so minor and had no connection with the risk, so that it 
should be regarded as insignificant by applying the de minimis rule and thus 
entitles the assured to recover for the loss. Moreover, another disadvantage 
derived from the exact compliance rule is that as the insurer tends to rely 
unfairly on a breach of warranty with the assistance of the literal wording of 
section 33(3) of the Act, it is likely that the brokers may be unwilling to facilitate 
insurance contracts with the insurers who act unfairly in relation to minor 
breaches of warranty. Thus, as far as future warranty is concerned, the law in 
this area should be reformed so as to introduce a substantial observance rule 
to future warranties which have no connection with the risk, apart from the 
warranty to pay the premiums within the specified time limit which must still be 
exactly complied with.  
Apart from the existing problem as to the exact compliance rule, it is rather 
difficult to make a clear distinction between the term ‘condition’ in this 
subsection and the term ‘condition’ used in ordinary contract law. Although a 
series of judgments given by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century held that 
warranties in marine insurance law were equivalent to conditions and thereby 
requiring strict compliance,145 it is, in principle, incorrect to equate the legal 
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effect of a breach of a marine warranty with that of a breach of a condition in 
ordinary contract law.146 For this reason, in order to avoid confusion, it is 
suggested by the author that the term ‘condition’, as appears in this subsection, 
should be replaced by the term ‘condition precedent’ as used by Lord Goff.147 
In more specific terms, in this thesis, it is suggested that the word ‘precedent’ 
and another additional sentence should be inserted into section 33(3) of the 
Act, so that this subsection should be altered to read as follows: 
A warranty, as above defined, is a condition precedent which must 
be exactly complied with, whether it be material to the risk or not. 
But a warranty relating to the fulfilment of future obligation can be 
substantially observed by the assured if such a warranty has no 
connection with the risk, except the warranty to pay premiums… 
2.6(2) A warranty does not have to be material to the risk148 
As far as marine insurance warranty is concerned, the well-established 
legal feature that there is no materiality between the warranty and the risk can 
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be found in section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.149 This means 
that a warranty must be literally complied with, even if it may not affect the risk 
in any manner. In other words, a warranty can be created for any purpose 
whatsoever. By way of illustration, as Lord Parmoor expressly stated in one 
case, ‘If the promise amounts to a warranty it is immaterial for what purpose 
the warranty is introduced.’150 Moreover, in the case of Farr v Motor Traders 
Mutual Insurance Society, 151  Lord Justice Bankes went even further to 
emphasize that no matter how absurd a warranty is, it is still binding on the 
assured, and if the warranty is breached, the policy comes to an end.  
Nevertheless, it is justifiable to say that like the exact compliance rule, the 
application of this feature may also provide unfairness to the assured, simply 
because the insurer may be willing to strengthen his legal position by 
converting every statement of fact into warranty, regardless of whether the 
warranty is material to the risk and its purpose. Consequently, it is fair to say 
that on the one hand, the law in relation to this feature should be regarded as 
appropriate in the sense that the principle of freedom of contract is preserved, 
so that the parties are free to incorporate any warranties, regardless of what 
their purposes are, into the insurance policy; on the other hand, the possibility 
for the insurer to insert unreasonable statements as warranties may cause 
unfairness and renders it rather difficult for the assured to comply with the 
warranty. It follows from this perspective that the law in this area should be 
reformed so that the protection of the subject matter insured should be the only 
legal purpose of inserting a warranty into the insurance policy, and any other 
purpose does not have to be complied with by the assured. Consequently, in 
this thesis, it is suggested by the author that this part of section 33(3) of the Act 
should be altered to read as follows: 
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A warranty, as above defined, is a condition precedent which must 
be exactly complied with only if the purpose of this warranty is to 
protect the subject matter insured. But a warranty relating to the 
performance of future obligation can be substantially observed by 
the assured if such a warranty has no connection with the risk … 
2.6(3) No defence for a breach of warranty 
The rule that there is, in general, no defence for a breach of a warranty is 
one of the other features in relation to a marine insurance warranty. This rule 
has firmly been established as a common law principle, even though it has not 
been specifically stated in the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906.152 The application of this rule can be found in the case of Hore v 
Whitmore153 where, following a breach of a sailing warranty, the assured was 
held not to be entitled to rely on the embargo laid down by a British Governor 
which prevented the insured ship from sailing on a particular date as an 
excuse. It should be noted that this rule applies even when the assured has 
exercised due care and due diligence or has shown good faith to comply with 
the warranty. In addition, in the case of a breach of a warranty, the assured 
would not be able to recover the loss from the insurer even if the loss was 
caused by an unforeseen accident or a latent defect unknown to the assured. 
In order to emphasize this rule, Lord Eldon pointed out with reference to the 
implied warranty of seaworthiness that ‘it is not necessary to inquire whether 
the owners acted honestly and fairly in the transaction, for it is clear that, 
however just and honest the intentions and conduct of the owner may be, if he 
is mistaken in fact, and the vessel is in fact not seaworthy, the underwriter is 
not liable.’154 
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2.6(4) Statutory excuses for breach of warranty 
Nevertheless, the rule that there is no defecne for a breach of warranty is 
subject to two statutory excuses, namely a change of circumstances and when 
compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law. 
These two excuses are set out in section 34(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 which can be used by the assured as a defence for non-compliance with 
a warranty. It should be pointed out that despite these two statutory excuses 
which would provide flexibility to some extent, the application of this rule is far 
too harsh for the assured. It follows from this point that in the event that a 
warranty is breached by the assured, the matter may be out of the control of 
the assured. So in order to mitigate the harshness of this rule, and protect the 
interest of the assured, the issue as to whether or not the assured has 
exercised due diligence155 in complying with the warranty should be taken into 
account for the purpose of releasing the harshness of this obligation. For this 
reason, an additional rule should be inserted into section 34(1) of the Act as a 
defence for the assured. The legal effect of this rule would be that if the 
assured has exercised due diligence but is still unable to avoid the breach of 
warranty, the insurer would be liable to indemnify the assured for any loss 
caused as a result of the breach of warranty. But in such a case, the burden of 
proof should be on the assured to show that he has made best efforts to avoid 
the breach of warranty. Therefore, in more specific terms, in this thesis, it is 
suggested by the author that this part of section 34(1) of the Act should be 
modified to read as follows: 
Non-compliance with a warranty is excused when, by reason of a 
change of circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to 
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the circumstances of the contract, or when compliance with the 
warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law. If the assured 
can show that he has exercised due diligence and due care in 
complying with a warranty, the insurer is liable to indemnify the 
assured for any loss as a result of the breach of this warranty. 
2.6(5) A breach of warranty cannot be remedied 
The rule that a breach of a promissory warranty is irremediable is indeed 
another feature of a marine insurance warranty which has been established 
since the 18th century. This feature is governed by one of the statutory 
provisions contained in the Marine Insurance Act 1906. In more specific terms, 
it declares that: ‘Where a warranty is broken, the assured cannot avail himself 
of the defence that the breach has been remedied, and the warranty complied 
with, before loss.’156 Put another way, ‘once a marine warranty has been 
breached, it is irrelevant whether the warranty is later complied with.’157 This 
aspect of law is demonstrated in the case of Quebec Marine Insurance Co v 
Commercial Bank of Canada158 where the vessel was insured under a voyage 
policy from Montreal to Halifax. After leaving Montreal, the vessel’s boiler 
became unmanageable owing to a defect in the boiler. As soon as the 
necessary repairs were carried out, the vessel resumed her voyage, but was 
lost during the voyage as a result of severe weather. The Privy Council held 
that the assured was in breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness even 
though the defect was remedied before the loss occurred.  
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the law on this subject may cause 
unfairness and harshness from the point of view of the assured, and it may 
also be far too easy for the insurer to escape liability even for a breach of 
warranty that has been cured before loss. In order to solve this problem, it is 
recommended that a less stringent remedy should be provided to the insurer, 
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because in the event of a breach of warranty, it is clear that the assured is at 
fault even though the breach of warranty may be cured by the assured at a 
later stage. Consequently, it is proposed by the author that section 34(2) of the 
Act should be altered to read as follows: 
Where a warranty is breached but subsequently remedied by the 
assured before loss, the insurer is only entitled to charge an 
additional premium at a reasonable rate without affecting any 
further liability to indemnify the loss. 
2.6(6) No causal connection between breach of warranty and loss 
Despite the absence in the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906, in the law of marine insurance warranty, it has been accepted as a 
common law rule that a causal connection between a breach of warranty and 
the loss does not have to be shown.159 As was indicated by Bennett, ‘there is 
no requirement of any causal link between a breach of a promissory warranty 
and the loss in respect of which the assured claims.’160 This issue was brought 
into discussion in the 18th century case of Hibbert v Pigou161 where an insured 
ship had failed to comply with the warranty of sailing with convoy. During the 
voyage, the ship was lost as a result of a storm. It was held that the assured 
was not entitled to recover from the loss on the basis that there was no causal 
connection between the breach of warranty and the loss. A similar judgment 
was reached in the case of Forsikringsaktielselskapet Vesta v Butcher162 
where the assured owner of a fish farm had failed to comply with a warranty 
whereby a 24-hour watch had to be maintained in the fish farm. The fish farm 
was destroyed by a storm. The assured argued that the loss caused by storm 
was not connected with the breach of warranty. As the warranty was breached 
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by the assured before loss, this argument was rejected by the court, even 
though the assured could in no way prevent the loss caused by storm.  
Admittedly, there is no doubt to say that the current law in this area has 
generated a great deal of criticism from scholars and legal professions, in the 
sense that the current law in this area may create unfairness insofar as the 
assured is concerned. Obviously, as the Law Commission pointed out, ‘it 
seems unjust that an insurer should be entitled to reject a claim for any breach 
of even a material warranty, no matter how irrelevant the breach may be to the 
loss.’163  According to the Law Commission, a causal connection test in 
relation to warranties should be introduced into the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
to protect the assured from a breach of warranty which has no connection with 
the loss. Therefore, it is proposed by the Law Commission that the assured 
should be entitled to be indemnified for the loss if he can prove on the balance 
of probability that the event or circumstances constituting the breach of 
warranty did not contribute to the loss. But in such a situation, the assured 
should bear the burden of proof to show that the breach did not contribute in 
any way to the loss in question.164 Additionally, if it can be shown that a 
particular breach contributed to only part of the loss, it is proposed that the 
insurer should not deny liability to pay for the loss that is unrelated to the 
breach.165  
It is generally accepted that the causal connection approach proposed by 
the Law Commission is appropriate to a certain degree, in the sense that it 
may prevent the insurer from taking the opportunity to deny liability on purely 
technical grounds and protect the interest of the assured. On the other hand, it 
can be argued that the weakness of the causal connection approach is that it 
has failed to take into account as to the right and interest of the insurer. This is 
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because if a breach of a warranty has no causal connection with the loss, the 
insurer would be left without a remedy, but in such a case, it is undeniable that 
the assured was clearly at fault for the non-compliance of the warranty. 
Furthermore, allowing the insurer to prove causation for a breach of warranty 
would be time consuming in terms of the trial of each case. For these reasons, 
in order to simplify the matter and balance the conflicting rights and interests 
as between the assured and the insurer, a different proposal, as well as a 
different remedy available to the insurer, should be introduced for the purpose 
of modifying the existing law. As such, it is suggested by the author that an 
additional subsection, that is to say section 33(4), should be inserted into 
section 33 of the Act, so that section 33(4) of the Act should be introduced in 
the following way: 
Where a breach of warranty is followed by a loss, the insurer is 
liable to indemnify the assured for the loss, less any damage 
caused as a result of the breach of warranty, if the loss in respect of 
which the assured seeks to be indemnified was not caused or 
contributed to by the breach. 
2.6(7) A breach of warranty automatically discharges the insurer 
from liability 
Unlike a breach of a warranty in ordinary contract law, a breach of a 
warranty, whether express or implied, in marine insurance law automatically 
discharges the insurer from further liability, although the insurance contract as 
a whole remains unaffected. To this end, it is clear that a breach of warranty 
does not have the effect of bringing the contract to an end, because the 
assured may have a continuing liability to pay the remaining premiums, and 
the insurer is also under an obligation to indemnify the assured for any loss 
occurred before the breach takes place. Put another way, in the event that a 
warranty is breached by the assured, the insurance contract is not void ab 
initio (from the time of conclusion of the contract). Losses which have accrued 
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prior to the breach of warranty must be paid by the insurer under the terms of 
the policy. This rule was spelt out in section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906. However, the automatic discharge rule should be criticised on the basis 
that the in the event of a breach of warranty, the liability of the insurer 
automatically comes to an end, and insurer will still be entitled to claim the 
remaining premium until the expiration of the policy if the premium is agreed to 
be paid by instalments. In the opinion of the author, this is clearly unfair for the 
assured who would easily lose the cover as soon as a warranty is breached. 
For this reason, it is suggested by the author that the automatic discharge rule 
should be replaced by a different statutory remedy.   
But according to the current law, the automatic discharge rule may not be 
the only remedy available for the insurer. Depending upon the terms of the 
policy, a breach of warranty may give rise to damages for breach of contract 
rather than termination of liability, provided that clear wording is used in the 
policy. In such a case, the insurer would only be entitled to claim damages for 
breach of contract. It has also been pointed out by Soyer that ‘due to the fact 
that section 33(3) has no connection with the notion of public policy, there is 
nothing preventing the parties from replacing the automatic discharge remedy 
spelt out by this subsection with a different one.’166 Therefore, it is fair to say 
that the law on this point is satisfactory, as it has preserved the common law 
principle of party autonomy.    
Despite being incorporated into the 1906 Act, the automatic discharge rule 
was not clarified until the House of Lords had ultimately reached its decision in 
the case of Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual Risks Association (Bermuda) 
Ltd (The Good Luck).167 Here, a ship called ‘The Good Luck’ was insured by 
the defendant club and mortgaged to the plaintiff bank. The benefit of the 
insurance was assigned to the plaintiff bank. The club provided the bank with a 
letter of undertaking whereby the club promised to inform the bank promptly if 
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they should ‘cease to insure’ the ship. An express warranty was contained in 
the policy prohibiting the ship from entering into certain declared areas. The 
owners of The Good Luck had regularly sent the ship into prohibited areas 
without informing the club and the bank. Such a practice was subsequently 
discovered by the club, but no reasonable steps had been taken by the club to 
notify the bank or stop the owners of The Good Luck in doing so. During the 
last voyage, the ship entered into the Arabian Gulf and was hit by Iraqi missiles 
with the result that she became a constructive total loss. The bank made 
further loans to the shipowners without being aware of the fact that the loss 
was not covered as a result of the breach of warranty. The insurance contract 
could not be sustained as a result of the breach of warranty. The bank brought 
an action against the club for failing to notify the bank as to the breach of 
warranty and the fact that the club had ceased to insure the ship by relying on 
section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.  
One of the crucial issues in this case arose as to whether the breach of 
warranty automatically discharged the liability of the bank as spelt out in 
section 33(3) of the Act or whether the bank was given the opportunity to 
terminate the contract. In the first instance, the trial judge held that by virtue of 
section 33(3) of the Act, the breach of warranty discharged the liability of the 
insurer, and the club was in breach of the letter of undertaking in failing to 
notify the bank as to the breach of warranty.  
On appeal to the Court of Appeal, it was held that a breach of a warranty 
provided the club, as the insurer, with the right to choose whether or not to 
rescind the contract, rather than automatic termination of liability, on the basis 
that a breach of a marine insurance warranty shares similarity with a breach of 
condition in ordinary contract law.168 Accordingly, as the club had not taken 
any steps to repudiate the contract before further loans were made by the bank, 
they were held not to be in breach of the letter of undertaking they had given to 
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the bank. In addition, the reason why the Court of Appeal did not accept the 
decision of the court of first instance was because the automatic discharge 
remedy for a breach of warranty appeared in section 33(3) of the Act clearly 
contradicted with the insurer’s right to waive the breach as set out in section 
34(3) of the Act.  
Reversing the Court of Appeal’s decision, the House of Lords held that a 
breach of warranty automatically discharges the insurer from liability as from 
the date of the breach, regardless of whether the insurer is aware of the 
breach, but all rights and liabilities of the parties accrued before the breach 
would remain unaffected. The word ‘automatic’ is of particular importance as in 
the event of a breach of warranty, there is no need for the insurer to take any 
positive steps to relieve himself from further liability under the policy, the 
ultimate effect of the breach is automatic. For this reason, the club was held to 
be in breach of the letter of undertaking, as once they chose to rely on the 
breach of warranty as a defence, they were automatically discharged from 
further liability at the time The Good Luck was sent to the prohibited area.  
In reaching this decision, Lord Goff made it clear that the Court of Appeal’s 
decision on this issue was inaccurate169 and stressed that section 33(3) of the 
Act must be interpreted in accordance with its literal wording. In more specific 
terms, as Lord Goff stated, ‘Even if in the result no further obligations rest on 
either parties, it is not correct to speak of the contract being avoided; and it is, 
strictly speaking, more accurate to keep the carefully chosen words in s 33(3) 
of the Act, rather than to speak of the contract being brought to an end, though 
that may be the practical effect.’170 In his judgment, Lord Goff made it clear 
that compliance with a warranty is a condition precedent171 to the liability of 
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the insurer. Thus, as stated in Lord Goff’s leading judgment, ‘In the case of 
conditions precedent, the word “condition” is being used in its classical sense 
in English law, under which the coming into existence of (for example) an 
obligation, or the duty or further duty to perform an obligation, is dependent 
upon the fulfillment of the specified condition.’172 
In addition to the automatic discharge rule as spelt out in section 33(3) of 
the Act, the legal consequence of a breach of warranty is subject to any 
express terms set out in the insurance policy. It follows from this point that if 
agreed by the parties, the automatic discharge remedy can be replaced by a 
different remedy in case of a breach of a warranty. For instance, the parties 
have the right to insert a held covered clause into the insurance policy, with the 
effect that if a warranty is breached by the assured, the policy may still be 
operative, so that the assured’s loss can be covered despite the breach of 
warranty. The best example of such a clause can be found in the Institute Time 
Clause (Hull) which reads as follows: 
Held covered in case of any breach of warranty as to cargo, trade, 
locality, towage, salvage services or date of sailing provided notice 
be given to the Underwriters immediately after receipt of advices 
and any amended term of cover and any additional premium 
required by them be agreed.173 
The operation of the held covered clause was clarified in the case of 
Greenock Steamship Co v Maritime Insurance Co Ltd174 where the plaintiff 
assured had breached the implied warranty of seaworthiness by sending the 
ship to sea with an insufficient amount of coal. However, a clause contained in 
the insurance policy stated as follows: ‘held covered in case of any breach of 
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warranty … at a premium to be hereafter arranged’. The court had made it 
clear that the clause applied to a breach of the implied warranty of 
seaworthiness. In this case, Bingham J also expressed his view in relation to 
the application of the held covered clause with the following wording: 
‘It entitles the shipowner, as soon as he discovers that the warranty 
has been broken, to require the underwriter to hold him covered. 
But what is to happen if the breach is not discovered until a loss has 
occurred? I think in that case the clause still holds good, and the 
only open question would be, what is a reasonable premium for the 
added risk.’175 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the law relating to the held covered 
clause is satisfactory, in the sense that the application of the held covered 
clause offers a flexible approach and can be regarded as a relaxation of the 
strictness of the obligation to comply with the warranty. Additionally, the held 
covered clause also has the practical benefit in the modern commercial world, 
in the sense that it would effectively protect the subject matter insured from 
loss or damage.      
Indeed, the automatic discharge remedy has been criticised as being 
wrong and unjust. For instance, as the Law Commission proposed, a breach of 
warranty should not automatically discharge the insurer from liability, but rather, 
the insurer should be entitled to terminate the insurance contract as a result of 
the breach of warranty.176 In similar vein, it is important to note that the 
Insurance Act 2015, 177  as the new legislation applying to marine and 
non-marine insurance, has also introduced a statutory provision for the 
purpose of abolishing the legal consequence of breach of warranty under 
section 33(3) of the 1906 Act. In particular, as it states, ‘any rule of law that 
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breach of a warranty (express or implied) in a contract of insurance results in 
the discharge of the insurer’s liability under the contract is abolished.’178  
Another provision of the Insurance Act 2015 also introduced the legal 
consequence for breach of warranty as distinct from the one established under 
the 1906 Act. The new statutory rule as to the legal consequence for breach of 
warranty can be found in section 10(2) of the Insurance Act 2015 which has 
amended the previous statutory rule as to breach of warranty, so that under 
section 10(2) of the Insurance Act 2015,179 in the event that a warranty is 
breached, the insurance cover will be suspended for the duration of the breach 
and re-instated once the breach has been cured. It can be said that although 
the Law Commission’s proposal and the new statutory provision of the 
Insurance Act 2015 provide the practical legal consequence and protects the 
right of the insurers, it may be difficult for both the insurer and the assured to 
obtain practical benefit after the termination of the insurance contract, because 
in such a case, the insurer may be unable to claim the remaining premiums if 
the premiums were agreed to be paid by installments, and the assured may 
simply lose the insurance cover as a result of the termination of contract. 
Instead, it would be more appropriate to retain the insurance contract as a 
whole and create an alternative remedy in favour of the insurer. Therefore, it is 
suggested by the author that section 33(3) of the Act should be altered in the 
following way: 
A warranty, as above defined, is a condition precedent which must 
be exactly complied with only if the purpose of this warranty is to 
protect the subject matter insured. But a warranty relating to the 
performance of future obligation can be substantially observed by 
the assured if such a warranty has no connection with the risk. If it 
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be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in 
the policy, the insurer is entitled to amend the terms of the contract 
on a reasonable basis and claim damages and administrative cost 
from the assured for the assessment of the alteration of risk. 
2.6(8) Waiver of breach of marine insurance warranty 
Despite the well-established statutory rule as to a breach of warranty, it is 
also common for the insurer to elect to waive the breach.180 Such a waiver 
may be either an act or a statement made by the insurer. More specifically, in 
order to constitute waiver, ‘it must be a clear and unequivocal representation, 
with full knowledge of facts, that the insurer will not use the automatic 
cessation right and the other party must be aware of this. Thus there needs to 
be some form of mutuality.’181 It follows from this point that the ultimate effect 
of waiver is that as soon as a warranty is breached by the assured, the 
insurers can, by way of waiving the breach, reinstate their contractual 
obligation to pay for the loss.182  
Nevertheless, the statutory rule that a breach of a warranty may be waived 
by the insurer seems to contradict with the automatic discharge remedy as set 
out in section 33(3) of the Act, because it is correct to say that if a breach of a 
warranty automatically discharges the insurer from further liability, there would, 
in reality, be nothing for the insurer to waive. Such a problem of inconsistency 
was resolved in the case of The Good Luck183 where Lord Goff ruled that the 
insurer would be precluded from relying on the breach of warranty to exempt 
him from liability if, through his words or conduct, he had made acceptance to 
the notice of the breach. This judgment appears to indicate that it is possible 
that certain conduct of the insurer can preclude him from relying on the breach 
of warranty. Despite the fact that the word ‘automatic’ was used in Lord Goff’s 
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judgment, this does not mean that the insurer is not required to make an 
election after a breach has occurred. Instead, the insurer must still make a 
choice whether or not to accept and waive the breach.  
In general, there are two types of waiver for a breach of a warranty, namely 
waiver by election and waiver by estoppel. Both types of waiver require the 
insurer to make an unequivocal representation, either by express words or 
conduct that he will not, in the future, insist on his legal right against the 
assured for the breach. The doctrine of waiver by election was clarified in the 
non-marine case of Bolton MBC v Municipal Mutual Insurance Ltd & 
Commercial Union Insurance Company Ltd. 184  The case concerned an 
asbestos claim made by the assured who was in breach of the condition 
precedent obligation to notify the insurer immediately of any accident or claim. 
The insurer therefore rejected the claim for coverage reasons. The key issue in 
this case was whether the insurer had elected to waive the right to rely on any 
other policy defences. The Court of Appeal pointed out that for the doctrine of 
waiver by election to arise, the insurer must have made a choice, with 
knowledge of all relevant facts giving rise to the right he is choosing to 
abandon, between two inconsistent courses of action, such as affirming or 
denying the cover. Once such a choice is made, it will be final and binding on 
the other party. As there was no inconsistency between both policy defences, 
the insurer was held not to be entitled to reject the claim. 
In contrast, the doctrine of waiver by estoppel185 in marine insurance law 
concerns the situation where, following a breach of a warranty, the insurer 
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becomes aware of the assured’s breach and makes an unequivocal 
representation through his words or conduct, and by relying on this 
representation, the assured is of the opinion that the insurer intends to keep 
the insurance contract on foot. In other words, in order for a waiver of this type 
to arise, the insurer must have made a clear and unequivocal representation of 
the kind required for the breach, and some positive act of reliance would also 
be required on the part of the assured. Nevertheless, the crucial issue to be 
determined in this context is not the actual state or extent of the insurer’s 
knowledge, but rather how the conduct of the insurer could have an impact on 
the assured.186     
Having considered the different forms of waiver for breach of warranty in 
insurance law, the next issue may arise as to which form of waiver applies 
directly to a breach of warranty in marine insurance contracts. Recent 
authorities appear to hold that in marine insurance contracts, waiver by 
estoppel is the only appropriate doctrine to be applied under section 34(3) of 
the Act. This is because in the event that a warranty has been breached by the 
assured, the insurer is automatically discharged from liability without the need 
to make any choice. For instance, in the case of HIH Casualty & General 
Insurance Ltd v Axa Corporate Solutions,187 Mr Jules Sher QC confirmed that 
the appropriate doctrine of waiver for the purpose of section 34(3) of the 1906 
Act was waiver by estoppel rather than waiver by election.  
More recently, in the case of Liberty Insurance PTE Ltd v Argo Systems 
FZE,188 the issue of waiver for breach of warranty was again considered by 
the Court of Appeal. In this case, the assured Argo arranged an insurance 
cover with the insurer Liberty Insurance PTE Ltd (Liberty) under a voyage 
policy for its floating casino to be towed from the US Gulf to India. The policy, 
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which was governed by English law, contained a warranty stating ‘warranted 
no release, waivers or “hold harmless” given to tug or towers’. The ship 
subsequently sank in the Caribbean Sea and became an actual total loss. 
Liberty refused to indemnify the assured for the loss as a result of the breach 
of warranty. Argo issued fresh proceedings against the insurer in England after 
the litigation had commenced in the US court. In the course of the English 
proceedings, one of the issues raised before the court was whether or not 
Liberty was estopped from relying on the breach of warranty as a result of the 
failure to plead the breach for seven years between the US proceedings and 
the English proceedings. In the court of first instance, it was held that there had 
been a breach of the ‘hold harmless’ warranty under the insurance policy, but 
Liberty had waived by estoppel the right to rely on the breach through its 
conduct.  
On appeal, the issue as to whether Liberty had made an unequivocal 
representation to the assured that they would not rely on the assured’s breach 
of the ‘hold harmless’ warranty to exempt from liability was again dealt with by 
the Court of Appeal. Ultimately, allowing Liberty’s appeal, the Court of Appeal 
held that despite the fact that the insurer had taken no positive action against 
the breach of warranty for seven years before the commencement of the 
English proceedings, this did not mean that the insurer had made an 
unequivocal representation. Put another way, it is submitted that in the 
absence of special circumstances, mere silence or inaction on the part of the 
insurer does not constitute unequivocal representation, so that in order to 
waive the breach of warranty, some positive actions must be taken by the 
insurer. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal stressed that as the 
liability of the insurer would terminate automatically following a breach of a 
warranty, there was no room for the application of waiver by election or 
affirmation, and since there was no election for the insurer to make, the 
principle of waiver stipulated in section 34(3) of the Act referred to waiver by 
estoppel only.  
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It follows from this judgment that in order for the assured to establish 
waiver, two conditions must be satisfied: first, there must be an unequivocal 
representation made by the insurer,189 either by words or conduct, that the 
insurer will not in the future insist on his legal right against the assured for the 
breach, and secondly, the assured has relied upon that representation in such 
a way so as to render it inequitable for the insurer to go back on his 
representation. 
Despite the fact that the law of waiver for breach of warranty has been 
clarified by recent case-law, the remaining problem is that it is unclear, under 
section 34(3) of the Act, as to how the breach of warranty can be waived by the 
insurer. That is to say, the way by which the insurer can choose to waive the 
breach of warranty was not stipulated in this subsection. The absence of such 
a statutory clarification in respect of waiver may cause ambiguity as well as 
uncertainty. In order to resolve this problem, the only form of waiver which can 
be used by the insurer should be inserted into this subsection. For this reason, 
it is suggested by the author a minimal reform of the law could clarify this issue, 
so that section 34(3) of the Act should be modified in the following way: 
A breach of warranty may only be waived by the insurer through an 
unequivocal representation consisting of words or conduct. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Overall, this chapter has critically examined the nature of marine insurance 
warranty. The term ‘promissory warranty’, as defined by section 33(1) of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, falls into two categories, namely present warranty 
and future warranty. Research was conducted in respect of present warranty 
where it was found that the application of present warranty may render it rather 
difficult for the assured to observe. It is therefore proposed by the author that 
all present warranties should be replaced by innominate terms as regulated by 
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ordinary contract law, so that in case of breach, the degree as to the 
seriousness of the breach would be taken into account to provide an 
appropriate remedy to the insurer. 
The research then proceeded to the legal nature of warranties. The 
statutory rule that a promissory warranty must be exactly complied with 
appears in section 33(3) of the Act. This feature can thus be distinguished from 
a representation which can be substantially observed. However, it is justifiable 
to say that this rule is rigid and unfair. It is therefore suggested by the author 
that if a warranty has no connection with the risk, substantial observance will 
be sufficient to make the insurer liable for any potential loss. 
The legal feature of warranty that there is no materiality between the 
warranty and the risk is also provided in section 33(3) of the Act. This statutory 
rule has created another unfair obstacle for the assured to comply with the 
warranty. It is proposed by the author that such a problem can be resolved by 
taking into account the purpose of the warranty, so that the assured only needs 
to comply with the warranty if the purpose of the warranty is to protect the 
subject matter insured. 
Despite the absence of a statutory rule, it has long been established that 
there is no defence for a breach of a warranty. But there are two statutory 
excuses for this rule as stated in section 34(1) of the Act, namely a change of 
circumstances and when compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by 
any subsequent law. It has been argued by the author that the harshness of 
the statutory rule that there is no defence for a breach of a warranty can be 
mitigated by adopting the notion of due diligence. The legal effect of such a 
modification is that if the assured can show that he has exercised due 
diligence in complying with a warranty, the insurer will not be entitled to avoid 
liability after the warranty has been breached. 
One of the other well-established principles in relation to the nature of 
warranty is that a breach of warranty cannot be remedied by the assured. This 
principle is governed by section 34(2) of the Act which does not provide the 
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assured with the right to argue that a warranty has been complied with before 
loss. But in order to balance the rights and interests between the assured and 
the insurer, an alternative remedy is introduced by the author whereby the 
insurer will only be entitled to charge an additional premium if a breach of a 
warranty has been remedied by the assured before loss. 
In the law of marine insurance, it has been established as a common law 
principle that there is no causal connection between a breach of warranty and 
the loss. However, the present law in this area has been criticised by 
academics and the Law Commission on the basis that it is unfair for the insurer 
to reject claims where the breach of warranty has no connection with the loss. 
Therefore, a causal connection test was introduced by the Law Commission. 
But in order to protect the right and interest of the insurer, it is proposed by the 
author that a different solution should be adopted to modify the present law, 
and an additional subsection, that is section 33(4) should appear after section 
33(3) of the Act. The ultimate effect of this law reform proposal would be that if 
the loss was not caused or contributed to by the breach, the insurer will not be 
entitled to reject the claim, but he will be entitled to damages. 
The research then proceeded to the legal consequence of a breach of 
warranty. As set out in section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the 
insurer’s liability will be automatically discharged if a warranty is breached by 
the assured, but this does not affect the insurer’s liability incurred before the 
breach. Nevertheless, the law on this subject was not clarified until the House 
of Lords has reached its decision in the case of The Good Luck.190 The 
automatic discharge remedy has also been criticised as wrong and unjust. 
Thus, the alternative remedy proposed by the author is that the insurer is 
entitled to amend the terms of the contract and claim damages and 
administrative costs from the assured following a breach of warranty. 
In addition, according to section 34(3) of the Act, the insurer can waive the 
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breach of warranty. In general, although there are two types of waiver, namely 
waiver by election and waiver by estoppel, waiver by estoppel is the only type 
of waiver which applies directly to marine insurance contracts. In order to 
constitute waiver, the insurer must have made an unequivocal representation, 
and the assured must have relied upon that representation. However, it can be 
argued that the law in respect of waiver of warranty may cause ambiguity. 
Such a problem can be resolved by modifying section 34(3) of the Act, and it is 
suggested by the author that the wording ‘unequivocal representation’ should 
appear in this subsection. 
So far, a historical development of English marine insurance law has been 
examined in Chapter 1. The issue as to how the law of marine insurance and 
marine insurance warranty developed into the current state has been analysed. 
The research completed for Chapter 2 is mainly based upon the nature of 
English marine insurance warranty as appears in section 33 and 34 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 and its law reform proposal where necessary. The 
law relating to the nature of warranty has been examined with the example of 
old and recent cases. For the sake of comparison, the research will then 
proceed to the examination as to the historical development of Chinese marine 
insurance law as well as the current law of marine insurance warranty in 
general. In particular, the research will mainly be based upon the Chinese 
Maritime Code 1993 and case examples. The issue as to whether the law in 
respect of the current warranty regime in China is satisfactory will be 
considered accordingly, and some law reform proposals will also be introduced 
where necessary.       
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Chapter 3 
A historical review of Chinese marine insurance law 
3.1 Introduction 
Having considered the historical development of English marine insurance 
law and the nature of marine insurance warranty as appears in the relevant 
provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, the author will then provide a 
historical review as to the law of Chinese marine insurance in this Chapter. 
Due to the enormous growth of economy and export trade transactions in 
China over the past 30 years or so, the marine insurance market in China has 
generated a great impact both on a national and international level. The 
insurance industry in China has developed into its mature state as a result of 
the economic system reform announced by Deng Xiaoping who was the 
reformist leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It should be noted 
that China has a traditional civil law system, and statute law is the only source 
of law in China. Currently, the law of marine insurance in China is mainly 
governed by the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 which came into force from 1st 
July 1993. Chinese marine insurance law is also regulated by other legislations, 
such as the Insurance Law of PRC 1995 and the Contract Law of PRC 1999. 
However, the Chinese law of marine insurance was deeply influenced by the 
English Marine Insurance Act 1906. 191  By way of illustration, the legal 
principles of warranty contained in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 were 
adopted into Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code 1993.192     
The aim of this Chapter is to explore a historical overview as to the 
developments of the Chinese insurance industry. At the outset, this Chapter 
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will provide a detailed overview as to the practice of trade and law in early 
Chinese history. This Chapter will then examine the issue as to how the 
business and practice of marine insurance in China emerged from the early 
19th century, although the first insurance company in China was set up by 
British merchants in the city of Guangzhou.193 This Chapter will continue to 
examine the issue as to how the law of marine insurance has gradually 
developed after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established. This 
Chapter will also evaluate the significant development of the marine insurance 
industry after China was opened up to the rest of the world with the economic 
system reform taking place in the late 1970s. In addition, this Chapter will 
consider the issue as to how the law of marine insurance in China has 
developed into its current state to meet international standards. The court 
system in China will also be briefly described in this Chapter to provide a better 
understanding as to the jurisdiction of marine insurance disputes. Last but not 
least, some general conclusions will be drawn at the end of this Chapter. 
 
3.2: The general law of trade and the practice of maritime trading 
activity in early Chinese history and the impact on modern trade 
According to the archaeological data, the roots of Chinese maritime trading 
activity can be traced back thousands of years to the Neolithic age (8000 
BC).194 In ancient times, China was a feudal state, and as a result, the activity 
of maritime trading was controlled and limited by the government to a great 
extent. Therefore, during the ancient times, China’s economy had a relatively 
low degree of commercialisation. As a result, commercial law in ancient China 
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did not receive much legislative or judicial attention, nor was there any rule or 
custom equivalent to the lex mercatoria developed in medieval Europe. This 
was mainly due to the presence of Confucianism in China which regarded 
merchants as selfish and placed them in one of the lowest classes of the social 
hierarchy.195 However, although there was legislation in the Qin Dynasty 
(221-205 BC) relating to the control and taxation of commercial transactions, 
the government did not set out rules for the determination of liability of 
merchants in respect of commercial transactions.196 In those early days, it was 
common for the merchants to trade through land rather than by sea, even 
though maritime trade, as a different trading activity, appeared in ancient 
China as early as 106 BC. Evidently, in the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), a 
special route called the Silk Road was established as a passage for the 
merchants to trade with each other. In particular, the Silk Road was a route of 
trade in the northwest part of China where it was used by the Chinese 
merchants to trade and transport goods from China to Central Asia, the Middle 
East and Europe, including Ancient Rome.197 Probably, the earliest Chinese 
law dealing with the issue of foreign trade in ancient China was the Tang Code 
which was made in the Tang Dynasty between approximately 581 and 960 
AD.198 More specifically, one of the general principles established in the Tang 
Code was that disputes between foreign merchants from the same country 
should be determined by referring to their own customs and laws, and disputes 
between foreign merchants of different nationalities should be resolved under 
the provisions of the code.199  
Due to the imperial hostility to any rival authority in ancient China and the 
fact that the Chinese governments continued to adopt strict regulations for the 
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purpose of restricting foreign trade, especially during the Ming Dynasty200 and 
the Qing Dynasty, there was no systematic foundation of commercial law or 
any rule equivalent to the law merchant in England to resolve commercial 
disputes. In other words, the medieval lex mercatoria and the lex maritima 
created by merchants and traders throughout Europe were not the most 
influential set of rules to be applied in ancient Chinese commercial law. 
Nevertheless, contemporary Chinese commercial law was, to a great extent, 
influenced by German and Japanese law due to the fact that the Chinese 
government adopted a number of commercial codes which were based on the 
German and Japanese model of law soon after the Opium Wars 
(1840-1842).201 Subsequently, in order to regulate mercantile transactions in a 
more efficient way, the General Rules of Merchants (Shang Ren Tong Li) were 
introduced in the Qing Dynasty in 1903. There were, in fact, 9 provisions in 
these Rules which only made direct reference to the general rules applicable 
to the merchants’ business conduct.202  
Generally speaking, although the history of Chinese commercial law did 
not generate a significant impact on the development of the existing system of 
international commercial law, the modern lex mercatoria, which was created 
by a wide variety of entities such as the UNCITRAL and the ICC, started to 
play an important role in the system of the contemporary Chinese commercial 
law from the early 1980s. The reason for this being that as soon as the 
economic system reform took place in China in the late 1970s, Chinese 
commercial law started to link up with the recent development of international 
practices. As a result, a number of international conventions, such as the 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
which came into effect on 1st January 1988, were signed by the Chinese 
government. This means that the Convention should enjoy priority over 
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Chinese domestic law. In similar vein, Chinese judicial practice indicates that 
lex mercatoria can be applied in chosen by the parties. Therefore, it follows 
from this perspective that the modern lex mercatoria is now to a large extent 
adopted into modern Chinese commercial law and widely used by Chinese 
businessmen to resolve international commercial disputes.203     
 
3.3: Historical background of the Chinese insurance industry before 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
The history as to the practice of insurance in China can be traced back to 
the ancient times. Traditionally, as early as the 3rd millennia BC, ancient 
people in China has adopted various means by which food and goods could be 
transported between inland China and its coastal cities on the Yangtze River 
which was regarded as the most important river in the history, culture and 
economy of China. However, it was soon acknowledged that the boats and 
goods could be exposed to risks during the river transit as a result of such a 
trading practice, such as fire, theft, capsizing and the weather condition and so 
on. In order to prevent the loss or damage to the boats and the goods, a 
number of collective agreements were introduced by the businessmen to 
distribute their goods across a number of vessels and share the potential loss 
of any boat with each other.204 A few years later, a new method of insurance 
was adopted by the merchants to conduct freight on the Yangtze River, 
namely each merchant would share the loss of goods with other merchants 
and place his goods on a number of different boats, and thereby minimise the 
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risk of loss incurred from the sinking of one boat. 205  This method was 
recognised as the oldest predecessor to modern insurance. 
Significant development as to the insurance industry in China appeared at 
the beginning of the 19th century. During this period of time, the country was 
still controlled by the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) which was the last feudal 
dynasty of China. From 1805 to 1948, British businessmen began to expand 
their trade to China, and at the same time, numerous foreign insurers entered 
into the Chinese insurance market. As a result, the modern forms of insurance 
were introduced to China by foreign merchants, especially by English 
merchants, in the late Qing Dynasty. In 1805, the first foreign insurance 
company, the Guangzhou Insurance Firm (or sometimes called the Canton 
Insurance Society), was founded by two British firms (Davidson-Dent House 
and Beale-Maginie-Jardine Firm) in the city of Guangzhou which was the most 
important coastal city for export trade in those early days.206 Subsequently, in 
1835, a group of traders engaged in the business of exporting goods from 
China formed a mutual association called the Union Insurance Society of 
Canton Limited. Later, more insurance companies were set up in China by 
English merchants, such as the Yangtze Insurance Company, the Sun 
Insurance Company, and the Insurance Department of Butterfield & Swire 
Company and so on. A large number of these insurance companies based 
their head offices in Shanghai. During that time, all proposal forms, insurance 
clauses, policies or premium rates were drafted by foreign insurance 
companies. 207  These insurance companies controlled China’s insurance 
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market profitably for a long period of time until the World War II. From the 
middle of the 19th century, the business of marine insurance in China was in 
great demand as a result of the expansion of foreign trade. This is because 
during this period of time, foreign businessmen were permitted to conduct 
business freely in the treaty ports of China. This has also enabled Chinese 
merchants to conduct business with them. However, there was no legislation 
or regulation concerning the practice of marine insurance at that period of time.  
As soon as the Chinese merchants realised the importance of foreign 
trade, the first domestic freight insurance company, the Shanghai Yihe 
Insurance Society, was set up by several Chinese businessmen in Shanghai in 
1865.208 However, as there was no domestic marine or shipping insurance 
company in China then, Chinese ships had to be insured by foreign insurance 
companies. In order to promote the expansion of transport business and 
regulate domestic insurance companies, China’s first National Insurance 
Institute, the Insurance Bureau of Commerce, was formally established in 
December 1875. This has changed the situation whereby foreign insurance 
companies were in a dominate position over the China’s insurance market. As 
a result of the emergence of the first domestic insurance company, the first 
piece of legislation regarding the business of insurance, namely the Qing 
Commercial Law, was drafted by the Qing government in 1904. The principles 
relating to loss and life insurance, as two distinct types of insurance, were 
covered by this piece of legislation. But the law had never come into operation 
due to the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911.209  
In fact, until the Qing Government was collapsed, a number of other 
Chinese national insurance companies, as well as other western insurance 
companies and agencies, were set up, and most of them were based in 
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Shanghai.210 One of the most important foreign insurance companies at that 
period of time was the American Insurance Group established in 1919. But 
until this period of time, the Chinese insurance market was still dominated by a 
large number of foreign insurance companies operating in Shanghai. 211 
Although domestic insurance companies sought to develop their market share, 
it was indeed difficult for them to expand their business and compete with 
foreign insurance companies. 212  This market structure was retained 
throughout the World War II and the civil war between the National People’s 
Party (Guo Min Dang) and the Communist Party (CP) until the victory of the 
CP and the establishment of the PRC.213 Soon after the Sino-Japanese War, 
Shanghai again became the centre of China’s insurance market. Foreign 
insurance companies which were forced to close down during the war time 
were able to re-open their business in Shanghai after the War.214 
The significant impact of Western legal texts (especially the German Civil 
Code) on Chinese law is thought to have been started under the devastation of 
auspices by Zexu Lin in 1839. Due to the fact that Germany was regarded as a 
rising power in the late 19th century, the German Civil Code has been highly 
influential for most of the oriental legal systems, including China. By way of 
illustration, in China, the German Civil Code was introduced in the later years 
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of the Qing Dynasty and formed the basic law of China. Subsequently, 
following the Civil Revolution of 1911, China adopted Western-style legal code 
into its own legal system, including the German Civil Code on insurance law. 
More specifically, the laws governing commercial and business activities were 
drafted by foreign-law-trained Chinese with the assistance of Western legal 
scholars.215  
From 1912 to 1948, China was dominated by Guo Min Dang (GMD) which 
was established by Sun Yat-sen. China’s insurance industry made little 
progress until the KMT government came into power. In order to regulate the 
insurance industry in an efficient way, the Insurance Law was drafted by the 
GMD government in 1929 and was revised in 1937.216 This piece of legislation 
consisted of four chapters. These were general principles, damage insurance, 
personal insurance and supplementary. Another piece of legislation drafted by 
the GMD government was the Insurance Company Law which was published 
in 1935. Despite the existence of these legislations, the laws were not put into 
practice due to the fact that foreign insurers made objections to these 
insurance laws. Having appreciated the significance of export trade, the GMD 
government also introduced the law of marine insurance which was governed 
by the Maritime Law drafted in 1931.217 
 
3.4: Development of the Chinese insurance market and the 
maritime law after the foundation of the PRC  
As soon as the People’s Republic of China was set up in October 1949, 
the People’s Insurance Company of China (PICC), as the first wholly 
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state-owned enterprise and the only domestic insurance service provider, was 
formed by the new Chinese government with its head office in Beijing. The 
PICC was in a dominant position over all domestic insurance companies and 
was the only insurance company specialising the business of marine 
insurance at that period. The PICC expanded rapidly; by the middle of 1950, it 
established branches and sub-branches in every province.218 In urban areas, 
the PICC conducted fire insurance, life insurance, transportation insurance 
and automobile insurance. In rural areas, the PICC offered crop insurance and 
animal insurance. From the international aspect, the PICC also provided 
export and import of goods, ocean marine cargo transportation insurance and 
war risks. Despite the fact that the PICC was directly controlled by the central 
government, the supervision of the Chinese insurance industry was carried out 
by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) which was also called the central bank of 
China. The PBC was also authorised to set the terms of the insurance 
contracts and the rates of the policies. 219  
As a result of the establishment of the PICC, all foreign insurance 
companies were required to exit the Chinese insurance market by the end of 
1952. Following the new Chinese government’s attempt to keep the maritime 
transportation system in operation, the Chinese legislative development on 
maritime law was partly achieved from the early 1950s when the maritime law 
drafting committee was set up by the Ministry of Communications, but the law 
drafting task came to an end as a result of the Great Proletarian Cultural 
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Revolution (GPCR).220 It was not until 1981 that the maritime law drafting task 
was resumed.221 
However, it was soon discovered by the PICC that there was insufficient 
domestic insurance business. Therefore, all transactions of domestic 
insurance business came to an end by 1958, except the business of aviation 
and export cargo transportation insurance, although foreign insurance and 
reinsurance business were still permitted in the insurance market. 222  In 
particular, at the end of 1958, it was decided at the National Financial Meeting 
that domestic insurance business should stop immediately, and only small 
foreign insurance business would be retained. Soon after, most branches of 
the PICC, except Shanghai, Guangzhou and Harbin, stopped domestic 
insurance business. During the GPCR in China between 1966 and 1976, the 
only insurance business conducted by PICC was export cargo transportation 
insurance. However, in the late 1970s, the new leader Deng Xiaoping began to 
direct the whole country into economic reform. In particular, the policy of 
economic reform and opening the door to the outside world was announced in 
December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Congress of the CCP.223 
Since then, China has begun to shift away from a centrally planned economy 
to a market economy with socialist characteristics. As such, the economic 
reform and the economic reconstruction became the main theme of China’s 
development, and this has created the necessary condition and environment 
for the development of China’s insurance market. At the initial stage of the 
economic systems reform, the government aimed at encouraging the business 
of domestic insurance.  
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Due to the economic system reform and the open door policy, in 1980, the 
PICC started to resume its dominant position and was authorised to deal with 
various domestic insurance transactions, such as marine insurance, property 
insurance, life insurance, agricultural insurance and reinsurance. This has led 
to the real and rapid development of modern insurance in China. From the 
1980s onwards, the PICC had also gained its reputation from an international 
perspective. Since then, the PICC has established international branches in 
Western Europe, the United States, Canada and Japan. Following the 
economic reform, foreign insurance companies were again authorised to enter 
China’s insurance market. But during this period of time, there was a lack of 
statutory rule as to the issue of marine insurance. This is because the Chinese 
legislators did not have sufficient experience and skill to draft insurance law or 
maritime law. As a result, from the late 1970s, foreign insurance policies, 
proposal forms and basis of the contract clauses were relied on extensively by 
Chinese insurers to draft their own policy and proposal forms.  
Following the economic reform and the rapid growth of the insurance 
industry, there has been a significant change in the China’s insurance market. 
Until 1986, the PICC was the only domestic insurance company and had 
dominated China’s insurance market. But this market structure did not last long 
until 1986 when more and more insurance companies were allowed to set up 
and compete with the PICC.224 From the early 1990s, the fast growth in 
economy, the increase of personal income, the large and aging population and 
the acceleration of industrialisation and urbanisation were all the factors which 
contributed to the rapid growth of the insurance industry.225 Due to the rapid 
growth of insurance market, by the end of 1990, the PICC maintained business 
relationships with all the leading insurance and reinsurance companies and 
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broker firms all around the world.226 At the same time, the PICC was also able 
to offer all types of foreign insurance which could only be obtained from the 
international insurance market in the past.  
In order to create a more competitive domestic insurance market, in the 
mid-1980s, the central government relaxed the insurance regulations, so that it 
was possible for other insurance companies to exist and compete in the 
insurance market. By the mid-1980s, the Interim Regulations on the 
Administrations of Insurance Enterprises was passed by the State Council (SC) 
of China in March 1985 with the aim of setting out the legal requirements for 
the new insurance companies to comply. At the same time, therefore, a 
number of domestic insurance companies were set up around the country, the 
most significant insurance company was the Farming Insurance Company of 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Group which was established in 1986. 
As a result of the establishment of these insurance companies, the PICC failed 
to retain its monopoly position in the insurance market. Subsequently, there 
were also other domestic insurance companies set up to compete with the 
PICC. By way of illustration, the Ping An Insurance Company227 and the China 
Pacific Insurance Company were established in 1988 and 1991 respectively. 
These two companies mainly specialised in the business of marine 
insurance.228 From the early 1990s, a number of subsidiaries were also set up 
by foreign insurance companies in China. These insurance companies include 
the American International Assurance Company which was the first foreign 
insurance company established in China since the economic systems reform 
and the Tokyo Marine & Fire Insurance Company established in Shanghai in 
1994.229  
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In order to further facilitate the great demand of export trade transactions 
and regulate maritime issues, the draft bill of maritime law was adopted in 
November 1992, and in the following year, the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 
came into force. Despite the fact that there are some areas of uncertainty, the 
Maritime Code serves as an important legal document for maritime law and the 
marine insurance industry from an international perspective, and it has been 
regarded as the dominant source of law in respect of maritime issues in China. 
But this does not prevent the parties from inserting foreign law into their 
insurance contracts in order to be legally effective.230 By way of illustration, in 
the case of Jiansu Overseas Entrepreneur Group v Feng Tai Insurance (Asia) 
Co Ltd,231 the goods were insured under the Institute Cargo Clauses (C), and 
the parties agreed that any dispute under the insurance policy should be 
resolved by referring to the English Marine Insurance Act 1906. For this reason, 
the Maritime Court of Shanghai upheld this clause and decided the case in 
accordance with English law. On the contrary, if the choice of law was not 
expressly specified in the contract, the Chinese courts would determine the 
applicable law with reference to the ‘closest connection’ test.232 This issue 
should be dealt with by conflict of law which was also developed in England as 
an important source of law.   
The Maritime Code has a total of 278 articles which regulate all aspects of 
maritime and admiralty issues. The Maritime Code regulates a wide range of 
maritime and shipping matters including vessels, crew, charters, towage, 
salvage, collisions, general average, limitation of liability, marine insurance 
and the carriage of passengers. The Maritime Code is to a large extent 
modelled on a number of international conventions, such as the Hague-Visby 
Rules, the Hamburg Rules, the International Convention on Salvage 1989 and 
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so on. By way of example, although the standard Hull Insurance Clauses used 
in the Chinese market were drafted by the PICC,233 the London Institute 
Clauses234 can also be used in the Chinese market.  
Marine insurance, as an important aspect of law, was stipulated in Chapter 
XII of the Maritime Code (articles 216 to 256) which applies to both hull 
insurance and cargo insurance and has 41 articles. It is worthwhile to note that 
the provisions relating to marine insurance contracts in the Maritime Code are 
closely connected with the English Marine Insurance Act 1906. That is to say, 
some important concepts and principles of English marine insurance law were 
adopted when drafting the Maritime Code. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, there was a concerted effort in China to establish legal codes based on 
European models from the end of the Qing Dynasty. Secondly, by the end of 
the 17th century, London started to become an important centre for export 
trade in respect of the business of marine insurance, and subsequently, the 
establishment of insurance companies in England gave English law the most 
significant prestige in this area which it largely maintains and forms the basis of 
almost all modern practice for international trade.  
Despite these similarities, it should be pointed out that the underwriting 
process for insurance practice is completely different between these two 
countries, because in the Chinese insurance market, the assured normally 
enters into a direct contract with the insurer without the need to choose an 
insurance broker. Nevertheless, the position would be different in respect of 
marine insurance contracts in which the policy wordings are generally drafted 
by the insurance brokers. The outcome of this practice would be that where 
there is any ambiguity contained in the policy wording, it will be construed in 
favour of the insurer who has drafted the policy wording on the basis that the 
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broker acts as an agent of the assured.235 In addition to the Maritime Code, 
the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Ordinance236 of Hong Kong, 
which was enacted in 1961, can also be used by the parties as the applicable 
law of the insurance contracts.   
But the modern Chinese insurance law did not develop into its mature 
state until September 1993 when the draft of the Insurance Law was 
completed and submitted to the SC for consideration. In October 1995, the 
Insurance Law of PRC 237  was finally passed by the National People’s 
Congress (NPC).238 The Insurance Law consists of 8 parts (152 Articles) in 
total. The current version of this piece of legislation is the Insurance Law of 
PRC 2009 which regulates all types of insurance contract. Moreover, the law in 
respect of marine insurance contracts is governed by the relevant provisions of 
this piece of legislation which was created on the basis of the relevant laws of 
other countries. Inevitably, this is the first piece of legislation that covers every 
aspect of insurance, including the law of life and property insurance contracts, 
the rules of insurance business operations, the legal standards for insurance 
agents and brokers, liability issues and so on.239 In addition, the regulation 
and administration of insurance companies can be found in the relevant 
provisions of this piece of legislation. Apart from the Insurance Law of PRC, 
marine insurance contracts are also regulated by the Contract Law of PRC 
1999 which governs the law of contract in general. The Insurance Law and the 
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Contract Law of PRC will only be applicable in marine insurance cases where 
there is a gap in the Maritime Code 1993 in respect of a relevant point of law. 
In the absence of the law on a particular point of legal issue, international 
maritime customs and practices, including the English Marine Insurance Act 
1906, can also be used by Chinese courts as a dominant source of law when it 
is necessary. This point is illustrated in Article 268 of the Maritime Code 
1993.240 
Another important change as to the Chinese insurance market appeared at 
the end of 1998 when the PBC no longer had any authority to regulate the 
insurance industry. Instead, from November 1998, the task for the regulation of 
the insurance industry was carried out by the China Insurance Regulatory 
Commission (CIRC)241 which was set up by the SC as a governmental agency 
in 1998. At the same time, the PICC, as an important market player with a 
national network of over 4000 branches, was reorganised by the State Council 
and thus became a holding company, namely the PICC Group. As a result of 
such a change, three completely independent subsidiaries of the PICC were 
set up, and these are the PICC Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 
the PICC Life Insurance Company and the PICC Reinsurance Company. 
During this period of time, the Chinese government still remained heavily 
involved in the insurance industry, though not as much as before.  
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3.5: The Chinese court system and the jurisdiction for marine 
insurance cases 
Unlike Western countries in which the court system has been well 
developed for centuries, the Chinese court system was rather undeveloped 
and rarely used before the establishment of the PRC. Neither did the judicial 
and legislative systems operate effectively during the GPCR, because the 
judicial and legislative systems were collapsed as a result of the GPCR.242 As 
such, legal scholars and judges were forced to leave their positions. But a 
proper institutional legal system, including the court system, was introduced 
soon after the economic systems reform took place in late 1978 with the aim of 
facilitating the demands of the growth of export trade and dealing with 
domestic disputes in a proper manner. According to the Chinese 
Constitution,243 in the Chinese legal system, the judicial branch has a strict 
hierarchical structure and can mainly be divided into a four-level court system, 
these are the district or county courts, the Intermediate People’s Courts, the 
Higher People’s Courts and the Supreme People’s Court.244 These courts 
have been established by the people’s congresses to which they are 
responsible and by which they are supervised. In China, however, the power of 
interpreting the law is mainly exercised by the legislature rather than the courts. 
The role of the Chinese courts is to implement the law and apply it in a 
particular dispute. Occasionally, however, it is rather difficult for Chinese 
courts to exercise their right of implementation of the law, due to the powerful 
political position of the local government and the fact that judges are appointed 
by the local people’s government.    
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Nevertheless, in China, all disputes concerning the issue of marine 
insurance must be dealt with in maritime courts245 which are in the same 
jurisdictional level as the Intermediate People’s Courts. The jurisdiction of 
maritime courts is divided by their geographical territories. The reason for the 
establishment of maritime courts is that it would be rather difficult for the 
judges of an ordinary court to deal with a maritime case which often involves 
with complex international trade and shipping matters. 246  All disputes 
concerning the issue of marine insurance will be heard at the first instance in a 
maritime court. Where necessary, appeals can be made to the appellate court 
which is the provincial court in the same geographical territory. The judgment 
made by the appeal court will be final and binding on both parties. Moreover, 
the innocent party generally has a two-year limitation period to bring an action 
in respect of marine insurance matters.247 Apart from the maritime courts, all 
disputes concerning the issue of marine insurance and export trade can also 
be dealt with by the China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC) which 
was set up in Beijing in 1959. But the operation of CMAC currently extends to 
Shanghai and Guangzhou to share the workload of marine insurance and 
export trade disputes. The principal aim of the CMAC is to operate 
independently and impartially to protect parties’ legitimate rights and interests 
in maritime transport disputes and thereby promote the growth of the 
international and domestic economy. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Historically, trading activities were controlled by the government as early 
as the Qin Dynasty. Different trading routes were also set up in ancient China, 
the most important one is the Silk Road established in the Han Dynasty. 
However, as commercial law was not developed on an international standard 
until the end of the Qing Dynasty, ancient Chinese commercial law had no role 
to play in the context of medieval lex mercatoria. But the contemporary 
Chinese commercial law has been deeply influenced by the modern lex 
mercatoria. 
The practice of marine insurance in China emerged as early as the 3rd 
millennia BC. From this period of time, in order to minimise the risk of loss or 
damage to the goods during the river transit, ancient Chinese merchants 
agreed to share the potential risk with each other by placing the goods on a 
number of different boats, so that all of the merchants would be liable for the 
potential loss of the goods. 
The Chinese insurance industry was not developed until the beginning of 
the 19th century when a number of foreign and domestic insurance companies 
were set up, although foreign insurance companies were in a dominant 
position in the insurance market. Soon after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, 
the GMD government passed the Maritime Law which also regulated marine 
insurance matters. 
As soon as the PRC was established in 1949, the PICC, as the only 
state-owned insurance company during that period, was formed by the 
government. Due to the economic systems reform, from the late 1980s, more 
and more domestic and foreign insurance companies entered into the 
insurance market.  
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In order to regulate maritime issues, the Maritime Code of the PRC was 
passed in 1993. Marine insurance law was governed by this Code and 
appeared in Chapter XII of the Code. Relevant provisions of the English 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 were codified into the Maritime Code. 
Subsequently, another piece of legislation governing the law of insurance 
contracts was passed in 1995, namely the Insurance Law of PRC. 
As the Chinese insurance industry developed into its mature state, the 
CIRC, as a governmental agency, was authorised to regulate the insurance 
industry from 1998. 
Unlike the English court system, a maritime dispute in China, including 
marine insurance case, must be dealt with in a selected maritime court 
depending on the geographical location of the dispute in question. With regard 
to a marine insurance dispute, the parties’ legal rights can also be protected 
with the assistance of the CMAC. 
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Chapter 4 
A critical analysis of the law on Chinese marine insurance warranty 
as appears in the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 
4.1 Introduction 
While Chapter 3 provided the overall development in respect of the 
Chinese marine insurance market and marine insurance law from a historical 
perspective, the aim of this Chapter is to provide a critical examination as to 
the law of Chinese marine insurance warranty which is governed by the 
relevant provisions of the Chinese Maritime Code 1993. 
Surprisingly, the traditional civil law in China has no provision equivalent to 
the concept of warranty under the Marine Insurance Act 1906. As a result, in 
Chinese marine insurance law, the law of warranty was rather undeveloped 
and unsettled until 1993 when the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 came into 
force. The legal concept of warranty can be found in the relevant provision of 
the Maritime Code which provides that ‘The insured shall notify the insurer in 
writing immediately where the insured has not complied with the warranties 
under the contract. The insurer may, upon receipt of the notice, terminate the 
contract or demand an amendment to the terms and conditions of the 
insurance coverage or an increase in the premium.’248 Although the Chinese 
law drafters were deeply influenced by the relevant provisions of the English 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 when drafting this Maritime Code, the legal 
principles in Article 235 of the Maritime Code have generated a large number 
of debates as to how the regime of Chinese marine warranty can be 
appropriately modified.249 This is because unlike the English Marine Insurance 
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Act 1906 which has a well-established set of statutory rules for warranties, the 
law relating to warranties in the Chinese Maritime Code has caused ambiguity 
and uncertainty in judicial and insurance practices due to the lack of a statutory 
definition of warranty250 and the simple provision of Article 235 of the Maritime 
Code.  
Due to the existing defects in Article 235 of the Maritime Code, law reform 
is urgently needed in the interests of market practice and export trade. 
Additionally, the concept of warranty has not received much judicial attention in 
China due to the fact that China has a typical civil law system, and as a result, 
court decisions and arbitral awards have rarely been regarded as legal binding 
precedents.251 This point indicates that when dealing with a particular case, 
Chinese judges normally base their judgements on their own understanding of 
the marine insurance law. The lack of a case reporting system in China 
indicates that these decisions and awards are only binding on the parties 
concerned and are not released to the general public. This is because unlike 
the English legal system, there is no legal phrase ‘ratio decidendi’252 in the 
Chinese legal system. But for the purpose of conducting a critical examination 
as to the present law of warranty under Article 235 of the Maritime Code, 
relevant court decisions and arbitral awards will be referred to throughout this 
Chapter.  
On the other hand, some law reform proposals concerning the current 
warranty regime have been proposed by various legal authorities with a view 
to overcome these problems. A typical example is the national legal research 
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project for the draft proposal of the Chinese maritime law which received 
governmental approval from the Chinese Ministry of Transportation in 2000.253 
The law relating to the contract of marine insurance, including the issue of 
warranties, was covered in this research project. In addition, the guidance 
notes on the problem of uncertainty arising from the marine insurance 
provisions of the Maritime Code was introduced and promulgated by the 
Supreme People’s Court who is also authorised to issue formal judicial 
interpretations. These guidance notes can be found in the Opinions of the 
Supreme People’s Court of PRC concerning the Application of the Chinese 
Maritime Code (draft) which is regarded as a formal judicial interpretation in 
China.254  
Contrary to English law, it is submitted that the concept of warranty in 
China can only be applied in contract of marine insurance, due to the fact that 
the concept of warranty is not recognised in non-marine insurance 
contracts.255 For this reason, the principal aim of this Chapter is to conduct 
legal research which reflects the current law of marine insurance warranties in 
the Chinese legal system. In particular, effort will be made to introduce the 
term ‘warranty’ as appears in Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code and 
elaborate the existing problems of the warranty regime with relevant case 
examples. In addition to the exploration of the existing problems, the 
contribution of this Chapter will be based upon the extent to which the concept 
of Chinese marine insurance warranty is in need of modification. The draft 
proposals of the Chinese maritime law introduced by national legal 
researchers and the Supreme People’s Court will be critically evaluated to 
                                                        
253
 In September 2003, the research results derived from the research project were published in the 
book called ‘“Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China” – The Modification of the Proposed 
Draft Provisions, the Referential Legislative Cases and Interpretation’. The outcome of this research 
project has, to a great extent, assisted the modification of Chinese maritime law on a practical basis. 
254
 The judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court are generally followed by the 
lower courts. 
255
 Pengnan Wang, Modern Marine Insurance Law and Practice (Chinese), 2004, p 130. 
117 
 
ascertain whether, and to what extent the present law is to be replaced by the 
draft proposal. Where necessary, some law reform proposals in relation to 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code will also be introduced by the author in this 
Chapter to overcome the problems and clarify the uncertainty. 
 
4.2: Conceptual analysis of the term ‘warranty’ under Article 235 of 
the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 
Similar to English marine insurance law, the term ‘warranty’ under Chinese 
marine insurance law is a special term which goes to the nature and scope of 
the risk and requires the assured to fulfil some contractual obligations, either 
present or future. Despite being absent from the provisions of the Maritime 
Code, it is suggested by a number of academics and legal professions256 that 
warranties in Chinese marine insurance law share the same meaning as that 
of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906. According to this suggestion, 
section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 can be used as a general 
definition for Chinese marine insurance warranty, that is, the assured promises 
that something will or will not be done, or guarantees the existence or 
non-existence of a certain state of facts. Besides the statutory definition 
contained in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, a similar legal definition was 
provided in the research project of the draft proposal of Chinese maritime law 
which states that ‘A warranty is what the assured promises to do or not to do, 
or guarantees the existence or non-existence of a certain state of facts under 
the contract.’ But it should be emphasized that the above arguments as to the 
definition of warranty only applies to express warranties, because the concept 
of implied warranties is not generally recognised in Chinese marine insurance 
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law and practice, with the exception of the implied warranty of legality.257 By 
way of example, it is submitted that there is no implied warranty of 
seaworthiness in Chinese marine insurance law.258    
As two important contractual duties, the relationship between warranty and 
utmost good faith should not be overlooked. This is because the assured is 
required to comply with the warranties in good faith. In other words, the 
principle of utmost good faith covers a wide range of issues within the whole 
insurance policy including warranties. By way of illustration, as pointed out by 
some Chinese academics, an insurance warranty constitutes an important part 
of the principle of utmost good faith.259 However, a clear distinction must be 
drawn between good faith and utmost good faith. This is because while the 
principle of good faith, which generally involves with honesty, depends mainly 
on the overall terms of the contract and the commercial context and requires 
the contracting parties to perform their fiduciary duties under the contract, a 
higher degree of obligation is expected from both parties to an insurance 
contract (especially the assured) in order to ensure the accuracy of the 
disclosure of all material facts which may affect the premium or the actual risk 
undertaken by the insurer.260 This point indicates that the principle of good 
faith is a basic legal obligation which is based on the intention of the parties 
and applies to all types of contract, whether expressly or impliedly.261 Similarly, 
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in Chinese law, acting in good faith is a general requirement for all contracts, 
and it exists through the whole period of the contract, not only before the 
conclusion of the contract.262  
As far as marine insurance contract is concerned, the doctrine of utmost 
good faith seems to impose a more onerous burden on the assured, as the 
doctrine covers the duty to observe good faith from pre-contractual period to 
post-contractual period. Failure to do so on the part of the assured renders the 
contract voidable at the option of the insurance company, so that the insurer 
will be entitled to terminate the contract. The relevant provisions of the English 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 require both parties, especially the assured, to act 
in good faith before the conclusion of the insurance contract, and the 
importance of the doctrine of utmost good faith is shown in two aspects: these 
are the positive duty to make material disclosure and the duty not to make any 
material misrepresentation, 263 whereas there is no express provision dealing 
with the issue of utmost good faith for marine insurance contracts in the 
Chinese Maritime Code, except Article 222 and 223 of the Maritime Code 
which set out the statutory requirement for the assured to disclose material 
circumstances to the insurer before the contract is concluded and the legal 
consequence for the breach of this obligation. In fact, the principle of utmost 
good faith is only stipulated in Article 5 of the Insurance Law of PRC 1995 
which provides that the contracting parties should fulfil their obligations by 
observing the principle of good faith.264 However, as the parties are under a 
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more onerous obligation to follow the principle of good faith in insurance 
contracts than in other types of contract, it is suggested by the author that the 
word ‘utmost’ should be inserted into this Article.  
Additionally, as far as this Article is concerned, it is justifiable to say that it 
has failed to state the legal consequence for the non-fulfilment of the principle 
of good faith. In the view of the author, the legal consequence for the failure to 
comply with the principle of utmost good faith should be stipulated in this 
Article, so that either party, especially the insurer, would be able to avoid the 
contract for the breach of this duty. Thus, in order to emphasize the importance 
of the doctrine of utmost good faith and avoid the problems of uncertainty and 
ambiguity, it is suggested by the author that the amended version of Article 5 
of the Insurance Law should be inserted into the Maritime Code to bring this 
aspect of law in line with international standards and enable the contracting 
parties to appreciate the importance of this statutory obligation. 
 
4.3: The concept of alteration of risk in the Insurance Law of PRC 
The term ‘warranty’ is well defined in section 33(1) of the English Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, whereas there is no statutory definition for the term 
‘warranty’ in either the Chinese Maritime Code 1993 or the Insurance Law of 
PRC 1995. But it is interesting to note that a similar concept, namely alteration 
(increase) of risk, which is also known as post-contractual change to the risk, 
has been developed in most European continental countries and other civil law 
countries, such as China. The concept of alteration of risk operates in a similar 
manner as the concept of warranty, because both concepts would assist the 
insurer to assess the risk throughout the currency of the contract.  
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The concept of alteration of risk was introduced into Article 52 of the 
Insurance Law of PRC 2009.265 As far as this provision is concerned, the 
assured is under a statutory duty to notify the insurer as to any remarkable 
increase of risk of the subject matter insured only if the notice of the increase 
of risk is contained in the relevant provision of the contract, and in such a case, 
the insurer will be entitled to charge a higher rate of premium from the assured, 
or terminate the contract in accordance with the terms of the contract. If the 
insurer chooses to terminate the contract, he should return the premium to the 
assured after deducting the amount between the time of commencement and 
the time of termination of the contract.266 But this does not mean that there is 
no other remedy available to the insurer in the event of a remarkable increase 
of risk. Equally, the insurer will also be required to notify the assured of the 
decision without undue delay. The remedies for the increase of risk may be 
different for each policy depending on the terms of the policy. However, in 
practice, the insurer generally chooses not to exercise the right to terminate 
the contract for a remarkable increase of risk, because for business purpose, 
the insurer wants to keep the insurance contract and the on-going commercial 
relationship with the assured by charging the agreed premium as a form of 
penalty.  
In fact, another situation may arise where the assured fails to perform the 
duty of notification in respect of an increase of risk. In such a case, the insurer 
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will be entitled to refuse to indemnify any loss caused by the material increase 
of risk.267 But it should be borne in mind that the burden of proof is on the 
insurer who must show clear evidence that the loss is caused by the material 
increase of risk. This means that a causal connection should be established 
between the loss and the increase of risk before the insurer can refuse to 
indemnify the loss. Obviously, it is true that the rationale for adopting this 
statutory rule into the Insurance Law is to protect the interest of the insurer and 
ensure that the risk of the subject matter insured does not change significantly 
from what the insurer agrees to cover at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. It follows from this perspective that alteration of risk can be dealt with 
in the policy, provided that clear contractual wording is used. So in the Hong 
Kong insurance market, it is quite common for the insurer to insert clauses 
concerning notification and liability for increase of risks in the policy. 268 
Likewise, as the Insurance Law of PRC is also applicable to Chinese marine 
insurance law, it is clear that this concept and the concept of warranty share 
similar function for the risk management during the insurance period.  
In Chinese insurance law, as the legal consequence for the increase of risk 
is severe and the assured may simply lose cover as a result of the increase of 
risk, Chinese courts have tended to reach decisions involving the issue of 
increase of risk in favour of the assured if the increase of risk is not on a 
permanent basis. On the other hand, Chinese courts have struggled to 
determine the issue as to what amounts to a permanent increase of risk, and 
as a result, on some occasions, unfair decisions may be reached against the 
assured. This issue arises in the case of Mr Li Xian v PICC Property Insurance 
Co (Dong Guan Branch)269 where Mr Li entered into an insurance contract to 
insure his car for private use only. One day during the currency of the policy, Li 
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took four men who were waiting for hitchhike and asked them to pay 25 RMB. 
The car was hijacked by the men. Li claimed the loss under the policy, but the 
insurer refused to indemnify Li on the basis that as Li changed the use of the 
car from private purpose to business purpose for remuneration without 
notifying the insurer of such a change, the risk was therefore increased, and Li 
had therefore breached the duty of notification regarding the increase of risk. 
As Clause 15 of the policy stated, ‘In the insurance period, if the insured 
vehicle is modified or the use of it is changed for business, which results in an 
increase of risk, the insured should notify the insurer in writing. Otherwise, 
insurer is not liable where the loss is caused by the increase of risk.’  
The Dong Guan People’s Court, however, held that the use of the car to 
take a number of passengers in return for remuneration was a one-off event 
and did not change the fact that the normal use of the car was for private 
purpose, because there was no evidence suggesting that the use of the car 
was changed permanently for business purpose. The insurer was therefore 
held liable for the loss. The insurer subsequently appealed and argued that the 
court of first instance had misinterpreted the meaning of the term ‘business 
use’ in the policy. In fact, the term ‘business use’ was defined in clause 17 as 
‘without getting permission from the Traffic and Transport Administration 
Department, the use of the vehicle by the insured or any other person who is 
allowed to drive by the insured for taking passengers or transport of goods for 
making money is deemed as for business use’. The appeal court accepted the 
insurer’s argument and reversed the decision of the court of first instance. As 
far as this case is concerned, it can be argued that the appeal court has 
reached an unfair decision against the assured. The reason for this is that the 
assured’s act to take four men was only temporary, and there was no evidence 
to suggest that the assured has intended to change the use of his car to 
business purpose on a permanent basis. 
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Another shortcoming of Article 52 of the Insurance Law of PRC 2009 is 
that there is a lack of statutory definition of the term ‘remarkable increase of 
risk’. Such a problem may even make it difficult for the Chinese courts to 
determine the issue as to whether or not the risk has in fact increased. Such a 
problem can be found in the case of Mr Feng Liao v Ping An Insurance Co Ltd 
Shenzhen Branch.270 Here, Mr Liao insured his car for private use against the 
risk of theft and robbery. A clause contained in the policy required Mr Liao to 
notify the insurer of any increase of risk, such as the change of use of the car 
for any other purpose. In August 2003, Liao placed an advertisement in a local 
newspaper setting out his intention that he was looking for a job, so that he 
could use his car for his employment. At the end of August, a man contacted 
Liao and discussed the matter of employing him and his car. The man also 
paid a deposit to Liao. On the 8th of September, Liao and the man met the 
‘Boss’ in the airport. They asked Liao to take them to a hotel where they could 
discuss the details of Liao’s employment. But Liao was robbed by them in the 
hotel, and they also drove his car away. Liao claimed the loss under the policy. 
But the insurer refused to indemnify Liao’s loss on the ground that Liao 
changed the use of his car from private purpose to business purpose without 
notifying the insurer of such a change, and the loss of the car was also caused 
by the increased risk.  
The People’s Court of Futian District of Shenzhen city rejected the 
insurer’s argument and held that although Liao intended to use his car for 
business purpose, his future employment was only at the stage of negotiation, 
and he did not start using his car for his employment. The insurer subsequently 
made an appeal. On appeal, the Middle People’s Court of Shenzhen city 
reversed the judgment of the court of first instance and held that Liao’s 
advertisement and receipt of deposit showed his intention to change his car for 
business purpose, and during the currency of the policy, Liao used his car to 
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meet a stranger for business purpose. As a result, Liao changed the use of the 
car without notifying the insurer, and the risk has therefore increased. As far as 
the court decision is concerned, it can be argued that the appeal court has 
made an unfair decision against Liao. This is because the risk did not increase 
at the time when Liao took the strangers to the hotel. Moreover, the fact that 
Liao did not receive any remuneration for his employment would mean that the 
risk did not increase.  
Despite the fact that the concept of alteration of risk in the Insurance Law 
has caused uncertainty in judicial practice, it is necessary to retain the concept 
of alteration of risk in the Insurance Law which only deals with non-marine 
insurance contracts. In contrast, marine insurance is a special type of 
insurance which generally involves with greater hazard, especially when the 
ship is sent to sea, and as a result, it is reasonable to require the assured to 
fulfil some more stringent obligations, such as compliance with the warranty. 
For this reason, a clear distinction should be drawn between the concept of 
alteration of risk and the concept of warranty, even though the concept of 
warranty also deals with alteration of risk during the insurance period. This is 
because the term ‘warranty’ is a fundamental term of the insurance contract. 
Breach of such a term would lead to more serious legal effect than the 
alteration of risk caused by the assured. Therefore, it is logical and reasonable 
to keep these two concepts separate and place them into two different 
legislations. This target has appropriately been achieved by the legislators 
under Chinese insurance law.                
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4.4: The introduction of a proposed statutory definition of warranty 
into the Maritime Code  
Nevertheless, as the term ‘warranty’ in the Maritime Code is directly 
applicable to Chinese marine insurance contracts, a clear statutory definition 
of warranty should therefore be introduced into the relevant provision of the 
Maritime Code. In the absence of a statutory definition as to warranty, the 
contracting parties, especially the assured, may be unaware of what would 
exactly constitute a warranty. Warranty is a special term in marine insurance 
law which is distinct from other contractual terms. Under section 11 of the 
English Sale of Goods Act 1979, a clear distinction has been made between a 
condition and a warranty, whereas such a distinction has not been made under 
the Contract Law of PRC 1999. As far as the Contract Law of PRC is 
concerned, the only provision dealing with the issue of the breach of 
contractual terms appears in Article 111 which specifies the liability and legal 
consequence for the breach of contractual terms. But as the term ‘warranty’ is 
continuously used worldwide, a clear statutory definition should be adopted 
into the Maritime Code. As such, the effort for introducing a statutory definition 
into the Maritime Code has been made by a number of academics. By way of 
illustration, a new statutory definition of warranty has been introduced in the 
book entitled ‘The amendment of the draft provisions, legislative cases for 
reference and interpretation of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of 
China’. Under the proposed provision of the Maritime Code, the definition of 
warranty has been defined in the following terms:  
‘The assured promises that some particular thing shall or shall not 
be done, or promises the existence or non-existence of a particular 
state of facts under the contract.’271  
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Despite the fact that the importance of warranty was recognised and 
stressed by Chinese courts, the definition of warranty has not been introduced 
by the Chinese judiciary even in recent court decisions. 272  By way of 
illustration, in the recent case of SPMP v China Continent P&C Co Ltd,273 it 
was ruled by the Shanghai Maritime Court that a warranty must be explicitly 
specified in the insurance contract by using the words such as ‘warrant’ or 
‘promise’, and the legal consequence for a breach of warranty must also be 
expressly spelt out in the contract. However, simply inserting section 33(1) of 
the English Marine Insurance Act 1906 into Article 235 of the Maritime Code 
may not completely resolve the problem. According to the Chinese insurance 
market practice, the term ‘promissory warranty’, like English marine insurance 
warranty, can be categorised into two types, these are present warranty and 
future warranty.  
As suggested by the author in Chapter 2, the statutory definition of 
warranty as stated in section 33(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should be 
modified in accordance with the general contract law principles. More 
specifically, a clear distinction has been drawn between present warranty and 
future warranty due to their distinct features. The ultimate effect of such a 
distinction is that while a future warranty must still be strictly complied with by 
the assured, a present warranty is to be replaced by an innominate term as 
established in the general contract law of England, the breach of such a term 
may lead to different legal consequence depending on the seriousness of the 
breach in question. To this end, in the view of the author, it is correct to say 
that the term ‘warranty’ in the context of marine insurance law is a promise 
which only relates to the future actions on the part of the assured. In 
consequence, in order to overcome the problem of uncertainty and provide a 
flexible remedy to the insurer, it is suggested by the author that the new 
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section 33(1) of the 1906 Act, as proposed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, should 
be inserted into Article 235 of the Chinese Maritime Code to provide the 
contracting parties with a better understanding of the term ‘warranty’. But as 
two distinct statutory rules, the definition of warranty and the legal 
consequence of a breach of warranty should be placed into different parts of 
Article 235 respectively as those can be found in the relevant provisions of the 
English Marine Insurance Act 1906. Therefore, it is suggested by the author 
that Article 235 of the Maritime Code should be divided into three parts with the 
result that Article 235(1) should only provide a statutory definition of warranty, 
the statutory nature of warranty should be introduced and placed in Article 
235(2), and the legal consequence of a breach of warranty and other 
corresponding rights and obligations of the contracting parties should be 
stipulated in Article 235(3) of the Maritime Code. 
 
4.5: The current problem of the statutory rule as to the assured’s 
notification obligation for a breach of warranty in the Maritime Code 
and its reform proposal     
In contrast with section 33(1) of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906 
which does not require the assured to notify the insurer for a breach of 
warranty,274 such a statutory obligation can be found in Article 235 of the 
Chinese Maritime Code which requires the assured to notify the insurer in 
writing immediately275 where the assured has failed to comply with a warranty. 
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According to the wording of this Article, in such a situation, as soon as the 
insurer receives the notice, he has the right to make an election from 3 
statutory remedies, these are the termination of the insurance contract or the 
amendment of the terms of the insurance policy or the demand of a higher 
premium.  
In practice, the importance of the assureds’ notification obligation in the 
policy as to a breach of warranty or an increase of risk was stressed in the 
recent case of Qais Trading Ltd v BOC Insurance Co Ltd276 which concerned 
a marine cargo insurance policy. In this case, the policy contained a 
warehouse to warehouse clause and covered all risks plus theft and 
non-delivery of a parcel of textile goods shipped from Shanghai via Jebel Ali to 
a warehouse in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates. As soon as the goods 
had been unloaded and arrived at Sharjah, it was reported that they were 
missing by theft. The assured brought an action against the insurer to recover 
the loss. One of the defences provided by the insurer was that the assured did 
not comply with the notification obligation as to the loss of the cargo by theft as 
prescribed in the policy, breach of which provided the insurer with a defence 
on liability. In the first instance, this argument was accepted by the Ningbo 
Maritime Court, and it was held that the notification requirement in the 
insurance policy, if not complied with, provided the insurer with a right to avoid 
liability. When the assured appealed to the Zhejiang High People’s Court of 
PRC for other issues, the issue as to the notification obligation was not 
disputed. This decision thus indicates that Chinese courts would continue to 
adopt a strict interpretation as to the effect of such notification clauses.  
It has been argued that the statutory requirement that the assured must 
notify the insurer immediately for a breach of a warranty is unreasonable, and 
in order to simplify the matter, this statutory requirement should be 
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abolished.277 This argument has received judicial support from the Opinions of 
the Supreme People’s Court of PRC concerning the Application of the Chinese 
Maritime Code (draft) which stipulates that where the assured fails to fulfil the 
obligation of notification provided for in Article 235 of the CMC, the exercise of 
the relevant rights by the insurer pursuant to Article 235 of the CMC shall not 
be affected.278  
Furthermore, it is submitted that the assured’s written notification should 
be understood as based on the principle of utmost good faith, and the insurer’s 
statutory right as to a breach of warranty should not be restricted by the written 
notification on the part of the assured.279 This point means that in reality, the 
insurer is well protected against a breach of warranty even without the 
assured’s written notification. If this contention is correct, in what ways will the 
insurer be able to receive notification as to the assured’s breach of warranty? 
Thus, it is unjustifiable to say that this is a convincing argument, because 
unlike the automatic discharge rule under section 33(3) of the 1906 Act which 
does not give the insurer any remedial option, it is necessary, in Chinese 
marine insurance law, for the assured to inform the insurer immediately as to a 
breach of a warranty, so as to enable the insurer to exercise the right of choice 
without unnecessary delay. Failure to fulfil the notification obligation on the part 
of the assured would mean that it is impossible for the insurer to make an 
election as to the breach.  
Apart from the notification obligation, it is, as suggested by the author, also 
necessary for the assured to ensure that the subject matter insured is 
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reasonably safe immediately after a breach of warranty, although best effort on 
the part of the assured to avoid or minimize the loss should discharge such a 
duty. According to this law proposal, although the assured is required to fulfil a 
more onerous obligation which seems to be rather harsh for the assured, this 
proposal would be beneficial for the assured. This is because if the subject 
matter insured is lost or damaged as a result of a breach of warranty, it is very 
likely that the insurer would elect to terminate the insurance contract. If this 
occurs, the assured would suffer from financial loss without any form of 
indemnity. Indeed, this perspective is also proposed in accordance with Article 
236 of the Maritime Code which requires the assured to take necessary and 
reasonable measures to avoid or minimize the loss even after the occurrence 
of the peril insured against.280 This requirement also appears in Clause 16.1 of 
the Institute Cargo Clauses which is called the Duty of Assured Clause. Under 
this Clause, the assured is required to take measures as may be reasonable 
for the purpose of averting or minimising loss, although such a clause is 
considered as a condition rather than a warranty.281 Therefore, in order to limit 
the risk of potential loss or damage to the subject matter, it is suggested by the 
author that once a warranty is breached, the assured should be obliged to take 
necessary and reasonable steps for the purpose of preventing potential loss to 
the subject matter.  
Nevertheless, the crucial issue may arise as to what the insurer should do 
to protect his contractual rights if he did not receive any notice from the 
assured in the event of a breach of warranty, and on the face of it, this means 
that in such a situation, the insurer would be placed into a less advantageous 
position as he would neither be able to receive such a notice from the assured 
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nor make any decision as to the breach of warranty, so that he cannot seek an 
appropriate remedy even after a warranty was breached by the assured.282 
This will be the case even if the insurer has already been aware of the breach 
through other sources. But such an outcome is obviously inconsistent with the 
true intention of the drafter of the Maritime Code. Therefore, the underlying 
problem with this part of the Article is that it has failed to set out the legal 
consequence for the failure of notification by the assured within a reasonable 
period of time. In the absence of the legal consequence for the failure of 
immediate notification as to a breach of warranty, the insurer’s statutory right 
for seeking an appropriate remedy would be unfairly postponed.  
In order to clarify the issue, it is suggested by the author that an additional 
sentence should be inserted into Article 235 of the Maritime Code, and thereby 
spelling out the legal consequence for the failure of notification on the part of 
the assured. It follows from this perspective that the most appropriate remedy 
for the insurer is that in the event of the failure of notification for a breach of a 
warranty, unless the policy provides otherwise, the insurance contract will be 
automatically terminated without the need for the insurer to refund any 
premiums already paid, regardless of whether such a breach has caused loss 
or damages to the subject matter, and any loss incurred after the breach of 
warranty will not be covered, even if the loss has no connection with the 
breach. The rationale for such a statutory proposal is that it is simple and less 
time consuming, as it enables the insurance company to deal with other clients 
efficiently after the automatic termination of contract, and at the same time, the 
assured will also be able to find other available sources of insurance.  
A different situation may also arise where a loss has occurred after the 
assured has given notice to the insurer as to a breach of warranty but before 
the insurer makes a decision for such a breach. Obviously, Article 235 of the 
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Maritime Code has failed to address this issue. In such a case, it is suggested 
by the author that the issue of causation should come into play to settle such 
an issue. In particular, it is proposed by the author that the issue as to whether 
such a loss should be covered would depend on whether the loss has a direct 
or indirect connection with the breach of warranty for which the notification is 
given. If it does, the loss would not be indemnified. If not, the insurer will be 
liable for the loss, and the contract is still in force. In more specific terms, it is 
suggested by the author that the second part of Article 235 of the Maritime 
Code in respect of the assured’s notification obligation as to a breach of 
warranty, that is Article 235(3), should be altered to read in the following way: 
‘The insured283 shall notify the insurer in writing immediately and 
take necessary measures to avoid or minimize the loss of the 
subject matter insured where the insured has not complied with the 
warranties under the contract. If the insured fails to do so, then, 
subject to any express provision in the policy, the contract will be 
automatically terminated without the need for the insurer to refund 
any premiums and indemnify any loss resulting from the breach of 
warranty. The insurer is liable for the loss occurred before receiving 
notification from the insured as to a breach of warranty only if the 
loss has no connection with the breach…’ 
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4.6: The legal consequence for a breach of warranty in Chinese 
marine insurance law 
4.6(1): A critical analysis as to the legal consequence for a breach 
of warranty under the Maritime Code 
Once the assured fulfils his statutory obligation by notifying the insurer as 
to a breach of warranty, the insurer will then be entitled to choose one of the 
three statutory remedies, namely termination of the insurance contract, 
amendment of the insurance policy and demand of an increase of premium by 
relying on Article 235 of the Maritime Code. This aspect of law is demonstrated 
in the Chinese case of The Canadian Harvest284 where the vessel was insured 
under the conditions of the PICC Hull Clauses (1/1/1986).  Policy required the 
vessel to sail on 20th April 1995. The vessel was towed to Canada for breaking 
up. During the voyage, the vessel sank at sea due to severe weather. The 
insurer denied liability on several grounds, one of which was that the vessel 
had not started the voyage at the particular date prescribed in the policy. It was 
held that the prescribed sailing date was a warranty according to international 
practice, and as a result, the insurer was entitled to terminate the contract or 
increase the premiums or amend the terms of the contract in accordance with 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code.  
It has been argued that the English proposition of automatic discharge of 
liability upon breach subject to any express provisions in the policy should be 
adopted as the legal consequence of breach of warranty in the Maritime 
Code.285 However, it is unjustifiable to say that this is a convincing argument, 
because in the opinion of the author, it can be argued that the legal 
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consequence for a breach of warranty under the Maritime Code has been 
appropriately introduced as a flexible statutory remedy, in the sense that it has 
reflected the common law principle of freedom of contract.  
However, the legal position is slightly different as far as Hong Kong is 
concerned. The issue as to the legal consequence of a breach of warranty has 
been considered in the recent Hong Kong case of Hua Tyan Development Ltd 
v Zurich Insurance Co Ltd 286  where the policy contained a deadweight 
tonnage warranty that provided coverage for a vessel with a deadweight 
tonnage of no less than 10,000 tonnes. The vessel named in the policy did not 
fulfil the deadweight tonnage warranty requirement, as the vessel only had a 
deadweight capacity of about 8,960 tons. During the sea voyage from 
Malaysia to China, the vessel sank and the cargo was totally lost, the insurer 
thus refused to indemnify the loss of the cargo on the ground of the breach of 
warranty. The Court of Final Appeal held that the insurer was required, under 
the policy, to cover the subject matter insured, provided that the deadweight 
tonnage warranty requirement was fulfilled by the assured. In reaching this 
decision, the Court of Final Appeal unanimously confirmed that by virtue of 
section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Ordinance, a breach of a marine 
warranty would bring the insurer’s liability to an end. This will be the case even 
if the warranty is not material to the risk. Logically, despite being absent from 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code, the insurer should also be required to notify 
the assured of his decision as to the breach of warranty without undue 
delay,287 so that the assured would be able to seek alternative insurance 
cover, particularly where the contract was terminated by the insurer.  
Additionally, another important proposal which can be made by the author 
is that cover should be retained until the insurer makes his election as to the 
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breach. This is because the insurer is provided with the statutory right to make 
an election as to the breach of warranty, and until he makes a choice, the 
insurance contract as a whole should be treated as if it was not affected by the 
breach. It should be pointed out that although the form of notice does not 
appear in the Maritime Code, the Supreme People’s Court took the view that 
such a notice should be in written form.288 In principle, a similar aspect of law 
in relation to the notification obligation can also be found in Article 27 of the 
Economic Contract Law of PRC which stipulates that the party intending to 
amend or terminate the economic contract shall promptly notify the other 
party.289 But the issue may then arise as to whether or not there is a time limit 
for the insurer to make his decision as to the breach of warranty. Such an issue 
was not covered under Article 235 of the Maritime Code. In the absence of this 
particular point of law, it is not surprising that it may take an unreasonably long 
period of time for the insurer to make a decision as to the breach of warranty. 
In such a case, it is very likely that the assured may suffer from loss as a result 
of the deliberate delay on the part of the insurer, and the assured may also 
lose the best opportunity from seeking an alternative cover. In order to prevent 
the insurer from standing in such an unfair advantageous position, the present 
law should be altered so as to introduce an additional statutory rule requiring 
the insurer to make a decision as to a breach of warranty within a reasonable 
time, as well as the legal consequence for the failure of complying with this 
obligation on the part of the insurer.290 As such, the new law suggested by the 
author is that if the insurer fails to notify the assured as to the decision for the 
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breach of warranty within a reasonable period of time, the insurer should not 
be entitled to use the breach of warranty as a defence to escape from liability.  
Apart from this law reform proposal, it is also likely that the assured may, 
for any reason, innocently or negligently breach a warranty, but the breach has 
caused no loss to the subject matter insured. In such a case, it would be 
unreasonable for the insurer to be entitled to terminate the insurance contract. 
Instead, the most satisfactory solution introduced by the author is that provided 
that the above conditions are satisfied, the law should require the insurer to 
issue a warning notice within a reasonable time without permitting the insurer 
to rely upon the legal effect of breach of warranty to seek any remedy. Such a 
warning notice requirement, once adopted into the Maritime Code, can serve 
as an important solution to the assured’s innocent or negligent breach of 
warranty which caused no loss to the subject matter insured. However, the 
situation would be different where the assured intentionally breaches a 
warranty without reasonable excuse, but the breach did not cause loss to the 
subject matter. In cases like this, it would be inappropriate to adopt the warning 
notice requirement, because any intentional breach of warranty without 
reasonable excuse should not be justified, regardless of whether or not the 
breach has caused loss. It is also unreasonable to treat innocent or negligent 
breach of warranty in the same way as intentional breach of warranty. In such 
a situation, it is suggested by the author that such a breach should not be 
excused, and the most satisfactory solution is that the assured should be 
required to pay an increased premium as a form of penalty. It follows from 
these two proposals that in the event of a breach of warranty, the remedy 
available to the insurer should depend on the degree of the assured’s fault.  
Similar to the English practice, the payment of premium warranty may also 
be created by the insurer under Chinese marine insurance policies. Thus, the 
situation may arise where the assured enters into a contract of marine 
insurance with the insurer, and the assured fails to pay the agreed premium 
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within the specific time limit. In cases like this, the issue as to whether or not 
the insurer is obliged to indemnify the assured for a peril of the sea insured 
against would depend on the terms of the insurance contract. So where a 
particular clause dealing with the legal consequence for the failure to pay the 
premium is set out in the contract, the issue will be easily resolved by the 
wording of the clause in question. Such a clause is generally written as ‘liability 
does not attach to the insurer unless the premium has been paid’ or ‘the 
contract will not take effect unless the premium has been paid’. Although 
similar wordings are used, they may result in two different legal effects. This is 
because as far as the latter wording is concerned, the insurer may not be 
entitled to claim the premium from the assured on the basis that the insurance 
contract has not taken effect. Under Chinese judicial practice, the courts tend 
to hold that payment of the premium will not affect the liability of the insurer, 
and the insurer will still be obliged to indemnify the assured in respect of the 
loss of the subject matter, even if the premium has not been paid by the 
assured. The main reason for the courts to adopt this approach is to protect 
the assured who is regarded as the weaker party. More specifically, it is 
suggested by the author that this part of Article 235 of the Maritime Code, that 
is Article 235(3), should be modified to read in the following way: 
‘The insurer may, upon receipt of the notice, terminate the contract 
or demand an amendment to the terms and conditions of the 
insurance coverage or an increase in the premium without 
unreasonable delay. If the assured innocently or negligently 
breaches a warranty without causing loss to the subject matter 
insured, the insurer will be required to issue a warning notice to the 
assured. If the insured intentionally breaches a warranty without 
reasonable excuse, but the breach has caused no loss, the assured 
will be required to pay an additional premium at a reasonable rate.’ 
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4.6(2): The legal consequence for a breach of warranty under the 
Hull Insurance Clauses 
In Chinese marine insurance practice, the most commonly used warranty 
clause can be found in Clause 6(3) of the Hull Insurance Clauses of PICC 
1/1/1986.291 A different legal consequence of breach of warranty is specified 
in Clause 6(3) which provides that in case of any breach of warranty as to 
cargo, voyage, trading limit, towage, salvage services or date of sailing, 
provided notice be given to the underwriters immediately after receipt of 
advices and any amended terms of cover and any additional premium required 
by them be agreed, the insurance will continue to be valid, otherwise, the 
insurance will terminate automatically. In other words, where the six types of 
specified warranty are breached, the insurer would not be entitled to terminate 
the contract if the assured notifies the insurer immediately and agrees to 
accept the amended contractual terms and the increased premium. In this 
respect, it can be said that the purpose of such a clause is to enable the 
contracting parties to renegotiate the contract following the assured’s breach 
of warranty. But it is not surprising that Clause 6(3), which can be regarded as 
a held covered clause, is clearly inconsistent with the plain wording of Article 
235 of the Maritime Code. This is because while the assured can be protected 
by Clause 6(3) in the event of a breach of warranty, the insurer can still use the 
breach of warranty as a defence to terminate the contract under Article 235 of 
the Maritime Code. Thus, the problem may then arise as to whether or not the 
legal effect of breach of warranty can be determined by relying on the express 
wording of Clause 6(3).  
In order to avoid the contradiction and ensure that the subject matter 
insured is effectively protected, it is suggested by the author that if the parties 
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have expressly agreed to insert Clause 6(3) into their insurance policy, such a 
clause should prevail over the express wording of Article 235 of the Maritime 
Code as a result of the phrase ‘subject to any express provision in the policy’ 
as appears in the amended version of Article 235 of the Maritime Code. 
Evidently, such a view has gained support in recent court decisions. By way of 
example, the application of a similar clause has received judicial attention in 
the case of Hong Kong Nylon Enterprises Ltd v QBE Insurance (Hong Kong) 
Ltd292 where the policy contained a warranty which provided ‘warranted that 
this is a container load shipment’. In fact, however, there was no such 
container shipped. Instead, the containers that were about to be shipped were 
devanned and their contents carried break bulk. The insurer contended that 
this was a promissory warranty within the meaning of section 33(3) of the 
Marine Insurance Ordinance 293  and must be exactly complied with. But 
Clause 8.3 of the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) was also incorporated into the 
policy, and as the Clause stated, ‘This insurance shall remain in force … 
during delay beyond the control of the Assured, any deviation, forced 
discharge, reshipment or transhipment and during any variation of the 
adventure arising from the exercise of a liberty granted to shipowners or 
charterers under the contract of affreightment.’ The argument advanced by the 
assured was that this clause was essentially a ‘held covered’ clause. 
Obviously, there was a conflict between the express warranty and Clause 8.3 
of the Institute Cargo Clauses. Stone J was of the opinion that the warranty 
and Clause 8.3 of the Institute Cargo Clauses should be read and considered 
jointly. Ultimately, the Hong Kong High Court held that Clause 8.3 took 
precedence over the warranty. It can be seen from this judgment that the 
courts have tended to protect the use of such clauses in favour of the assured.  
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It follows from the above analysis that Article 235 of the Maritime Code 
should only be applicable where no express contrary provision can be found in 
the policy. The problem of the inconsistency can be resolved by inserting the 
phrase ‘subject to any express provision in the policy’ into this part of Article 
235 of the Maritime Code. Such a phrase would indeed soften the harshness 
of the legal consequence of breach of warranty as appears in Article 235 of the 
Maritime Code. But as the phrase has already existed in the amended version 
of Article 235(2), in this respect, it would be superfluous to place this phrase 
again into this part of Article 235 of the Maritime Code.  
4.6(3): The legal consequence after the termination of the contract 
for a breach of warranty    
In addition, in the event of a breach of warranty, it is likely that the insurer 
may choose to terminate the contract by relying on Article 235 of the Maritime 
Code, although in Chinese marine insurance law, the insurer is also entitled to 
a statutory right of termination of the contract where the assured fails to take 
reasonable care as to the safety of the subject matter insured294 and where 
the risk of the subject matter insured is increased.295 In such a case, the issue 
may well arise as to at which point the contract is deemed to be terminated. As 
far as section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 is concerned, in the 
event of a breach of warranty, the liability of the insurer will be automatically 
discharged as from the date of the breach, unless there is a held covered 
clause or a similar provision contained in the policy. Nevertheless, such an 
issue was not specifically stated in the Maritime Code.  
It has been argued that the Maritime Code should set out the rule as to the 
time of which the contract is deemed to be terminated upon a breach of 
warranty, and this aspect of law, if introduced by the Chinese law drafters, 
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should follow the legal consequence of a breach of warranty as stated in 
section 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, so that the contract will be 
terminated automatically as from the date of the breach of warranty. 296 
However, it is unjustifiable to say that this is a convincing argument. This is 
because in accordance with Article 235 of the Maritime Code, the insurer has 
another two alternative remedies to choose once a warranty is breached, 
these are the amendment of the terms and conditions of the contract and an 
increase of the premium.  
Furthermore, another view held by Chinese academics is that as a marine 
insurance contract in China is a special type of contract which is also governed 
by the rules that form part of the general law of contract, where an insurer 
elects to terminate the contract for a breach of warranty, then according to the 
general principles of Chinese contract law, the termination of contract should 
only take effect when the assured receives the notice of termination from the 
insurer.297 In such a situation, the assured would have no right to argue that 
he has not become aware of the existence of such a notice. As the insurer is 
required to exercise a right of choice for a breach of warranty, it is proposed by 
the author that if the insurer chooses to terminate the contract, such a 
termination should be effective as soon as the insurer notifies the assured as 
to his decision in writing, regardless of whether or not the assured has 
received the written notification from the insurer. This means that where a 
marine insurance contract is terminated by the insurer on the ground of a 
breach of warranty, then, according to the general principles of Chinese 
contract law, the legal effect of such termination should be prospective,298 so 
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that the parties’ contractual relationship would come to an end from the time 
the termination takes effect. Obviously, it follows from this law reform proposal 
that the premium paid to the insurer between the date when the contract is 
effectively terminated and the original expiry date of the insurance policy 
should be returned to the assured. The rationale for such a view is that as soon 
as the contract is effectively terminated, the insurer bears no risk of loss to the 
subject matter, so that it is unjust for the insurer to retain the premium.  
However, it is submitted that as the termination of contract takes effect 
only after the notice has been served on the assured, any loss occurred before 
the breach of warranty should be indemnified by the insurer.299 It is justifiable 
to say that this is a cogent argument, because before the breach of warranty 
takes place, the assured fulfilled his entire statutory obligation, so that on the 
insurer’s side, any contractual obligation must still be fulfilled before the 
termination of the contract becomes effective. Evidently, the same proposition 
can also be found in Article 46 of the Opinions of the Supreme People’s Court 
of PRC concerning the Application of the Chinese Maritime Code (draft) which 
provides that where the insurer chooses to terminate the contract by relying on 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code, the insurer shall pay the insurance 
compensation in accordance with the terms of the contract for the losses of the 
subject matter insured which occurred before the contract is terminated and 
are not related to the breach of warranty. 
In Chinese marine insurance law, apart from the express warranties 
inserted into the insurance contract, it is also possible for the parties to agree 
and attach a similar term, that is, condition precedent, to their insurance 
contract under Article 45 of the Contract Law of PRC 1999.300 This means that 
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in a marine insurance contract, if the insurer and the assured expressly agree 
to insert a condition precedent into the contract, failure to comply with such a 
term will allow the insurer to refuse from paying a related claim or automatically 
bring the contract to an end as from the time of the non-compliance.   
 
4.7: The introductory proposal as to the different nature of express 
warranty in the Maritime Code 
It has been firmly established that under section 33(3) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, a warranty does not have to be material to the risk, but it 
must be exactly complied with. In contrast, the situation is different in China, as 
the Maritime Code is rather silent on these two issues. However, the situation 
appears to be different as far as the insurance law of Hong Kong is concerned. 
By way of illustration, in the case of Leung Yuet Ping v. Manulife (International) 
Ltd301 where the deceased applied for a life insurance policy in June 2006 with 
Manulife. He was later diagnosed with colon cancer in June 2006 and died in 
November 2006. The deceased’s widow applied to Manulife for payment of the 
benefits under the policy to her as the beneficiary. Manulife discovered that the 
deceased had made a visit to his doctor following experience of an episode of 
shortness of breath and palpitations 11 days before applying to Manulife for 
the relevant life insurance cover. The deceased was then advised by his 
doctor to consult a cardiologist but he failed to follow that advice. Manulife 
refused to indemnify relying on the fact that the deceased had failed to inform 
them in the proposal (application) form and the medical examination form of 
the visit to his doctor. The High Court in Hong Kong held that the information 
provided by the deceased in the proposal form was a condition precedent to 
attachment of the risk, or to the liability of Manulife under the policy, and was 
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therefore a warranty. The Court found the answers given by the deceased in 
the proposal form and the medical form to be inaccurate and misleading. As 
the deceased had breached the warranties, Manulife was held to be entitled to 
repudiate the insurance contract. In reaching this decision, the Court made it 
clear that a breach of warranty would entitle the insurer to avoid liability under 
the policy and reinforced the need for strict compliance with warranties in 
insurance contracts.  
Although the Marine Insurance Act 1906 can be applied by Chinese courts 
as a source of law where there is no relevant domestic law in China, due to the 
existing trouble and criticism of the concept of warranty in section 33(3) of the 
1906 Act, it is inappropriate for Chinese courts to adopt section 33(3) of the 
1906 Act when considering the same disputable issue. Instead, in order to 
clarify the issues and ensure that the right of the assured is not unfairly 
prejudiced, it is suggested by the author that the amended version of section 
33(3) of the 1906 Act, as proposed by the author in Chapter 2 of the thesis, 
should be adopted and inserted into Article 235(2) of the Maritime Code. 
Despite the effort made by the UK Law Commission and some academics 
for introducing the element of causation into the current warranty regime, the 
issue as to whether or not there is a causal connection between a breach of 
warranty and the loss has not been considered by the Chinese judicial 
authorities. The well-established common law principle that a causal 
connection between a breach of warranty and the loss does not have to be 
shown does not appear in the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 or the Maritime Code, and as a result, it is unclear as to whether or not 
this common law principle can be adopted by Chinese courts to settle a 
particular dispute. As a warranty is a very special term of the insurance 
contract, the breach of which may increase the risk of loss to the subject 
matter insured, it is fair to say that the causal connection approach proposed 
by the Law Commission is unsatisfactory, in the sense that it is clearly 
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inconsistent with the plain wording of section 33(3) of the 1906 Act, that is, ‘if it 
be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in the policy, 
the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of 
warranty...’ Therefore, in order to protect the interest and statutory right of the 
insurer, it is suggested that the new section 33(4) of the 1906 Act, as 
introduced by the author in Chapter 2 of the thesis, should also be inserted into 
Article 235(2) of the Maritime Code.  
Therefore, the proposed statutory rules of exact compliance, materiality of 
risk and causation, as three different types of the nature of express warranty, 
should all be adopted into a different section of Article 235 of the Maritime 
Code, that is Article 235(2), to cover all relevant disputable situations, in the 
sense that the nature of express warranty should be regarded as a different set 
of statutory rule from the statutory definition of warranty and the legal 
consequence of a breach of warranty. In more specific terms, it is suggested 
by the author that Article 235(2) of the Maritime Code should be introduced in 
the following way: 
‘A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly 
complied with only if the purpose of this warranty is to protect the 
subject matter insured. But a warranty relating to the performance 
of future obligation can be substantially observed by the assured if 
such a warranty has no connection with the risk, except the 
warranty to pay premiums.’ 
‘Where a breach of warranty is followed by a loss, the insurer is 
liable to indemnify the assured for the loss, less any damage 
caused as a result of the breach of warranty, if the loss in respect of 
which the assured seeks to be indemnified was not caused or 
contributed to by the breach.’ 
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4.8: A proposal as to the waiver of a breach of warranty in Chinese 
marine insurance law 
It is unclear, under Chinese marine insurance law, as to whether or not a 
breach of warranty can be waived by the insurer, because this aspect of law is 
not stipulated in the relevant provision of the Maritime Code, and there have 
been remarkably very few cases concerning the issue as to the waiver of a 
breach of warranty. A recent example of such an issue is illustrated in the 
Hong Kong case of Hua Tyan Development Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co Ltd.302 
In this case, the approach taken by the court was that where a warranty was 
breached, the insurer could lose the legal protection by unequivocally waiving 
the breach, and this may occur where the insurer, having known the breach of 
warranty, chooses not to avoid the cover through his words or conduct. The 
court has also made it clear that in order to constitute waiver by estoppel in 
accordance with section 34(3) of the Marine Insurance Ordinance, the burden 
of proof would be on the assured to show clear evidence.  
Despite the lack of judicial decisions on the issue of waiver, a similar 
aspect of law can be found in Article 95 of the Contract Law of PRC 1999 
which requires one contracting party to exercise the right of termination of 
contract within a reasonable time or the time limit as agreed by the parties. 
Failure to do so would mean that such a right will lapse. Due to the distinct 
nature of warranty, it may, however, be inappropriate for this aspect of law to 
be applied in the context of marine insurance as the law of waiver of breach of 
warranty. As a breach of warranty generally leads to severe legal 
consequence and requires the insurer to exercise a right of choice immediately, 
it is suggested by the author that mere silence or inaction on the part of the 
insurer should be sufficient to constitute waiver. This means that in the event of 
a breach of warranty, if the insurer fails to take any positive actions to exercise 
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his statutory rights as to the breach within a reasonable time, the assured will 
be entitled to assume that the insurer has waived his right as to the breach, 
and must therefore indemnify any loss as a result of the breach. In English 
marine insurance law, as the legal consequence of a breach of warranty is 
automatic and does not require any election to be made on the part of the 
insurer, the doctrine of waiver set out in section 34(3) of the 1906 Act refers to 
waiver by estoppel rather than waiver by election. This is because there is no 
election for the insurer to make after a warranty is breached by the assured.  
In contrast, the situation is entirely different as far as Chinese marine 
insurance law is concerned, because the insurer is required to make a choice 
immediately as to a breach of warranty. It follows from this perspective that in 
the event of a breach of warranty, the insurer should also be required to make 
an unequivocal representation as to whether or not he will waive the breach. 
This means that if the insurer wishes to waive a breach of warranty, the 
doctrine of waiver by election derived from English law should be adopted into 
the Maritime Code, so that the insurer, having been aware of the breach of 
warranty, must have made a choice between two inconsistent courses of 
action, such as denying the cover or accepting the breach and keep the 
contract on foot. Such an election, once made, is final and is not dependent 
upon reliance on it by the other party.303 Similar to the assured’s notification 
obligation as to a breach of warranty, it is suggested by the author that the 
insurer should also be required to notify the assured in writing within a 
reasonable time if the insurer wishes to waive a particular breach of warranty, 
and such an action should be sufficient to constitute an election. In 
consequence, it is suggested by the author that like the legal consequence of a 
breach of warranty, the waiver of a breach of warranty also requires the insurer 
to make an election for the breach; and therefore, the new Article 235(3) of the 
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Maritime Code will be the proper place to accommodate the proposed law on 
this aspect. As such, the proposed statutory rule as to the waiver of a breach of 
warranty should be introduced into Article 235(3) of the Maritime Code in the 
following way: 
‘The insurer can only waive a breach of warranty by making an 
election as to the breach. Such an election, once made, must be 
communicated to the assured in writing within a reasonable time.’ 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
In consequence, although some new law reform proposals in respect of 
marine warranty in Article 235 of the Maritime Code has been introduced by 
academics and the Supreme Court’s guidance notes, it is clear that there are 
still certain defects in the current Article 235 of the Maritime Code. At the 
outset, the problem as to the lack of a statutory definition of warranty has been 
addressed by the author. According to the author’s view, the new section 33(1) 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should be adopted into Article 235(1) of the 
Maritime Code as a statutory definition. Under the relevant provisions of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, there are three important aspects of the nature of 
warranty, namely a warranty must be exactly complied with, a warranty does 
not have to be material to the risk and a causal connection between a breach 
of warranty and the loss does not have to be shown. It is suggested by the 
author that the amended version of these three aspects of the nature of 
warranty should be introduced and incorporated into Article 235(2) of the 
Maritime Code to clarify certain issues.  
Under the current version of Article 235 of the Maritime Code, the assured 
must notify the insurer immediately as to any breach of warranty, but in the 
author’s view, in such a case, the assured should also be required to take 
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reasonable measures to protect the subject matter insured, otherwise, subject 
to any express provision in the policy, the contract will be automatically 
terminated, with the premiums being non-refunded. Another amendment made 
by the author is that if the insurer fails to make an election immediately upon a 
breach of warranty, the assured will be entitled to assume that the insurer have 
waived the breach, but if, for the first time, the assured committed a minor 
breach of warranty, the insurer can only issue a warning notice to the assured. 
It is believed that these law reform proposals, if introduced into the Maritime 
Code, would bring Chinese marine insurance law in harmony with international 
maritime practice and enable more parties to choose Chinese law to be the 
applicable law. 
Apart from the critical analysis as to Article 235 of the Maritime Code, the 
creation of express warranties, as another aspect of the concept of warranty, is 
also of great importance for the purpose of discussion. Unlike section 35 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906, the law as to the creation of express warranties 
was not stipulated in the relevant provisions of the Maritime Code. However, 
this does not mean that section 35 of the 1906 Act is as perfect as it stands. 
Section 35 of the 1906 Act should also be modified to a certain extent while a 
detailed set of statutory rules concerning the creation of express warranties 
should also be introduced into the Maritime Code. Therefore, these two targets 
will be achieved by the author in the next Chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
A critical analysis as to the statutory rules of the creation of express 
warranty in English and Chinese law 
5.1 Introduction 
After considering the statutory rules of warranty as appears in Article 235 
of the Maritime Code 1993, the author will now make a critical examination as 
to the statutory rules of the creation of express warranty as appear in section 
35 of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906 in this Chapter. The current law in 
this area is also subject to a great deal of criticisms, and therefore, where 
necessary, law reform proposals will be made, through the assistance of 
relevant cases, to bring this area of law into its satisfactory state. The rules 
adopted by the courts over the past years as to the construction of express 
warranty will also be critically examined to reveal its problem. Regrettably, 
such a statutory rule does not appear in the relevant provision of the Maritime 
Code. In the absence of such a statutory rule, it is inevitable that some 
disagreements may arise between the parties as to whether or not a particular 
term of the contract can be treated as a warranty. In addition, in this Chapter, 
the author will analyse the issue as to whether or not the current section 35 of 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 can be appropriately inserted into the Maritime 
Code as the statutory rules for the creation of express warranty. 
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5.2 A critical analysis as to section 35 (1) of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 and its reform proposal 
5.2(1) The way by which an express warranty can be created 
The issue as to how an express warranty can be created is well 
established in section 35 (1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. According to 
this subsection, a warranty can be created in any form of words as long as the 
intention to warrant can be inferred. Thus, the intention of the parties, as can 
be ascertained from the whole of the policy, will prevail. It is clear from this 
subsection that any form of language from which the mutual intention of the 
parties to warrant will be sufficient to constitute a warranty, and there is no 
formal or particular form of wording for an express warranty to be drafted. It 
follows from this perspective that an express warranty can be created in 
standard forms, as those appear in the Institute Clauses. Alternatively, it can 
be created with the words of the contracting parties.304 The use of the word 
‘warranty’ or ‘warranted’ does not necessarily mean that the term is a true 
warranty, although the usual practice in the London market is to use the word 
‘warranted’ to create an express warranty. A typical example of an express 
warranty would appear to be ‘warranted condition survey before shipment’.  
The reason as to why the word ‘warranty’ or ‘warranted’ is not 
determinative of whether a term is a warranty is that the word is sometimes 
used in a different sense as opposed to a promissory warranty, and the word is 
only descriptive of the subject matter or of the risk, so that the insurer is only 
on risk at the time when the term is complied with by the assured.305 This type 
of warranty is generally referred to as a delimiting warranty. A typical example 
of a delimiting warranty can be found in the case of Roberts v Anglo-Saxon 
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Insurance Association Ltd306 where a clause contained in a policy of motor 
vehicle insurance provided: ‘Warranted used only for the following purposes: 
commercial travelling’. Despite the fact that the clause was expressly agreed 
by the parties as a warranty, it was held that the clause should only be 
considered as a description of the risk. This simply means that in the event that 
the vehicle was not used for the purpose of commercial travelling, it would not 
be covered.  
The situation appeared to be different in the case of Sea Insurance Co v 
Blogg307 where a clause contained in the marine policy required the assured’s 
vessel to sail on a specific date. This clause was held to be an express 
warranty, even though the word ‘warranty’ or ‘warranted’ was not used. These 
court decisions suggest that it is possible for the courts to adopt different 
interpretations in respect of similar policy terms. However, according to Baris, 
the use of these words can be regarded as good evidence to prove that the 
parties do have the intention to create express warranties, unless it relates to 
the risk insured. 308  Equally, there are certain types of clause that are 
traditionally referred to as warranties and are given effect as such. A typical 
example would be an express warranty to pay the premium instalments within 
the specific time limits, even though such a warranty does not relate to the 
risk.309 The legal effect of a breach of a particular clause inserted by the 
parties into the policy may assist the court to determine whether or not this 
clause should be construed as a warranty. For instance, where the clause 
expressly states that if it is breached, cover will be terminated or the policy will 
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become void, then this term is likely to be construed by the courts as a 
warranty, even if the breach is immaterial to the risk.310  
Nowadays, the most common method to create an express warranty is to 
ask the assured to make a declaration on the proposal form311 to the effect 
that the statement given by the assured and appeared on the proposal form is 
to be the ‘basis of the contract’312 between the parties, provided that it is 
possible to ascertain the intention of the parties to warrant. This is a legal 
device whereby the assured’s answers and declarations in the proposal form 
will be converted into express warranties, irrespective of the issue as to the 
test of materiality. In general, breach of such a clause, however trivial, would 
be treated as a breach of warranty and give the insurer the right to terminate 
the entire contract. But it should be noted that the ‘basis of contract’ clauses 
apply only to the non-marine insurance field for warranties relating to past or 
present facts.    
5.2(2) The approach adopted by English courts for the 
interpretation of an express warranty 
Due to the harshness and unfairness of the current law as to the legal 
consequence of the breach of warranty, for many years, the courts have 
attempted, through case-law, to mitigate the harshness of the law by adopting 
strict interpretation against the interest of the party who has put it forward313. 
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This point suggests that the courts have a wide discretionary power to 
determine the issue as to whether or not a particular clause is a warranty, 
because such an issue is a question of construction. But the view expressed 
by the Law Commission is that while this has advantages it also introduces 
uncertainty into the law.314 For instance, a particular clause in the policy may 
be construed by the court as a suspensive condition which suspends the 
liability of the insurer only for the duration of the breach, even though from the 
wording of the clause, it appears that it is a promissory warranty.315 
5.2(2)(i) The common law rule of contra proferentum    
Occasionally, the words of a warranty may be ambiguous and capable of 
more than one meaning. In cases like this, the English interpretational rule of 
contra proferentum,316 which stands for verba caratum fortius accipiuntur 
contra proferentum (a contract is interpreted against the person who wrote it), 
would play a crucial role. As such, if two possible interpretations of an express 
term existed, one being favourable to the assured, and one being favourable to 
the insurer, the words will be construed narrowly against the insurer who has 
drafted the wording and sought to rely on it, so that the words will be construed 
in favour of the assured. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the assured 
can avail himself of an apparent ambiguity as to a particular word where its 
meaning would be clear to a reasonable person.317  
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The rule of contra proferentum has been considered at some length in the 
case of Simmonds v Cockell318 where Mr Justice Roche stated that ‘… it is a 
well-known principle of insurance law that if the language of a warranty in a 
policy is ambiguous it must be construed against the underwriter who has 
drawn the policy and has inserted the warranty for his own protection.’ The 
same issue was also considered in the non-marine case of Re Bradley and 
Essex and Suffolk Accident Indemnity Society.319 In this case, as Farwell LJ 
pointed out, ‘it is especially incumbent on insurance companies to make clear, 
both in their proposal forms and in their policies, the conditions which are 
precedent to their liability to pay, for such conditions have the same effect as 
forfeiture clauses, and may inflict loss and injury to the assured and those 
claiming under him out of all proportion to any damage that could possibly 
accrue to the company from non-observance or non-performance of the 
conditions. Accordingly, it has been established that the doctrine that policies 
are to be construed “contra proferentes” applies strongly against the 
company.’320 
5.2(2)(ii) Other common law rules governing the creation of express 
warranty   
In order to mitigate the harsh effects of a warranty, another principle of 
interpretation developed by the courts is that if the insurer wishes to stress the 
draconian consequences of a warranty, it will be the insurer’s responsibility to 
stipulate them in particularly unambiguous terms, and it is not open to the court 
to re-write the terms of the contract. The ambiguities can only be cured by the 
insurer through proper contractual wording. This common law principle was 
brought into discussion in the case of AC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) 
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Ltd321 where a wholesale distribution warehouse was insured under a policy 
which contained a protection maintenance warranty. This warranty provided 
that ‘the whole of the protections provided for the safety of the insured property 
shall be maintained in good order … all defects occurring in any protections 
must be promptly remedied’. The policy also contained a burglar alarm 
maintenance warranty which provided that ‘the burglar alarm shall have been 
put into full and effective operation at all times when the insured’s premises are 
closed for business … all defects occurring in any protections must be 
promptly remedied’. In March 2007, a large amount of cigarettes and tobacco 
were stolen from the warehouse. The ADSL line operated by BT had been 
disconnected for some weeks before the theft. Although it had been 
reconnected before the break-in, there was still an intermittent default on the 
line which prevented the thieves from being detected by the CCTV. The 
insurer refused to indemnify the assured on the ground of the breach of 
warranty. In the judge’s view, as the warranty required the insured to remedy 
any defect promptly, the assured would only be in breach if there was some 
fault of which the assured was aware but failed to remedy in good time. 
Consequently, it was held that the assured was not in breach of warranty, as 
the assured could not have known that there was a continuing fault on the line.  
The English courts’ approach that the insurer must create the warranties in 
clear terms has also been adopted in the Singapore case of Marina Offshore 
Pte Ltd v China Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd and Another 322  which 
concerned a maritime routing warranty. The facts of this case were that Marina 
Offshore insured a coastal tug for one year. The surveyor made six 
recommendations in the survey. One of them concerning the voyage route 
provided: ‘Route to follow to be tracking along nearest coast of Japan, 
Philippines, Sabah unless weather permitted, and to seek shelter if weather is 
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bad …’ In the court of first instance, it was held that this provision was an 
express warranty, and as Marina Offshore had breached this warranty, they 
were not entitled to claim an indemnity under the policy. However, this finding 
was overruled by the Singapore Court of Appeal. According to the Court of 
Appeal’s view, this provision was simply a recommendation rather than a 
warranty. In particular, the Court stressed that a warranty must be constructed 
with express, specific and clear wording in the light of the serious legal 
consequence of the breach so as to ensure that the assured is aware of what 
he has to comply with.323         
Moreover, the words or phrases appeared in a warranty are generally 
construed by the courts in accordance with their ordinary and literal meaning 
as can be found in the dictionary. Nonetheless, the dictionary meanings of 
words may not always reflect the commercial context in which the parties 
reached the agreement, so that the meaning of a particular word is to be 
construed in the context of the relevant background that ordinary commercial 
persons would have understood it to mean.324 Put another way, the ordinary 
meaning of a term will not be adopted where the term has acquired a legal, 
technical or business meaning. By way of example, in the case of Algemeene 
Bankveereniging v Langton,325 it was held that the word ‘robbery’ should not 
be construed in accordance with any legal or technical English meaning of the 
word. Instead, it should be construed in the way that ordinary businessmen 
would have understood it.  
The general approach adopted by the English courts in respect of the 
creation of express warranty is to construe a particular warranty in accordance 
with its intended purpose. Indeed, the courts will allow some degree of 
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flexibility in respect of the ordinary and literal meaning of the warranty. This 
point has been considered in the case of GE Frankona Reinsurance Ltd v 
CMM Trust No 1400 (The Newfoundland Explorer)326 where, under a contract 
of insurance, a motor yacht was insured for one year. One of the express 
warranties in the policy provided ‘warranted vessel fully crewed at all times’. 
The insurer refused to indemnify the assured when the vessel was severely 
damaged by fire on the ground that no crew members were aboard the vessel 
at the time of the fire. It was held that on the proper construction of this clause, 
it required the assured to keep at least one crew member on board the vessel 
24 hours a day. However, taking into account the commercial purpose of this 
clause, it was also held that complying with this clause was subject to two 
exceptions; these are emergencies rendering the crews’ departure necessary, 
and necessary temporary departures for the purpose of performing the 
crewing duties or other related activities. It is clear that in reaching this 
decision, the judge regarded the purpose of the crews’ departure as a crucial 
factor.  
Most importantly, the commercial purpose of the warranty will be taken into 
account in order to construe a particular warranty. It follows from this 
perspective that where the meaning of the wording is ambiguous, the courts 
will adopt a sensible and businesslike construction as opposed to an absurd or 
unreasonable construction. This means that the creation of express warranty 
must be for the benefit of the trade, and for the assured.327 Thus, in the case 
of Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society,328 it 
was suggested by Lord Hoffmann that courts should place more weight upon 
the factual matrix surrounding the contract than the actual words used by the 
parties in the contract. Therefore, this means that the words appeared in the 
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clause should be interpreted according to the commercial purpose as can be 
found in the contract rather than the textual meaning.  
Obviously, the concept of factual matrix would include commercial 
background behind the contract and also the rationale behind the need to 
insert the warranty into the contract. A typical example as to the purpose of a 
warranty can be found in the case of Hart v Standard Marine Insurance Co 
Ltd.329 In this case, an express warranty stated that ‘… warranted no iron or 
ore exceeding the net registered tonnage …’ This warranty was held to be 
breached when a quantity of steel in excess of such net tonnage was shipped, 
because for ordinary business purpose, the term ‘iron’ includes steel. A similar 
decision was reached in the case of Brownsville Holdings Ltd v Adamjee 
Insurance Co Ltd (The Milasan) 330  where one of the disputing issues 
concerned an express warranty in a motor yacht policy which required 
professional skippers and crew to be in charge at all times. The insurer argued 
that the assured was required, under the warranty, to employ a person who 
was professionally qualified to be a skipper for the motor yacht. Taking the 
rationale of the warranty into account, it was held by Aikens J that the words 
‘professional skipper’ referred to a person who had some professional 
experience that qualified him to become a skipper, and this did not necessarily 
mean that he was required to pass formal examinations in order to be a 
professional skipper.  
Nevertheless, a particular warranty will be construed by the court in a way 
that goes no further than necessary to achieve the commercial purpose.331 
Again, this point is dealt with in the case of Hart v Standard Marine Insurance 
Co Ltd332 where Lord Esher MR stated: ‘a warranty like every other part of the 
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contract is to be construed according to the understanding of merchants, and 
does not bind the insured beyond the commercial import of the words … the 
words are not to be construed in the sense in which they would be used 
amongst men of science, but as they would be used in mercantile 
transactions.’333  
In addition, a warranty will be construed by the courts in relation to its 
reasonableness. This point was addressed in the recent case of Pratt v 
Aigaion Insurance Co SA334 where an express warranty required the assured 
to keep at least the owner or an experienced skipper on board at all times. It 
was held that this warranty applied only to the times when the ship was at sea, 
despite the fact that the phrase ‘at all times’ appeared in the warranty 
statement. These court decisions indicate that the courts have a wide 
discretionary power to determine the issue as to whether or not a particular 
term can be construed as a warranty, even though by ascertaining the mutual 
intention of the parties, it is clear that on a proper construction of the term, it 
should be viewed as a warranty. So in the non-marine case of Kler Knitwear 
Ltd v Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd,335 a term of the policy expressly 
stated that the policyholder’s sprinkler system would be inspected 30 days 
after renewal. The contract also stated that the term was a warranty and 
non-compliance would bar any claim ‘whether it increases the risk or not’. In 
fact, the sprinkler system was inspected about 60 days late, although the late 
inspection showed that the system was under its normal working condition. 
Unfortunately, the policyholder’s factory subsequently suffered from storm 
damage which was wholly unconnected with the late inspection. On the face of 
it, it is clear that the parties did intend the term to be a warranty. Nevertheless, 
it was held that this term was merely a suspensive condition, with the effect 
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that the insurer’s liability was temporarily suspended during the 60 days when 
the sprinkler system was not inspected.  
As far as this case is concerned, it should be pointed out that the court has 
reached an unfair decision, because ‘the term itself was called a warranty and 
was drafted in clear and intelligible language and the legal consequences of 
non-compliance were spelt out.’336 It follows from this perspective that as the 
parties’ intention to warrant was clear; this court decision contradicts with the 
plain wording of section 35(1) of the Act which permits an express warranty to 
be created in any form of words. Nevertheless, different situations may arise 
where it would be rather difficult for the courts to infer from the parties’ 
intention to warrant. 
It has also been pointed out by Rix LJ that to determine the issue as to 
whether or not a particular clause can be construed as a warranty, three issues 
must be considered, these are ‘whether the term goes to the root of the 
transaction; whether the term bears materially on the risk of loss; and whether 
damages would be an inadequate or unsatisfactory remedy for the breach.’337 
A decision concerning these issues was reached in the case of GE 
Reinsurance Corporation v New Hampshire Insurance Co338 which dealt with 
reinsurance contracts. Here, a term of the film finance policy stated that the 
film production company would keep the employment contract with its creative 
inspiration, Steve Stabler, for the duration of the policy. But in fact, Mr Stabler 
left the production company soon after the inception of the risk. Before the 
expiry of the insurance policy, the film production company went into 
liquidation and was unable to repay the debt of US $100 million. The reinsurers 
argued that they were entitled to deny liability as the term in question 
constituted an express warranty. It was held by Langley J that the term was a 
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true warranty, because Mr Stabler’s role in the production company was a 
material factor in defining the extent of the risk. It was also confirmed that if the 
reinsurers were to be limited for a claim for damages as a result of the breach, 
it would be an unsatisfactory and inadequate remedy as it would be difficult, 
though not impossible, to assess how Mr Stabler’s departure could have 
affected the production company’s ability to repay its debt. 
5.2(3) The law reform proposal as to the statutory rule of the 
creation of express warranty  
In order to avoid the problem of identifying warranties, it is suggested by 
the author that the existing section 35(1) of the Act should be replaced by a 
new statutory mechanism. In particular, it is proposed by the author that when 
creating an express warranty, the importance of warranty and the legal 
consequence for the breach must be set out in the policy with clear wording in 
order to draw the assured’s attention, so that the assured will be able to 
understand the legal purpose of the warranty and comply with the warranty by 
taking extra care. If the insurer fails to do so, such a term will not be construed 
as a warranty. If this law reform proposal is to be implemented, it will also 
assist the courts to determine the issue as to whether or not a particular term 
can be treated as a warranty. Indeed, this law reform proposal is consistent 
with the relevant provision of the Insurance Law of PRC which provides that 
where an insurance contract contains terms and conditions concerning 
exclusion of the liability of an insurer, the insurer shall warn the insured in the 
proposal form or other insurance documents to notice such terms and 
conditions and shall clearly explain orally or in writing such terms and 
conditions to the proposer at the time of concluding the contract. Where such 
terms and conditions are not clearly explained, they shall not be effective.339  
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In addition, the purpose of a warranty is indeed another factor which must 
be taken into account in order to determine whether or not a particular term 
can be treated as a warranty. Words describing or qualifying the subject matter 
of the insurance have been held to be warranties in the classic case of 
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Campbell,340 even though these words had 
nothing to do with commercial or risk-related purpose. In this case, the view 
taken by Lord Sumner was that subject to the mutual intention of the parties, a 
description inserted into the policy for the purpose of identifying the subject 
matter insured are deemed to be warranties. This decision is clearly unfair as 
far as the assured is concerned, particularly where a loss has occurred as a 
result of the perils of the sea, because in such a situation, the assured would in 
no way recover his loss due to the breach of the descriptive warranty which 
has no connection with the risk insured.  
In order to prevent the insurer from converting every statement into 
warranty, in the opinion of the author, therefore, a new statutory proposal 
should be introduced into section 35(1) of the Act, that is, a warranty should 
only be created with commercial or risk-related purpose in order to be effective; 
terms created by the insurer with other purposes should not be treated as 
warranties. In other words, a warranty should be created to ensure that it is fair 
and reasonable for the assured to comply with, and any absurd or 
unreasonable terms inserted into the policy should not be treated as 
warranties, but this does not mean that these terms should not appear in the 
policy as less stringent contractual terms.  
Both of these two law amendment proposals should be inserted into 
section 35(1) of the Act, so that it would be more straightforward for the courts 
to determine whether or not a particular term can be construed as a warranty 
without reaching an unfair decision. But in the author’s view, this does not 
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mean that the existing wording of section 35(1) of the Act should not be 
retained, as they do not appear to contradict with each other. Moreover, if 
these two law amendment proposals were to be implemented, the assured’s 
interest and the subject matter insured would be protected in a more effective 
way. In more specific terms, it is suggested by the author that the new section 
35(1) of the Act should be introduced to read as follows:  
An express warranty may be in any form of words from which the 
intention to warrant is to be inferred. In order for an express 
warranty to be valid, the importance of warranty and the legal 
consequence for the breach must appear in the policy. A warranty 
must be created with commercial or risk related purpose to be valid.  
 
5.3 Different types of clause other than warranties      
Despite the fact that some types of contractual terms are similar to express 
warranties, these terms should not be treated as such. A typical example is 
exclusion clauses which simply limit the extent of the coverage and use similar 
wording to express warranties, such as: ‘Warranted free of capture and 
seizure’. The purpose of such a clause is to discharge the insurer from liability 
if the insured vessel is seized. Obviously, these wordings do not constitute true 
warranties, because the purpose of these wordings is simply to define the 
extent of the policy and exclude the insurer’s liability for a particular risk of loss 
where necessary. Nevertheless, similar to warranties and condition 
precedents, the insurer does not have to show a causal connection between 
the assured’s non-compliance and the loss.341 Unlike a promissory warranty, 
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an exclusion clause does not represent a promise on the part of the assured; 
rather, it only gives rise to a temporary increase in the risk.342  
The legal distinction between a warranty and an exclusion clause has 
been drawn in the case of De Maurier (Jewels) Limited v Bastion Insurance Co 
Ltd343 where Donaldson J stated: ‘… In the marine field “warranted free from 
capture and seizure” is a warranty of the former character [i.e. an exclusion] 
leaving the contract effective in respect of loss by other perils. “Warranted to 
sail on or before a particular date” is, however, of a promissory character … 
The commercial reasoning behind this legal distinction is clear, namely, that 
breach of the former type of warranty does not affect the nature or extent of the 
risks falling outside the terms of the warranty; breach of a promissory warranty 
may, however, materially affect such risks.’ A typical example of such an 
exclusion clause can be found in the case of Roberts v Anglo Saxon Insurance 
Co344 where a clause of a motor policy provided: ‘warranted used only for … 
commercial travelling’. This clause was held to be an exclusion clause which 
simply defined the risk. This means that the vehicle was off risk when it was 
used for other purposes, but cover would resume as soon as the vehicle was 
again used for commercial travelling. Despite the clear distinction between a 
warranty and an exclusion clause, the use of the word ‘warranted’ in marine 
policies may still cause confusion on some occasions. For this reason, the 
insurers should be extremely cautious to choose the appropriate wording when 
creating an express warranty. 
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5.4 The evaluation of the requirement that an express warranty 
must be in written forms 
Despite the fact that no specific wording is necessary to create an express 
warranty, as required by section 35(2) of the Act, a warranty must be included 
in, or written upon, the policy, or contained in some documents incorporated by 
reference into the policy.345 It follows from this perspective that a warranty 
may be written in any part of the policy, either at the top or bottom. Besides, it 
can also appear on the margin346 or on the back of the policy. But if the 
warranty is written on the back of the policy, particular attention should be 
drawn to the assured on the face of the policy. This is because if the warranties 
are completed on the face of the policy, the assured would be entitled to 
assume that all the warranties appeared on the face constitute the whole 
contract between the parties.347 Thus, provided that the parties’ intention to 
warrant is clear, answers to questions contained in slips, proposal forms or 
covering notes can all become warranties. That is to say, a particular clause, if 
properly drafted by the insurer, can become an express warranty, provided 
that it is inserted or incorporated, either directly or indirectly by way of 
reference, into the policy. This statutory rule was originally established by Lord 
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Mansfield in the case of Pawson v Watson348 where he stated: ‘if the parties 
had considered it as a warranty they would have had it inserted in the 
policy.’349 It must also be made clear, however, that oral statements made 
during the course of negotiations will not be considered as express warranties. 
This is because oral statements can only give rise for avoiding the policy on 
the basis of misrepresentation which is governed by section 20 of the 1906 
Act.  
But the situation would be different where an oral statement or a 
representation is subsequently incorporated into the policy in written forms. In 
such a case, it may be construed as a warranty provided that the parties’ 
intention to warrant is clear. However, this aspect of law should be criticised on 
the basis that oral statements or representations should be distinguished from 
express warranties which are created by the insurer as special terms of the 
insurance contract. The reasoning behind this argument is that oral statements 
or representations made by the assured before the conclusion of the contract 
generally involve with past or present facts which, according to the author’s 
point of view, should not be regarded as express warranties,350 even though 
these statements or representations are subsequently set out in written forms 
and incorporated into the policy.  
Furthermore, as far as marine insurance law is concerned, a clear 
distinction should be drawn between a warranty and a representation. While a 
warranty must be strictly complied with by the assured, a representation is only 
required to be substantially true. In terms of the legal consequence for the 
breach, the insurer is automatically discharged from liability for the breach of 
warranty unless the breach is waived by the insurer, whereas a 
misrepresentation will render the contract voidable, so that the contract will 
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remain in force unless and until the insurer exercises his right to avoid it. For 
this reason, in the opinion of the author, it is suggested that oral statements or 
representations made by the assured should not be included into the policy by 
the insurer as express warranties. As such, it is proposed by the author that 
section 35(2) of the Act should be amended to read in the following way: 
An express warranty must be included in, or written upon, the policy, 
or must be contained in some document incorporated by reference 
into the policy. But oral statements or representations subsequently 
incorporated into the policy shall not be considered as warranties. 
 
5.5 The lack of a statutory rule as to the creation of express 
warranty in the Maritime Code 
Under Chinese marine insurance practice, every express warranty must 
be written into the policy in order to be effective, and the word ‘warrant’ or 
‘promise’ is generally used for the construction of a warranty. But a warranty 
should be created reasonably by taking into account the interests of the 
assured. In Chinese legal practice, no reported cases have so far been found 
on the issue as to the creation of express warranties. Unlike section 35 of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 which provides a detailed set of statutory rules as 
to the creation of express warranty, such an issue has not been set out in the 
relevant provisions of the Maritime Code. Due to the simple provisions of 
Chapter XII of the Maritime Code, it may sometimes lead to uncertainty and 
unnecessary disputes as to whether or not a particular clause can be 
construed as an express warranty.  
170 
 
In China, however, as far as the practice of insurance is concerned, an 
express warranty can also be created by the basis of the contract clause351 as 
the English practice. That is to say, some of the statements made by the 
policyholder relate to past or present facts, which can be converted into 
express warranties by the basis of the contract clause. In general, most of the 
basis of the contract clauses can be found at the bottom of the proposal form. 
Breach of such a clause will give the insurer the right to reject the 
policyholder’s claim. In China, it is undisputable that the existence of the basis 
of the contract clause would harm the interest of the assured. This is especially 
true where an innocent assured may honestly give wrong information. 
Alternatively, the false information given by the assured may be trivial rather 
than material.352 In such a case, the insurer would be entitled to reject the 
assured’s claim by relying on the basis of the contract clause. This is clearly 
unfair for the assureds, because many assureds in China do not even 
understand the meaning and the legal effect of the basis of the contract clause. 
In other words, the basis of the contract clause may operate as a potentially 
dangerous trap for the assured. Nevertheless, in the absence of any decided 
cases on the issue as to the application of the basis of the contract clauses in 
China, Chinese courts will reject a particular contractual term in the proposal 
form where they think that term is unfair for the policyholder.353 But it can be 
concluded that the retention of the basis of the contract clauses in China would 
not be beneficial for the insurer. This is because once the insurer rejects the 
policyholder’s claim for a breach of the basis of the contract clause which was 
created unfairly against the policyholder, it is very likely that the insurer’s 
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business reputation will be damaged accordingly. In consequence, in the 
opinion of the author, the basis of the contract clause should be abolished for 
both marine and non-marine insurance from the Chinese insurance industry. 
This means that all warranties created by the insurers through the use of the 
basis of the contract clauses should have no effect on the assured.      
In Chinese marine insurance law, when construing an express warranty, 
the English interpretational rule of contra proferentem can be adopted by the 
courts to resolve a particular dispute. The doctrine of contra proferentem has 
also been adopted in the relevant provision of the Chinese Insurance Law 
which provides: ‘If there is any dispute between the insurer and the applicant, 
the insured or the beneficiary, over the terms of an insurance contract, the 
people’s courts or arbitration organisations shall interpret such disputed terms 
in favour of the insured and the beneficiary.’354  
The judicial practice of the courts to adopt the rule of contra proferentem 
can be found in Hong Kong. By way of illustration, in the case of Hong Kong 
Nylon Enterprises Ltd v QBE Insurance (Hong Kong) Ltd,355 an express 
warranty appeared in the policy provided: ‘Warranted that this is a container 
load shipment’. One of the disputing issues was whether or not this wording 
could be construed as a warranty. The insurer argued that this was a 
promissory warranty within the meaning of section 33(3) of the Marine 
Insurance Ordinance, so that it had to be exactly complied with. The assured, 
on the other hand, contended that the warranty was ambiguous and that the 
word ‘shipment’ could mean the act of shipping the goods on board or merely a 
consignment of goods intended for shipment. This would only mean that the 
goods had to be in containers at the time of inception of the risk, and therefore, 
the warranty had been complied with. However, this argument was rejected by 
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Stone J who interpreted the warranty as requiring the goods to be shipped in a 
container without any temporal limitation to the moment of the inception of risk. 
This case is in contrast with the ELAZ case356 where the insurance policy in 
question was issued ‘subject to full container load’. The policy also contained 
an express warranty that the goods would at all times be in a container. After a 
careful consideration of this wording, Stone J held that the wording did not 
constitute an express warranty that there could never be transhipment 
between containers. As a result, the insurer was not entitled to rely on the 
breach of the alleged warranty as a defence.  
 
5.6 The introduction of the statutory rule as to the creation of 
express warranty in the Maritime Code 
In order to overcome the problem of uncertainty, it is suggested by the 
author that a detailed statutory rule should be introduced into the relevant 
provision of the Maritime Code. In the view of the author, the amended version 
of section 35(1) and 35(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, as proposed by 
the author earlier in Chapter 2, are the most appropriate statutory rules which 
can be inserted into Article 235 of the Maritime Code as the creation of 
express warranties. It follows from this proposal that a new Article should also 
emerge from the Maritime Code, that is, Article 235(4) which should deal 
explicitly with the rules as to the creation of express warranties. 
Apart from this law proposal, it is suggested by the author that a warranty 
should also be created with legal purpose in order to prevent the insurance 
company from inserting illegal warranties into the policy. In other words, a 
warranty should be created to enable the assured to comply with the warranty 
in a lawful manner. By way of example, let us assume that a warranty 
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appearing in the policy requires the insured vessel to enter into an area which 
is strictly prohibited by the local government, this warranty will clearly be an 
illegal warranty which should not be complied with by the assured. It follows 
from this perspective that in order to constitute an express warranty, the 
commercial, risk-related and legal purpose should all be taken into account. In 
consequence, it is suggested by the author that this part of Article 235(4) of the 
Maritime Code should be introduced to read as follows: 
An express warranty may be in any form of words from which the 
intention to warrant is to be inferred. In order for an express 
warranty to be valid, the importance of warranty and the legal 
consequence for the breach must appear in the policy. A warranty 
must be created with commercial, risk-related or legal purpose to be 
valid.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the statutory rules as to the creation of express warranty 
under section 35 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 have been critically 
examined by the author in this Chapter. As far as section 35(1) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 is concerned, there is no statutory requirement for the 
insurer to create an express warranty. It follows from this aspect of law that it is 
possible for a warranty to be created with ambiguity. In such a case, the words 
will be construed in favour of the assured. In addition, the purpose of the 
warranty is another factor which has to be considered by the courts. It is 
sometimes difficult for the courts to identify a particular warranty. Therefore, in 
the author’s view, in order for an express warranty to be valid, the importance 
of the warranty and the legal consequence for the breach must appear in the 
policy to assist the assured to comply with the warranty. An express warranty 
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should also be created with commercial or risk-related purpose. These two law 
amendment proposals should be inserted into section 35(1) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. As far as section 35(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
is concerned, an express warranty must be set out in writing and included in 
the policy. It has also been established that oral statements and 
representations made by the assured may become express warranties if these 
statements and representations are subsequently incorporated into the policy 
in written forms. But as these statements and representations generally 
involve with past or existing facts, it is suggested by the author that they should 
not be considered as express warranties. In contrast, the rules as to the 
creation of express warranties were not covered in the Maritime Code. 
Therefore, it is proposed by the author that the amended version of section 
35(1) and 35(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 should be inserted into 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code, but the legal purpose of the warranty must 
also be taken into account by the insurer when creating an express warranty. 
Having critically examined the statutory nature of express warranties under 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the Chinese Maritime Code, the author will 
then provide a detailed analysis as to the statutory rules of the implied 
warranties in Chapter 6. The warranty of seaworthiness is the most important 
type of implied warranty. Therefore, a lengthy discussion will be provided in 
Chapter 6 to reveal whether or not the current law in this area is in need of 
modification. Apart from the implied warranty of seaworthiness, other types of 
implied warranty will also be critically examined in the next Chapter. Equally, 
the law as to the implied warranties between English law and Chinese law will 
also be critically compared. 
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Chapter 6 
A critical examination as to implied warranties in respect of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the Maritime Code 1993 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, the author has analysed the rules as to the 
creation of express warranty in the Marine Insurance Act and the Maritime 
Code. It is appropriate, at this stage, to examine another type of warranty 
which was created by English law and Chinese law, that is, the implied 
warranty.357 Unlike express warranties which can be created by the parties 
and which must be included in or written upon the policy, implied warranties 
are deemed to apply by the operation of law without the need for the insurer to 
insert these warranties into the insurance contract. As far as the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 is concerned, there are generally 4 types of implied 
warranty; these are warranty of portworthiness, 358  warranty of 
cargoworthiness,359 warranty of legality360 and warranty of seaworthiness.361 
There is no doubt to say that the warranty of seaworthiness is the most 
important type of implied warranty. This is because the term ‘seaworthiness’ 
has a strong connection with the condition and quality of the ship which should 
be regarded as a crucial factor for the liability of the insurer to indemnify any 
potential loss to the ship or the cargo. As such, the term ‘seaworthiness’ will be 
analysed to reveal whether the current statutory definition of the term 
‘seaworthiness’ is appropriate. The doctrine of stages as appears in section 
39(3) is another important issue which should be considered in this Chapter. In 
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addition, the issue as to the burden of proving unseaworthiness will also be 
critically analysed in this Chapter. Last but not least, while the warranty of 
seaworthiness directly applies to voyage policies, there is, in general, no 
implied warranty of seaworthiness in time policies unless the assured is aware 
of the unseaworthiness when the ship is sent to sea. However, the current 
section 39 of the 1906 Act has failed to address the issue as to whether or not 
the warranty of seaworthiness has a role to play in mixed policies. This area of 
law will also be critically examined to reveal whether or not the current law is in 
need of modification or clarification. 
In contrast, seaworthiness is treated as an exception to the liability of the 
insurer rather than an implied warranty under the Maritime Code. The current 
problem in respect of the law of unseaworthiness under the Maritime Code is 
that it has failed to provide a statutory definition as to the term ‘seaworthiness’. 
In addition, it is unclear, under the Maritime Code, as to whether or not 
unseaworthiness applies to voyage policies and time policies. These problems 
and uncertainty will be also addressed by the author in this Chapter through a 
critical comparison between English law and Chinese law. Where necessary, 
some new law reform proposals will also be introduced for the purpose of 
replacing the existing law. 
 
6.2 Warranty of portworthiness 
In English marine insurance law, there are a number of statutory 
obligations under the Marine Insurance Act 1906 that the assured must fulfil in 
order to be entitled to claim the loss of the subject matter insured. One of these 
obligations is the warranty of portworthiness which can be found in section 
39(2) of the 1906 Act. In particular, this sub-section provides that where the 
policy attaches while the ship is in port, there is an implied warranty that she 
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shall, at the commencement of the risk, be reasonably fit to encounter the 
ordinary perils of the port. The warranty of portworthiness generally applies to 
the ‘at and from’ policy with the result that the ship insured must be seaworthy 
for the port362 or portworthy.  
In practice, the warranty of portworthiness applies to all voyage policies, 
provided that it is not excluded by the terms of the policy.363 The express 
wording of this sub-section indicates that the insured vessel in question only 
needs to be reasonably fit to encounter the ordinary perils of the port as soon 
as the risk attaches. This means that the warranty of portworthiness does not 
have to be complied with throughout the life time of the policy. Rather, it is 
sufficient that the assured complies with the warranty of portworthiness at a 
specific point of time. This point is illustrated in the case of Mersey Mutual 
Underwriting Association Ltd v Poland364 where a vessel called Sunlight was 
insured under a time policy with the plaintiff underwriters. The plaintiffs then 
entered into a contract of reinsurance with the defendants, so that the Sunlight 
was covered for a port risks policy until leaving Shannon. When leaving 
Shannon, the Sunlight struck the bottom and was seriously damaged. The 
plaintiffs indemnified the owners of the Sunlight. But when the plaintiffs sought 
to recover on their port risks policy from the defendants, the defendants 
rejected their claims. The court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
recover under the port risks policy on the basis that risks associated with the 
port terminated when the Sunlight left her moorings. In particular, as Hamilton 
J stated, ‘I think that the risk under a port risk policy ceases when the ship, 
being fitted and equipped for sea, and possessed of her clearances, crew, and, 
                                                        
362
 The wording ‘seaworthy for the port’ was stated by Lord Penzance in the case of Quebec Marine 
Insurance Co v Commercial Bank of Canada (1870) LR 3 PC 234 at p 241. 
363
 Susan Hodges, Law of Marine Insurance, 1996, p 122. 
364
 (1910) 15 Com Cas 205. 
178 
 
if necessary, her cargo, commences to navigate upon her voyage, and no 
longer remains moored in the port in the course of preparing for the voyage.’365 
Furthermore, it is clear that the express wording ‘reasonably fit to 
encounter the ordinary perils of the port’ indicates that in order to determine 
the issue as to whether or not a particular vessel is portworthy, a number of 
factors should be taken into account. These factors would include the class of 
the vessel, different types of the port, different types of the year and the 
weather conditions. This means that the issue as to whether or not the 
warranty of portworthiness has been complied with is a question of fact. It is 
not surprising that port risks generally constitute a less serious hazard than 
that of the sea voyage. For this reason, the assured may find it easier to 
comply with the warranty of portworthiness as opposed to the warranty of 
seaworthiness. Additionally, as regular surveys and controls are carried out by 
classification societies, complying with the warranty of portworthiness may not 
be a heavy burden for the assured when the risk attaches. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the statutory requirement that the warranty of portworthiness must 
be complied with may sometimes be superfluous. As such, it is suggested by 
the author that in certain circumstances, the assured’s duty to comply with the 
warranty of portworthiness can be discharged. This means that the current 
section 39(2) of the 1906 Act should be modified in the following way: 
In voyage policy and time policy, there is no implied warranty of 
portworthiness provided that regular surveys are carried out by an 
approved classification society. 
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6.3 Warranty of cargoworthiness 
In contract of marine insurance, it is not sufficient for the assured to ensure 
that the ship is in a reasonably good condition to encounter the ordinary perils 
of the sea. The assured is also required to comply with the implied warranty of 
cargoworthiness, so that the original nature of the goods transported can be 
protected throughout the entire voyage. This warranty indicates that the ship 
must be fit enough to carry the contractual goods to the intended destination in 
a safe manner. In carriage of goods by sea, the requirement of 
cargoworthiness falls within the scope of the implied warranty of 
seaworthiness. This point is well illustrated in the Carriage of Goods by sea Act 
1971.366 In contrast, in the law of marine insurance, the term ‘cargoworthiness’ 
is defined in a different way from the term ‘seaworthiness’. Evidently, the 
statutory definition of the term ‘cargoworthiness’ can be found in section 40(2) 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 which requires the ship to be reasonably fit, 
at the commencement of the voyage, to carry the goods or other moveables to 
the destination contemplated by the policy. It can be seen from this subsection 
that whether or not a vessel is sufficiently fit to carry the particular kind of cargo 
to the destination contemplated by the policy would depend on the vessel’s 
physical state which includes the design of the ship and the equipment 
available on the ship. So while a ship may be reasonably fit to carry frozen 
meat, the ship would probably be uncargoworthy for the transport of steel rails. 
By way of example, in the case of Sleigh v Tyser,367 it was held that to be 
considered as cargoworthy, a vessel carrying livestock was required to have 
sufficient ventilation and stockmen to care for the cargo. 
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But it should also be emphasized that the warranty of cargoworthiness 
only applies at the time the voyage commences. So like the warranty of 
seaworthiness, the fact that the ship is uncargoworthy after the 
commencement of the voyage does not mean that the warranty of 
cargoworthiness is breached. This rule is introduced in accordance with Rule 1 
of Article III of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 which provides, in 
relevant part, that the carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the 
voyage to exercise due diligence to make the holds, refrigerating and cool 
chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and 
safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. In other words, if the cargo 
was damaged as a result of the uncargoworthiness of the vessel at one point 
during the sea voyage, the insurer will still be liable to indemnity the assured 
for the damage of the cargo, provided that the warranty of cargoworthiness 
has been complied with at the commencement of the voyage.  
While the application of the warranty of cargoworthiness has been made 
clear in section 40(2) of the 1906 Act, it has failed to take into account the 
issue as to the vessel’s physical state to carry the particular kind of cargo in 
time policies. In the absence of such a statutory rule, it is not surprising that the 
insurer does not wish to accept loss or damage of the cargo if the ship is 
unsuitable for the transport of a particular type of cargo in time policies. In 
order to ensure that the cargo transported is well protected, it is suggested by 
the author that the warranty of cargoworthiness should also apply to time 
policies. However, as far as time policy is concerned, the ship may be insured 
for only one calendar month which should be regarded as a short period of 
time. It is also likely that the ship is insured for a long period of time, such as 
one year. As such, it would be unreasonable to require the assured to ensure 
that the ship is cargoworthy, especially when the ship is insured for a long 
period of time. This is because such an obligation would be a heavy burden for 
the assured. But in the opinion of the author, this does not mean that the 
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assured should not be required, under the 1906 Act, to comply with the 
warranty of cargoworthiness in time policies. Logically, it would be easier for 
the assured to comply with the warranty of cargoworthiness while the ship is 
moored at a port. This is because in such a case, the cargo will need to be 
protected by necessary equipment which can be easily loaded onto the ship, 
such as refrigerating machinery. But this may not be the case after the ship 
has commenced her voyage. Put another way, during the ocean transit, it 
would be almost impossible to load necessary cargo equipment onto the ship 
or maintain the cargo equipment in good condition.  
Therefore, in order to achieve fairness between the assured and the 
insurer, in the opinion of the author, the warranty of cargoworthiness should 
also apply to time policies, but it should apply only when the ship is moored at 
a port. As such, it is proposed by the author that an additional sentence should 
be inserted into section 40(2) of the 1906 Act, so that the new version of 
section 40(2) of the 1906 Act should be introduced in the following way: 
In a voyage policy on goods or other moveables there is an implied 
warranty that at the commencement of the voyage the ship is not 
only seaworthy as a ship, but also that she is reasonably fit to carry 
the goods or other moveables to the destination contemplated by 
the policy. In a time policy, there is an implied warranty that the ship 
is reasonably fit to carry the goods or other moveables only when 
the ship is moored at a port. 
 
6.4 Warranty of legality 
In order to ensure that the subject matter insured is well covered by the 
insurer, the assured must also comply with the implied warranty of legality 
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which is spelt out in section 41 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.368 In more 
specific terms, this section provides that there is an implied warranty that the 
adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so far as the assured can control 
the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner. As far as this 
section is concerned, it is clear that not only the subject matter insured must be 
legal, but also the adventure insured must be legal and must be performed 
legally. It can be seen from the express wording of this section ‘the adventure 
shall be carried out in a lawful manner’ that the warranty of legality is a 
continuing warranty, so that as long as the assured can control the matter, the 
warranty of legality will be breached if there is any subsequent illegality which 
arises during the currency of the policy. In addition, unlike other types of the 
implied warranty which apply only in voyage policies, the warranty of legality 
applies to voyage policy as well as time policy. This is because the term 
‘adventure’ used in this section clearly covers the term ‘voyage’. To be more 
specific, section 41 of the 1906 Act should be divided into 2 aspects of law, 
namely the legality of the adventure and the performance of the adventure.  
Where the adventure insured is illegal from the outset, the assured will be 
in breach of the implied warranty of legality. This aspect of law is illustrated in 
the case of Redmond v Smith.369  In this case, as Chief Justice Tindal said, ‘A 
policy on an illegal voyage cannot be enforced; for it would be singular, if, the 
original contract being invalid and incapable to be enforced, a collateral 
contract founded upon it could be enforced. It may be laid down, therefore, as 
a general rule, that, where a voyage is illegal, an insurance upon such voyage 
is illegal.’ In order to determine the issue as to whether or not a violation of a 
particular statute or regulation would constitute an illegal marine adventure, 
the statute or regulation in question has to be interpreted by the courts. If the 
intention of the legislator is to prohibit such an adventure, there will clearly be a 
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breach of the warranty of legality. In cases where the degree of the breach of 
the statute or regulation would only constitute the infliction of a penalty, the 
insurer will not be entitled to deny the assured’s claim by reason of a breach of 
the warranty of legality.370 
Another situation where a marine adventure insured may be rendered 
unlawful is when trading with a particular country is prohibited by international 
law. By way of illustration, under the UN Resolution 1990/661, an embargo 
was introduced by the United Nations (UN), so that trading with Iraq was 
prohibited, and all the members of the UN were required to enact legislation 
that complies with the embargo of the UN. In this situation, the implied 
warranty of legality will be breached by the assured where a voyage sailing to 
that country was insured under the policy. 
In order to ensure that the adventure insured is a lawful one, the assured 
must also prepare a valid safety management certificate and document of 
compliance showing that the management system of the ship insured complies 
with the requirements of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code.371  
The second part of section 41 of the 1906 Act also requires the adventure 
insured to be performed legally if the assured is able to exercise control over 
the matter. This aspect of law indicates that in order to ensure that there is no 
breach of the implied warranty of legality, statute or regulation should not be 
violated during the performance of the adventure. A typical example of this 
aspect of law is demonstrated in the Canadian case of James Yachts Ltd v 
Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co Ltd and Others372 where the assured 
violated the bylaws and regulations of the local authority during the 
performance of the adventure insured. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia held that the performance of the adventure insured was illegal on the 
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basis that according to the objective of these regulations the performance of 
such a business in that particular place was prohibited. 
Under the second part of section 41 of the 1906 Act, the issue as to 
whether or not the assured is able to control the matter is a question of fact. So 
in the case of Pipon v Cope,373 the crew members had committed repeated 
acts of barratry on three consecutive voyages. In such a situation, it was held 
that the shipowner was not entitled to argue that the matter was beyond his 
control, because he was under an obligation to ensure that the adventure 
insured was performed in a lawful manner. 
As far as the warranty of legality is concerned, another issue that must be 
considered here is when the parties enter into an insurance contract that 
involves foreign elements. In such a case, the issue as to which set of legal 
rules govern the transaction would arise. Depending on the choice of law 
agreement of the contract, such an issue should be determined by the 
contracting parties through the concept of party autonomy which refers to the 
power of the parties to a contract to choose the law that governs that contract, 
such that the principle of the choice of law comes into play to reconcile the 
differences between the laws of different legal jurisdictions. However, if the 
parties choose a foreign law as their applicable law by virtue of the concept of 
party autonomy with the intention to avoid the mandatory applicability of 
certain legal rules, such as the Hague-Visby Rules, the choice of law 
agreement would be considered void by the courts. This issue arose in the 
case of The Hollandia374 where the House of Lords made it clear that the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 gives effect to the Hague-Visby Rules, 
which have the force of law in the United Kingdom (UK). In this case, the 
House of Lords held that a choice of forum clause in a bill of lading would not 
be given effect to by English Court if its enforcement would result in the Hague 
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Visby Rules not being applied. According to the House of Lords, by virtue of 
Rule 8 of Article III of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971,375 the choice of 
forum clause would be null and void if its application had the effect of lessening 
the liability of the carrier as compared with the standard of liability under the 
Hague-Visby Rules. Therefore, it can be seen from this case that applying this 
type of clause to the insurance contract should be considered as an action 
which must be invalidated by the courts.          
In addition to the statutory rule as to the implied warranty of legality as 
appears in section 41 of the 1906 Act, it has been developed as a common law 
principle that breach of the implied warranty of legality cannot be waived. This 
common law rule indicates that section 34(3) of the 1906 Act does not apply to 
breach of the implied warranty of legality. Indeed, this point is demonstrated in 
the case of Gedge v Royal Exchange Assurance Corpn376 where a breach of 
the implied warranty of legality was involved in this case. The insurer 
attempted to rely on the concealment of material fact as a defence to deny 
liability rather than illegality. However, according to the decision of the court, 
illegality would render the whole contract void, regardless of whether the 
insurer uses any other defence for the denial of liability. In more specific terms, 
as the court stated in this case:  
‘No court ought to enforce an illegal contract or allow itself to be 
made the instrument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of 
a contract or transaction which is illegal, if the illegality is duly 
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brought to the notice of the court, and if the person invoking the aid 
of the court is himself implicated in the illegality.’ 
In general, it is clear that the current implied warranty of legality as 
appears in section 41 of the 1906 Act has been appropriately introduced as a 
statutory rule, in the sense that the courts should not assist the assured who 
has committed any illegal act to gain advantage in respect of the adventure 
insured or the performance of the adventure. Nevertheless, as far as section 
41 of the 1906 Act is concerned, the problem may arise as to whether the 
adventure insured or the performance of the adventure must also be legal 
according to the law of another state.377  
As the Marine Insurance Act 1906 was enacted in the UK, it is clear that 
under this section, the common law and statute law of England will play a 
crucial role in order to determine whether or not the adventure insured or the 
performance of the adventure is legal. But this section has failed to address 
the issue as to whether any adventure contravening a foreign law will 
constitute a breach of the implied warranty of legality. It can be argued that in 
such a case, a breach of the implied warranty of legality will also need to affect 
the contract of insurance. The rationale behind such a view is that the assured 
should have no excuse to argue that he is not aware of the current statute laws 
of other states. This view suggests that apart from English laws, the assured is 
also under an obligation to ensure that any foreign laws which are directly 
connected with the adventure insured or the performance of the adventure are 
complied with. This means that any foreign laws which are in no way 
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connected with the adventure insured or the performance of the adventure fall 
outside the scope of the warranty of legality. Ignorance of foreign laws on the 
part of the assured may adversely affect the friendly relationship between 
states in the long term. Therefore, it is suggested by the author that taking 
notice as to any foreign laws in respect of the marine adventure should be 
placed into section 41 of the 1906 Act as another statutory requirement. In 
consequence, in the view of the author, the amended version of section 41 of 
the 1906 Act should be introduced to read as follows: 
There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful 
one, and that, so far as the assured can control the matter, the 
adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner. The obligation to 
comply with this warranty applies to English law and foreign laws 
which only regulate the adventure insured or the performance of the 
adventure. 
 
6.5 Warranty of seaworthiness 
6.5(1) General issues as to the warranty of seaworthiness 
It is a widely acknowledged fact that the seaworthy state of the ship plays a 
crucial role for the purpose of ensuring that the ship, cargo, environment and 
human life are not exposed to danger during the ocean transit. It is for this 
reason that in English marine insurance law, another type of implied warranty, 
that is, the warranty of seaworthiness, has been introduced into the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. In England, an absolute warranty of seaworthiness 
implied by law has been widely applied to contracts of affreightment and 
marine insurance since the 19th century. In contrast, under the Carriage of 
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Goods by Sea Act 1971,378 the duty to provide a seaworthy ship is relative, as 
the carrier is only required to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy 
ship.  
It has been generally accepted that the warranty of seaworthiness is the 
most important type of implied warranty in contracts of marine insurance. The 
reason for this is that the issue as to whether or not the insured ship is suitable 
to sail to the intended destination has a direct impact on the insurer’s liability to 
indemnify the assured for any potential loss or damage to the ship or the cargo. 
This point can be proved by section 39(1) of the 1906 Act which specifies that 
in a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of 
the voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the purpose of the particular 
adventure insured. This subsection clearly indicates that the warranty of 
seaworthiness applies to voyage policies, regardless of the subject of 
insurance, so that voyage policies insuring the ship, freight or any other goods 
are all subject to the warranty of seaworthiness under this subsection.379 So in 
general, the shipowner or the assured’s claim for the loss or damage to the 
insured ship or the cargo under a marine insurance policy may be denied by 
the insurer if the ship concerned was unseaworthy regardless of whether the 
assured was negligent or not, unless the warranty of seaworthiness was 
subsequently waived by the insurer under section 34(3) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. Additionally, it must also be noted that if the 
unseaworthiness of the ship is caused or brought about by the negligence of 
the master or latent defects in the machinery or hull, under the Inchmaree 
Clause,380 the insurer will not be entitled to deny liability as a result of such 
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unseaworthiness. Nevertheless, if the assured is aware of the negligence of 
the master or a latent defect, the loss or damage will not be recoverable even if 
it falls within the scope of the Inchmaree Clause.381  
Due to the practical importance of the warranty of seaworthiness, express 
seaworthiness clauses are often incorporated into marine hull insurance 
policies. However, the general legal principles relating to the warranty of 
seaworthiness may vary depending on the terms of the policy in issue, such as 
in the case of the Institute Cargo Clauses and Institute Hull Clauses. The 
general principles relating to the warranty of seaworthiness, as contained in 
section 39 of the 1906 Act, have received judicial attention in a number of 
aspects which will be evaluated by the author from the next section. 
6.5(2) Statutory definition as to the term ‘seaworthiness’ 
The first issue in relation to the warranty of seaworthiness may arise as to 
the meaning of the term ‘seaworthiness’. In reality, it is not surprising that the 
term ‘seaworthiness’ may cause confusion as far as lay people are concerned. 
For the non-jurists, the term ‘seaworthiness’ has been defined as ‘the fitness of 
a vessel in all respects to undertake a particular voyage which is a matter of 
concern to shipowners who contract for carriage of goods by sea, and marine 
insurance underwriters.’382 A similar definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’ has 
been provided in section 39(4) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. Under this 
subsection, in order for a ship to be considered seaworthy, the ship must be 
‘reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the 
adventure insured’. At the outset, it is necessary, at this stage, to consider the 
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meaning of the phrase ‘reasonably fit in all respects’ in this subsection. In fact, 
the word ‘reasonably’ clearly indicates that the ship insured does not have to 
be in a perfect condition to perform a particular voyage. In other words, it is 
sufficient that the ship provided by the assured is suitable for the intended 
voyage as stipulated in the insurance policy. This point is supported by the 
case of President of India v West Coast Steamship Co383 where District Judge 
Kilkenny held that the standard required for a ship to be seaworthy ‘is not an 
accident-free ship, nor an obligation to provide ship or gear which might 
withstand all conceivable hazards. In the last analysis the obligation, although 
absolute, means nothing more or less than the duty to furnish a ship and 
equipment reasonably suitable for the intended use or services.’384  
Moreover, the phrase ‘ordinary perils of the seas’ as appears in section 
39(4) of the 1906 Act is another aspect of law which must be examined in 
detail. The phrase ‘ordinary perils of the seas’ suggests that the implied 
warranty of seaworthiness will be satisfied if the ship insured has the ability to 
withstand ordinary weather conditions during the course of the voyage. This 
means that as far as the warranty of seaworthiness is concerned, the ship in 
issue is not required to withstand the stress of wind or waves that are not 
expected for a particular voyage. Nevertheless, the fact that a ship is in a 
seaworthy state for a particular voyage does not necessarily mean that the 
ship is seaworthy in another voyage. Equally, different time of year is indeed 
another factor which must be taken into account when considering whether or 
not a particular ship has in fact satisfied the seaworthiness requirement. By 
way of example, a ship may be seaworthy for a summer voyage, but 
unseaworthy for the same voyage undertaken in winter times, because she 
may be in an unseaworthy condition to encounter perils under severe weather 
conditions, such as strong wind and waves or iceberg. Another factor which 
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would affect the seaworthy state of the vessel is the different types of 
navigational water she would sail in. As a result, a higher standard of 
seaworthiness is required for a vessel which sails in ocean or sea voyages 
than a vessel which sails in inland waters. Thus, it can be seen from the above 
analysis that the term ‘seaworthiness’ is a relative and flexible term. The issue 
as to whether or not a ship is seaworthy would depend on the nature of the 
ship, the nature of the designated voyage concerned, different seasons and 
other surrounding circumstances. The 1906 Act has defined seaworthiness by 
using broad terms, such as the phrase ‘in all respect’, and as a result, the 
courts have the discretion to determine the issue as to what would constitute 
seaworthiness in each case, having regard to the facts and the circumstances 
surrounding each case.385  
In practice, the seaworthy state of a ship may be affected by a number of 
internal factors. Generally speaking, these factors would include the design 
and construction of the ship; the machinery and other technical equipment 
which are closely related to the use of the ship; the navigational aids; 
sufficiency and competence of the crew; 386  the appropriate documents 
ensuring that the ship can enter and leave the ports without any problem, 
sufficient amount of fuel or coal and stowage, the loading of the cargoes and 
the adequately trained master.387  
More specifically, in order to be considered seaworthy, the physical 
condition of the ship must be in good order. In this respect, the vessel’s hull, 
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machinery, hatches, pipes, pumps, tackle and steering mechanism, as well as 
other technical equipment, must be tight and in good working condition. For 
instance, in the case of The Theodegmon,388 the failure of the steering gear 
caused the stranding of the ship, and as a result, the ship was held to be 
unseaworthy. In similar vein, in the case of The Makedonia,389 it was held that 
the inefficient chief engineer was a factor that rendered the ship unseaworthy. 
The above analysis clearly shows that the assured or the shipowner is 
under an onerous obligation to ensure that the ship is in a seaworthy status by 
taking into account all the surrounding circumstances. It is indisputable that 
this would be a heavy burden for the assured or the shipowner. This is clearly 
unfair for the assured who will be placed under enormous pressure, and at the 
same time, he must also bear the risk of the loss of the ship or cargo if he has 
failed to satisfy the seaworthiness requirement in any respect, even after the 
premium has been paid to the insurer. For this reason, in the opinion of the 
author, the implied statutory obligation to satisfy the seaworthiness 
requirement should be eased by amending the statutory definition of the term 
‘seaworthiness’ under section 39(4) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. In 
particular, according to the author’s point of view, a ship must sail with a 
sufficient number of crew members, and these crew members must be 
competent so as to deal with any serious or dangerous incident which is likely 
to affect the ability of the ship to sail to the intended destination.  
Apart from this statutory requirement, it is suggested by the author that as 
far as the ship insured has the ability to commence the intended voyage, the 
seaworthiness requirement should be deemed to be satisfied. However, this 
does not mean that the external factors which are likely to affect the fitness of 
the ship during the voyage, such as the nature of the voyage and different time 
of year, should not be considered. As a result, there is no doubt to say that the 
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seaworthiness of the ship would include not only external factors, but also 
internal factors, such as the physical condition of the ship. But as far as 
internal factors are concerned, it would be rather difficult, though not 
impossible, for the assured to ensure that every part of the ship is strong and 
tight enough to withstand the ordinary perils of the seas. In similar vein, it 
would be unreasonable to require the assured to provide a ship with all the 
necessary equipment in good working order. In contrast, a different statutory 
obligation in respect of seaworthiness can be found in Rule 1 of Article III of the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 which requires the shipowner to make the 
ship seaworthy and fit to receive and carry cargo. This statutory obligation is 
sufficiently wide to include the fitness of the ship to receive and carry cargo. 
However, as the issue of seaworthiness and cargoworthiness are dealt with 
separately under the Marine Insurance Act 1906, a fair and reasonable 
statutory definition of seaworthiness, as opposed to the statutory obligation 
under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, should be introduced into the 
1906 Act.  
In consequence, taking all these perspectives into account, it is proposed 
by the author that the problem as to the unfairness and uncertainty of the 
seaworthiness obligation, as appears in section 39(4) of the 1906 Act, should 
be removed from this subsection, so that a new subsection should be 
introduced to replace the existing one. The ultimate effect of such a law reform 
proposal is that both the internal factors including the sufficiency of the crew 
and all other relevant factors which may affect the seaworthiness of the ship 
and external factors including the nature of the voyage and different seasons 
should be taken into account in order to determine whether a particular ship is 
seaworthy. Obviously, under this statutory reform proposal, the assured would 
be required to comply with a more onerous statutory obligation. However, in 
the author’s view, the proposed statutory definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’ 
would provide a fair solution to the existing problem and enable the assured to 
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understand how to satisfy the statutory seaworthiness obligation, so that any 
uncertainty as to the performance of the seaworthiness obligation can be 
removed. As such, it is suggested by the author that the amended version of 
section 39(4) of the 1906 Act, which provides a more appropriate statutory 
definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’, should be introduced to read in the 
following way: 
Taking external factors into account, a ship, with sufficient number of crew, 
is deemed to be seaworthy if she has the ability to commence the voyage as 
contemplated by the policy. 
6.5(3) Definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’ at common law 
In certain circumstances, the term ‘seaworthiness’ is also defined under 
common law, in a similar fashion as defined in section 39(4) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, in order to assess whether or not a ship is in a seaworthy 
state to commence her voyage, taking into account all the surrounding factors. 
The common law test relating to the seaworthy state of a ship applies an 
objective test by looking at the state of mind of the ordinary, careful and 
prudent shipowner at the time he sends the ship to sea. Unlike a subjective 
test, as far as the common law test of seaworthiness is concerned, it is no 
defence for the shipowner to argue that he did not intend to provide an 
unseaworthy ship for the intended voyage. This issue was considered in the 
case of Steel v State Line Steamship Co.390 In this case, Lord Blackburn 
expressly pointed out that the implied obligation to provide a seaworthy ship 
under common law constituted an undertaking ‘not merely that they should do 
their best to make the ship fit, but that the ship should really be fit’.391 The 
decision of the court in this case indicates that the duty of seaworthiness at 
common law constitute an absolute obligation. This means that ‘if the ship is in 
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fact unfit at the time when the seaworthiness obligation begins, it does not 
matter that its unfitness is due to some latent defect which the shipowner does 
not know of, and it is no excuse for the existence of such a defect that he used 
his endeavours to make the ship as good as it could be made’.392 But the 
standard for the seaworthiness is a relative one, in the sense that the ship 
provided by the shipowner does not have to be in a perfect condition. In order 
to be considered seaworthy, the ship concerned and its equipment needs only 
to be reasonably fit to enable the ship to reach the intended destination.393 It 
follows from these two aspects of law that under common law, the 
seaworthiness obligation is considered as both absolute and relative. The 
standard that the ship must meet in order to be seaworthy is relative. But the 
shipowner’s obligation to make the ship fit for the intended purpose is absolute. 
At common law, another feature of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship is that 
such a duty is absolute and non-delegable, so that it is no defence for the 
shipowner to argue that the unseaworthy condition of the vessel is caused by a 
third party, rather than the shipowner. 
It has been recognised under common law that the legal effect for the 
breach of the seaworthiness obligation may vary depending on the 
seriousness of the breach. In certain circumstances, the cause of the 
unseaworthiness may be so trivial that it can be remedied quickly without delay, 
such as an open hatch. On the other hand, other factors may also constitute 
unseaworthiness, and these factors can be so serious that they cannot be 
remedied within a reasonable time, and these factors would render the ship 
unfit for its intended purpose and deprive the cargo owner from the whole 
benefit of the contract. Therefore, under common law, in order to determine 
the issue as to whether or not the seaworthiness obligation is breached by the 
carrier, a legal test has been established. As far as the test is concerned, the 
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relevant question that must be considered is whether the unseaworthiness 
deprived the cargo owner substantially from the whole benefit of the contract. If 
the answer is yes, then the cargo owner will be entitled to terminate the 
contract. This test has been applied in the case of Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co 
Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd394 where it was confirmed by Lord Diplock 
that the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy ship could be classified as 
an innominate or intermediate term which fell between warranty and condition. 
This means that the common law obligation to provide a seaworthy ship is 
absolute, as this obligation indicates that the ship provided by the assured 
must be fit in an objective sense. But the breach of this obligation may, 
depending on the seriousness of the breach, lead to different legal 
consequence. This means that the nature of the problem and the speed to 
remedy it should be taken into account in order to determine whether the 
carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy ship has been breached.395           
At common law, there is an implied obligation which requires the 
shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship in contract of affreightment. So in the 
case of Kopitoff v Wilson,396 Field J expressly stated that the carrier should 
provide a vessel ‘fit to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and other 
incidental risks which of necessity she must be exposed in the course of the 
voyage’.397 Under this implied obligation, the shipowner must ensure that his 
ship, with sufficient number of crew and sufficient amount of fuel, is suitable to 
commence the intended voyage. But another issue that is relevant for 
consideration at this point is the application of the duty of seaworthiness. Such 
an issue was highlighted in the case of Maxine Footwear Co Ltd v Canadian 
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Government Merchant Marine Ltd398 where the court made it clear that by 
virtue of Rule 1 of Article III of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, the duty 
of the carrier to provide a seaworthy ship applied from the commencement of 
loading until the commencement of the voyage. Consequently, the carrier 
owed a duty to the shipper to exercise due diligence to ensure that the ship 
remained seaworthy throughout this period.  
In addition to this legal requirement, in order to be considered seaworthy, 
the shipowner must also provide the facility necessary and appropriate for the 
carriage of the cargo.399 Thus, it has been held that the unfitness of the hull to 
receive cargo could also be a factor which rendered a ship unseaworthy.400 It 
can be seen from this perspective that the common law obligation requiring the 
shipowner to provide a seaworthy ship is far too harsh for the shipowner. The 
reason for this argument is that it would be unreasonable for the concept of 
seaworthiness to include the fitness of the ship to receive and carry cargo. Put 
another way, the fact that the ship is unsuitable to carry the cargo does not 
necessarily mean that the ship is unable to withstand the ordinary perils of the 
seas. The unfairness on this aspect of law appears in the old case of Stanton v 
Richardson401 where the shipowner contracted to carry wet sugar, but the ship 
was not in a good condition to carry it. The court held that the shipowner had 
an obligation to ensure not only that the ship was in a seaworthy condition, but 
also that the ship was fit to receive and carry the cargo. The decision of this 
case indicates that this common law rule would place the shipowner under a 
more onerous seaworthiness obligation. It is also likely that the shipowner’s 
commercial interest will be unfairly prejudiced as a result of a minor breach of 
the seaworthiness obligation. Therefore, in the view of the author, the 
obligation of the assured to ensure that the ship is fit to carry the cargo should 
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be dealt with as a separate common law principle in order to mitigate the 
harshness of the seaworthiness obligation. As such, the breach of such a 
common law obligation, on the part of the shipowner, should lead to less 
serious legal consequence than the breach of the implied obligation to provide 
a seaworthy ship. In more specific terms, it is suggested by the author that the 
shipowner will only be required to pay damages if the ship he has provided is 
unsuitable to receive or carry the cargo to the intended destination. 
6.5(4) The application of the warranty of seaworthiness under 
section 39(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
Having examined the statutory definition of the term ‘seaworthiness’, the 
next issue that should be borne in mind is when the warranty of seaworthiness 
applies under section 39 of the 1906 Act. Put another way, as far as the 
assured is concerned, he will be interested to know what he has to do in order 
to satisfy the statutory requirement to provide a seaworthy ship, and when the 
implied obligation to comply with this warranty will terminate. Obviously, the 
application of the warranty of seaworthiness is expressly stated in section 39(1) 
of the 1906 Act which provides that in a voyage policy, there is an implied 
warranty that at the commencement of the voyage the ship shall be seaworthy 
for the purpose of the particular adventure insured. It can be seen from the 
phrase ‘at the commencement of the voyage’ that the ship concerned should 
only be seaworthy at the time as she sets sail.402 This point indicates that the 
ship does not have to be seaworthy for the entire voyage. As such, the 
assured will only be required to comply with the warranty of seaworthiness by 
ensuring that the ship he has provided is seaworthy for the voyage insured 
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when she sails on it.403 It can be seen from this perspective that there is no 
implied warranty that the ship should continue to be seaworthy. This aspect of 
law was originally established by Lord Mansfield in the 18th century. In 
particular, as Lord Mansfield stated, ‘every ship must be seaworthy when she 
first sails on the voyage insured, but she needs not continue so throughout the 
voyage.’404 As far as this aspect of law is concerned, the position appears to 
be different in respect of Rule 1 of Article III of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1971 where exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship on the 
part of the shipowner applies before and at the commencement of the voyage. 
So it is clear that the statutory obligation to provide a seaworthy ship under the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 is wider in scope than the application of 
the warranty of seaworthiness as appears in section 39 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906.       
Despite the fact that the statutory rule as to the application of the warranty 
of seaworthiness has survived for more than hundred years, in the opinion of 
the author, the law is likely to cause unfairness as far as the insurer is 
concerned. The rationale for such a view is that requiring the assured to 
comply with the warranty of seaworthiness only at the commencement of the 
voyage would mean that the assured’s statutory obligation in respect of 
seaworthiness can be easily discharged, and as a result, there will be a high 
possibility that the insurer is required to indemnify the loss of the subject matter. 
This is particularly unfair for the insurer where the vessel insured is lost or 
damaged soon after the commencement of the voyage, because in such a 
case, there is a high possibility that the vessel insured is unseaworthy at the 
time she commences the voyage. Therefore, in order to remove the unfairness 
from the current section 39(1) of the 1906 Act, a new statutory requirement 
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should be introduced into this subsection. In the opinion of the author, during 
the voyage, the seaworthy condition of the vessel should be associated with 
different weather conditions. It follows from this perspective that during the 
voyage, the assured should, under the new statutory requirement, ensure that 
the vessel insured remains its seaworthy state under ordinary weather 
conditions. But this does not mean that the assured must also ensure that the 
vessel is seaworthy under extraordinary weather conditions. Last but not least, 
the issue as to whether a particular weather condition is ordinary or 
extraordinary should be considered as a question of fact, and such an issue 
should be left to the court to determine. In more specific terms, this proposed 
statutory rule should be inserted into section 39(1) of the 1906 Act in order to 
balance the interests between the insurer and the assured, so that the 
amended version of section 39(1) of the 1906 Act should be introduced to read 
in the following way: 
In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the 
commencement of the voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the 
purpose of the particular adventure insured. During the voyage, the 
ship must remain its seaworthy state under ordinary weather 
conditions. 
6.5(5) The application of the doctrine of stages as appear in section 
39(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
In some cases, the distance of the voyage may indicate that it would be 
impossible for the ship insured to proceed directly to the intended destination 
as shown in the policy. In a voyage policy, this is particularly the case where 
the intended voyage is so long that the ship is unable to reach the intended 
destination with sufficient amount of bunkers or fuel. In such a situation, it 
would be necessary for the ship to call at intermediate ports to obtain more 
bunkers, fuel or other necessary equipment in order to complete the voyage. It 
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is for this reason that the Marine Insurance Act 1906 has established another 
well-known principle, that is, the doctrine of seaworthiness by stages. In more 
specific terms, this doctrine is expressly defined by section 39(3) of the 1906 
Act which states: Where the policy relates to a voyage which is performed in 
different stages, during which the ship requires different kinds of or further 
preparation or equipment, there is an implied warranty that at the 
commencement of each stage the ship is seaworthy in respect of such 
preparation or equipment for the purposes of that stage. 
Originally, the doctrine of stages was established in the 19th century. The 
doctrine was said to have created in the case of Bouillon v Lupton405 where a 
vessel was insured under a voyage policy from Lyons to Galatz. The assured 
had warranted to the insurer that the vessel was to sail before a specific date. 
The vessel left Lyons on time with full equipment for the river voyage to 
Marseilles, but not for the sea voyage thence to Galatz. In accordance with 
international shipping practice, the vessel was then rigged out for the sea 
voyage in Marseilles with the result that the ship had sailed after the warranted 
sailing date as specified in the policy. The court held that as the distance of the 
voyage was so long, it was impossible not to divide the entire voyage into two 
different stages, so that the implied warranty of seaworthiness had not been 
breached by the assured on the ground that the vessel in question had been 
reasonably fit for each stage of the voyage at the commencement thereof.  
The doctrine of stages was subsequently observed in a number of cases 
decided in the early 20th century. By way of illustration, in the case of Greenock 
SS Co v Maritime Insurance Co,406 the application of the doctrine of stages 
was considered by Bigham J when he said: ‘But the warranty is one thing and 
the observation of it is another. It is clear that in such an adventure, it is 
practically impossible for the ship to sail with sufficient coal for the whole of the 
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contemplated voyage. She would have to call at convenient ports on her route 
for the purpose of replenishing her bunkers, and therefore, though the 
warranty at starting is that she shall be seaworthy for the whole voyage, the 
warranty is sufficiently observed if the voyage is so arranged as that the ship 
can and shall coal at convenient ports en route.’407 However, as far as English 
courts are concerned, the application of the doctrine of stages has been 
confined to commercial, physical or practical needs. Depending on the 
circumstances of each case, the application of the doctrine of stages is only 
limited to cases of refuelling, and when its application can be justified with 
regard to the surrounding circumstances, such as when ‘the ship requires 
different kinds of or further preparation or equipment’.408 
In the opinion of the author, the application of the doctrine of stages under 
section 39(3) of the 1906 Act appears to be appropriate on the basis that the 
existence of long voyages and the different conditions and design of the ship 
would mean that it is more appropriate and necessary for the entire voyage to 
be divided into a number of different stages. To this end, it is clear that the 
doctrine of stages governed by section 39(3) of the 1906 Act has provided a 
flexible approach, so that the doctrine can be regarded as a statutory 
relaxation of the strictness of the implied warranty of seaworthiness. As such, 
requiring the assured to comply with the warranty of seaworthiness by stages 
would mean that the interest of the insurer is well protected for the voyage 
insured, in the sense that the doctrine minimises the risk of the insurer in 
respect of the subject matter insured. On the other hand, despite the strength 
of the doctrine of stages, another view expressed by the author is that the 
application of the doctrine of stages would mean that the statutory obligation to 
comply with the warranty of seaworthiness can be easily fulfilled by the 
assured on an unjust basis. The rationale for such a view is that according to 
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the doctrine of stages, the assured is only required to comply with the warranty 
of seaworthiness at the commencement of each stage. The potential 
unfairness in respect of the doctrine of stages may arise where the ship is 
permitted to complete the voyage through different stages. In this particular 
instance, if the ship is found to be unseaworthy soon after the voyage 
commences but before it reaches the first intermediate port, the insurer must 
still bear the risk of the loss or damage of the ship during this period by virtue 
of the doctrine of stages. As a result, it would not be surprising that the insurer 
is standing on an unfair disadvantageous position. In such a situation, it is 
suggested by the author that the insurer should be entitled to assume that the 
ship is unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage if there is no clear 
evidence on the part of the assured to show that the loss or damage of the ship 
is caused by a peril of the sea insured against.  
Apart from the above point of view, it would be extremely unfair for the 
insurer to indemnify the loss or damage of the ship, particularly where the 
voyage is so long and must be divided into different stages. This is because in 
such a case, the insurer must bear the risk for the loss or damage of the ship 
for a long period of time. In consequence, in order to ensure that the insurer’s 
commercial interest is well protected against unnecessary risk under the 1906 
Act, it is suggested by the author that in order to comply with the warranty of 
seaworthiness by stages, the assured must also be obliged to comply with the 
warranty of seaworthiness between the time the voyage commences and the 
time the ship reaches the first intermediate port. Indeed, the above analysis 
clearly shows that the doctrine of stages as appears in section 39(3) of the 
1906 Act should be modified to balance the conflicting interest between the 
insurer and the assured. Thus, it is suggested by the author that the current 
section 39(3) of the 1906 Act should be modified in the following manner: 
Where the policy relates to a voyage which is performed in different 
stages, during which the ship requires different kinds of or further 
204 
 
preparation or equipment, there is an implied warranty that at the 
commencement of each stage the ship is seaworthy in respect of 
such preparation or equipment for the purposes of that stage. There 
is also an implied warranty that the ship shall remain its seaworthy 
state between the commencement of the voyage and the first 
intermediate port. 
6.5(6) The statutory rule of the warranty of seaworthiness in time 
policies and the concept of privity in section 39(5) of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 
According to the above analysis, it is clear that the implied warranty of 
seaworthiness applies directly to voyage policies by virtue of section 39 of the 
1906 Act. The rationale for this statutory rule is that under a voyage policy, it 
would be reasonably easy for the assured to exercise control over the ship 
before the ship commences the voyage, so that complying with the warranty of 
seaworthiness on the part of the assured should be regarded as a strict 
statutory requirement. But the issue may also arise as to whether or not the 
warranty of seaworthiness has a role to play in time policies.409 This issue has 
also been addressed in section 39(5) of the 1906 Act410 which can be divided 
into two parts. The first part of this subsection sets out the general principle 
that there is no implied warranty of seaworthiness in a time policy,411 whereas 
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the second part specifies the special role which seaworthiness plays in a time 
policy. 
As far as time policy is concerned, under section 39(5) of the 1906 Act, it 
has been established as another statutory rule that the issue of seaworthiness 
has no application in time policies. This is because the risk under a time policy 
commences on a particular date rather than on a particular voyage. 412 
However, common law has provided an exception to this rule, so that under 
common law, parties are at liberty to incorporate an express warranty of 
seaworthiness into time policies. That is to say, ‘just as it is possible for the 
parties in a voyage policy to negate the warranty of seaworthiness implied by 
section 39(1), it is also possible for the parties in a time policy to insert an 
express warranty of seaworthiness in spite of the statutory declaration that 
there is no implied warranty of seaworthiness in such a policy.’413  
Nevertheless, it can be seen from the subsequent wording of section 39(5) 
of the 1906 Act that the application of the warranty of seaworthiness does have 
a connection with time policies. In more specific terms, it declares that ‘but 
where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy 
state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness.’ 
Therefore, it is clear that the warranty of seaworthiness has limited application 
in time policies in the sense that its application depends mainly on the 
requirement of the knowledge of the assured to the unseaworthiness of the 
ship at the time the ship is sent to sea and the issue as to whether any loss is 
attributable to the unseaworthiness. 
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At the outset, in order to determine the issue as to whether or not the 
warranty of seaworthiness applies to time policies, the privity of the assured to 
the unseaworthiness of the ship must be taken into account. It should be 
emphasized that according to case-law, the term ‘privity’ includes not only 
positive knowledge, but also knowledge that have been expressed by the 
courts as ‘turning a blind eye’. So in the case of Compania Naviera 
Vascongada v British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co Ltd (The Gloria)414 it 
was held that the term ‘privity’ was not confined to the actual knowledge of the 
assured in respect of the unseaworthiness of the ship. More precisely, as 
Branson J expressly stated in this case, ‘I think that if it were shown that an 
owner had reason to believe that his ship was in fact unseaworthy, and 
deliberately refrained from an examination which would have turned his belief 
into knowledge, he might properly be held privy to the unseaworthiness of his 
ship. But the mere omission to take precautions against the possibility of the 
ship being unseaworthy cannot, I think, make the owner privy to any 
unseaworthiness which such precaution might have disclosed.’415 Obviously, 
the decision of the court in this case indicates two points. The first point is that 
the insurer will be entitled to assume that the assured has knowledge as to the 
unseaworthiness of his ship if the assured deliberately turns a blind eye to the 
truth. The second point is that gross negligence or mere omission to take 
precautions on the part of the assured should not be equated with the 
knowledge that the ship is unseaworthy when she is sent to sea.  
Indeed, subsequent court decisions have confirmed the proposition that 
the negligence of the assured for not knowing the unseaworthiness of the ship 
should be treated differently with the concept of privity as established in 
section 39(5) of the 1906 Act. So for instance, in the case of Compania 
Maritima San Basilio SA v Oceanus Mutual Underwriting Association 
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(Bermuda) Ltd (The Eurysthenes),416 the assured shipowner entered into an 
insurance contract with a P&I club to cover against the damage to or loss of 
the cargo. When much of the cargo was lost at sea, the assured sought to 
claim the loss from the insurer. But the insurer refused to indemnify the 
assured by relying on section 39(5) of the 1906 Act and arguing that the ship 
was sent to sea in an unseaworthy condition with the privity of the assured. In 
this case, it was stressed by Lord Denning that negligence in not knowing the 
truth is not equivalent to knowledge of it.417 In addition, in this case, another 
important point was considered by the Court of Appeal, that is, the extent to 
which the concept of privity applies. As far as this point is concerned, the Court 
held that that the relevant knowledge as to the unseaworthiness of the ship 
must be held either by the assured himself in the case of an individual assured 
or of his alter ego, and in the case of a company, the relevant knowledge refers 
to the knowledge possessed by the person who can be considered as the alter 
ego of the company. But the person who merely acted as the servants of the 
assured must be excluded from being the alter ego. 
In reality, there are two situations to which the concept of privity applies. 
The most straightforward situation appears where the assured is an individual 
who runs his own business. In cases like this, the knowledge of that individual 
assured, as well as the alter ego of the assured, which consists of both positive 
knowledge and knowledge that could be expressed as ‘turning a blind eye’, 
should be taken into account in order to determine whether or not that 
individual assured is privy to the unseaworthiness.  
A more complex situation may arise where the company is regarded as the 
assured when signing the insurance contract. In such a case, the task for the 
identification of the relevant knowledge within the company is based on the 
person who has direct control over the corporate policy, and such a person is 
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to be regarded as the alter ego of the company. Unlike an individual assured, 
the company is an artificial entity and does not possess any relevant 
knowledge. As such, the person who has direct control over the corporate 
policy should sign the insurance contract with the insurer. For this reason, the 
concept of the ‘directing mind and will’ of the company has been adopted 
through early case-law. This point can be found in the case of Lennard’s 
Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd418 where the test of the ‘directing 
mind and will’ for attributing knowledge to the company was adopted by 
Viscount Haldane LC. This aspect of law indicates that a company’s ‘directing 
mind and will’ would normally be the company’s board of directors or the head 
men of the company who are in direct possession of executive powers in 
relation to the corporate management.  
However, subsequent case-law has altered the concept of the ‘directing 
mind and will’ of a company. By way of illustration, in the case of Meridian 
Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v The Securities Commission,419 the 
Privy Council replaced the concept of the ‘directing mind and will’ with a more 
flexible approach. The ultimate effect of such a replacement is that in certain 
circumstances where the company is regarded as the assured, the concept of 
privity is to be determined by the persons in the company who are directly 
involved in the decision making process as required for sending the ship to sea. 
This new approach suggests that the agent or employees of the company, as 
well as the board of directors, may also sign the insurance contract as the alter 
ego of the company. 
As indicated earlier, the concept of privity includes not only positive 
knowledge, but also knowledge that could be expressed as ‘turning a blind 
eye’. This rule was observed in the case of Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v 
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Uni-Polaris Insurance Co Ltd (The Star Sea)420 where a time policy was 
issued for the ship called ‘The Star Sea’. When the ship was sent to sea from 
Corinto in Nicaragua with a full cargo of bananas, mangoes and coffee, a fire 
accidentally started in the ship’s engine room. Due to the fact that the master 
was incompetent and did not know how to use the CO2 fire suppression 
system to pull out the fire, the fire soon spread to other parts of the ship. As a 
result, the ship was destroyed by fire as she approached to the Panama Canal 
and became a constructive total loss. The insurer refused to indemnify the loss 
of the assured’s ship on the ground that the assured was privy to the fact that 
the ship was unseaworthy when she was sent out to sea. In particular, the 
insurers alleged that the ship was made unseaworthy as a result of the 
ineffective sealing of the engine room. In addition, the insurers also contended 
that the ship was in an unseaworthy state on the basis that the master was 
incompetent in that he was unaware of the need to use the CO2 system as 
soon as he realised that the fire could not be fought in any other way.  
In the High Court, it was held by Tuckey J that the fact of this case showed 
that the master did not want to know about the unseaworthiness of the ship, so 
that the master was held to have ‘blind eye knowledge’. As the master was the 
alter ego of the assured in the circumstances of the case, the court ruled that 
the assured was privy to the unseaworthiness. According to the High Court, 
the master showed suspicion as to the ship’s unseaworthiness, but 
deliberately decided not to take effective steps to remedy the 
unseaworthiness.  
Nevertheless, on appeal, the decision of the High Court was overturned by 
both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. This is because there was no 
clear evidence to show that the assured suspected the incompetence on the 
part of the master of ‘The Star Sea’. In fact, the assured was only negligent in 
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the sense that he failed to take positive steps to ensure that the master was 
aware of how to use the CO2 fire suppression system. As far as the issue of 
privity is concerned, in the House of Lords, Lord Hobhouse examined the 
assured’s state of mind in respect of the issue of privity. According to the 
House of Lords, in order to establish privity, the assured must have knowledge 
not only of the facts constituting unseaworthiness, but also knowledge that the 
ship is made unseaworthy as a result of those facts. His Lordship considered 
the obvious question as to why the assured did not check the condition of the 
ship. This point can be covered by two different situations. The first situation 
arises where the assured becomes aware of the unseaworthiness of the ship 
but deliberately chooses not to enquire and remedy the unseaworthiness. In 
such a situation, the privity of the assured to the unseaworthiness of the ship 
must be established. A different situation would also arise where the assured 
did not enquire because he was grossly negligent or believed that there is 
nothing wrong with the seaworthy state of the ship. In cases like this, there will 
be no privity on the part of the assured.  
In the present case, Lord Hobhouse adopted a subjective test to consider 
the privity of the assured. The test is based on the assured’s actual state of 
mind at the time he sends the ship to sea. As the master of ‘The Star Sea’ did 
not have any knowledge as to how the CO2 fire suppression system works, 
this only constituted gross negligence of the master, and there was no room for 
the ‘blind eye knowledge’ to be established. Therefore, the insurer’s defence 
failed on the basis of the privity of the assured. In order to constitute ‘blind eye 
knowledge’, there has to be an appreciation of the problem and a decision not 
to address it for fear of what might be learnt on the part of the assured. To 
break it down, the test to be applied in order to establish privity in the form of 
‘blind eye knowledge’ requires three elements. The first element is a suspicion 
of the fact giving rise to unseaworthiness. The second element is the 
knowledge that if such a fact existed, it would render the vessel unseaworthy. 
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Finally, there must also be a conscious decision not to solve the problem in 
relation to the ship.421  
Indeed, the issue of seaworthiness in time policies under section 39(5) of 
the 1906 Act has been regarded as appropriate by a number of scholars.422 
However, the requirement for the privity of the assured clearly indicates that 
the cover provided by the insurer would be lost only if the assured was privy to 
the unseaworthiness at the time he sends the ship to sea. So where the ship is 
sent to sea in an unseaworthy state due to the gross negligence of the assured, 
he can still claim loss or damage to the ship from the insurer even if he has no 
positive knowledge or blind eye knowledge to the unseaworthiness. In other 
words, according to the author’s view, the current section 39(5) of the 1906 Act 
would make it far too easy for the assured to discharge the seaworthiness 
obligation in time policies.  
For this reason, with regard to time policies, the view expressed by the 
author is that the application of the seaworthiness obligation under section 
39(5) of the 1906 Act should be extended to cover the commencement of the 
first stage of the adventure, regardless of the vessel’s sailing route. This view 
indicates that apart from the current seaworthiness obligation under section 
39(5) of the 1906 Act, if the ship in issue is unseaworthy at the commencement 
of the first stage of the adventure, then, the insurer will also be entitled to deny 
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liability as to any loss or damage of the ship, provided that the loss or damage 
of the ship is caused by or attributable to the unseaworthiness. In such a 
situation, the liability of the insurer should be terminated irrespective of 
whether the assured is privy to such unseaworthiness. The reasoning behind 
such a view is that where the ship is lost or damaged at the commencement of 
the first stage of the adventure, it is very likely that the ship is in an 
unseaworthy condition at the time she sets sail. Thus, in such a case, even in 
the absence of clear evidence as to the cause of the loss, the insurer should 
be entitled to assume that the ship is in an unseaworthy state. It follows from 
this point of view that an additional sentence should be inserted into the 
second part of section 39(5) of the 1906 Act. As it stands, the new section 39(5) 
of the 1906 Act should be introduced to read in the following manner: 
In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be 
seaworthy at any stage of the adventure, but where, with the privity 
of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness. 
Where the ship is unseaworthy at the commencement of the first 
stage of the adventure, the insurer is not liable for any loss 
attributable to unseaworthiness, regardless of the privity of the 
assured to unseaworthiness. 
6.5(7) The meaning of the phrase ‘attributable to’ as appears in 
section 39(5) of the 1906 Act  
As analysed in Chapter 2 of the thesis, according to the nature of express 
warranty, the rule that a causal connection between the breach and the loss 
does not have to be shown has been established as a common law principle. 
But the situation is different as far as the seaworthiness obligation in time 
policy is concerned. So under a time policy, in order for the insurer to escape 
from liability, he is also required to prove that the loss is attributable to 
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unseaworthiness rather than a peril of the sea. This rule has also been 
inserted into the second part of section 39(5) of the 1906 Act which provides, 
in relevant part, that but where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent 
to sea in an unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable 
to unseaworthiness. It can be seen from this statutory rule that the issue of 
causation does have a role to play in time policies concerning the 
seaworthiness obligation. This means that the insurer must bear the risk of 
loss in the absence of clear evidence that the loss was attributable to the 
unseaworthiness, even though the assured has been privy to the 
unseaworthiness when the ship was sent to sea. This statutory rule can also 
be contrasted with the implied warranty of seaworthiness in time policies as 
appears in section 39(1) of the 1906 Act where the issue of causation does not 
apply.  
But under this part of section 39(5) of the 1906 Act, the issue as to the 
application of the term ‘attributable to’ has given rise to a number of 
controversial debates. That is to say, it would be rather difficult to ascertain the 
meaning of the term ‘attributable to’ in a legal context. According to the 
ordinary dictionary meaning, the term ‘attributable to’ simply means caused 
by.423 Nevertheless, in the context of marine insurance, the term ‘attributable 
to’ should not be equated with the term ‘caused by’. This is because if the term 
‘attributable to’ is equivalent to the term ‘caused by’, the drafter of the 1906 Act 
would have simply use the term ‘caused by’ in this part of section 39(5) of the 
Act instead of ‘attributable to’ in order to avoid confusion. 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that a cause of loss can be divided into 
two types, namely a proximate cause of loss and a remote cause of loss. 
According to Dr Susan Hodges, the term ‘attributable to’ covers not only the 
proximate cause of loss, but also the remote cause of loss. Put another way, 
                                                        
423
 Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 2001. 
214 
 
the term ‘attributable to’ is much wider in scope than ‘proximately caused by’ 
and will ensnare any loss which is in some measure (however minor or remote) 
brought about or contributed to by the unseaworthiness of the ship.424 It 
follows from this perspective that the ultimate effect of introducing the term 
‘attributable to’ into section 39(5) of the 1906 Act is that as long as the loss was 
caused by the unseaworthiness to which the assured is privy when sending 
the ship to sea, the liability of the insurer would come to an end, even though 
the cause of the loss was remote. This point denotes that the liability of the 
insurer will be discharged if the unseaworthiness to which the assured is privy 
constitutes a cause of the loss, but the unseaworthiness that affects the liability 
of the insurer does not have to be the proximate cause under the condition of 
the privity of the assured.425 This issue may be demonstrated by a practical 
example. So let us suppose that in a time policy, if the ship, during any stage of 
the adventure, is lost due to a number of factors and one of them is 
unseaworthiness with the privity of the assured, he will not be entitled to claim 
the loss. It can be seen from this example that in time policies, 
unseaworthiness has a tangled relationship with perils of the sea in situations 
where both of them constitute the cause of the loss. 426  But in certain 
circumstances where unseaworthiness itself constitutes the proximate cause 
of loss, the issue as to the privity of the assured to the unseaworthiness would 
become superfluous, as the insurer is not liable for any loss which is not 
proximately caused by an insured peril in accordance with section 55(1) of the 
1906 Act.427    
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However, although it is fair to say that the term ‘attributable to’ has been 
carefully and appropriately chosen by the drafter of the 1906 Act as a less 
demanding criterion for the requirement of causal connection, in the absence 
of a clear statutory definition as to the term ‘attributable to’, it may still be 
difficult for the non-jurists to make a distinction between the term ‘attributable 
to’ and the term ‘caused by’. The lack of a statutory definition may also cause 
unfairness from the point of view of the assured. Thus, in order to remove the 
problem of ambiguity and simplify the matter, in the view of the author, this part 
of section 39(5) of the 1906 Act should be modified, so that it would be easier 
for the assured to understand the meaning of the term ‘attributable to’. As the 
term ‘attributable to’ includes both direct cause and indirect cause, it is 
suggested by the author that this part of section 39(5) of the 1906 Act should 
be altered to read in the following manner: 
In a time policy there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be 
seaworthy at any stage of the adventure, but where, with the privity 
of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss either directly or indirectly caused by 
unseaworthiness. Where the ship is unseaworthy at the 
commencement of the first stage of the adventure, the insurer is not 
liable for any loss either directly or indirectly caused by 
unseaworthiness, regardless of the privity of the assured to 
unseaworthiness. 
6.5(8) The common law rule as to the burden of proof in relation to 
unseaworthiness 
In a voyage policy, where the ship insured is lost or damaged during the 
voyage, the crucial issue would automatically arise as to who should bear the 
                                                                                                                                                              
caused by a peril insured against.  
216 
 
burden of proving that the ship in question was in a seaworthy or unseaworthy 
condition. Such an issue has not been dealt with in the relevant part of the 
1906 Act. Nevertheless, the burden of proof in unseaworthiness allegations 
has been developed by common law, so that as a common law principle, the 
general proposition is that a ship is prima facie to be deemed seaworthy.428 If 
the insurer claims that there has been a breach of the warranty of 
seaworthiness on the part of the assured, then the insurer will be the party who 
is required to prove that the ship insured is unseaworthy at the relevant time. If 
the existence of the unseaworthy state of the ship has successfully been 
proved by the insurer, then, according to the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur,429 
the evidential burden will shift to the assured to prove the contrary, such as the 
proof of the loss of the ship by a peril of the sea insured against. 
But the situation may be different where the ship sank or became disabled 
shortly after the commencement of the voyage, and the cause of the loss was 
uncertain. In such a situation, the insurer will be entitled to assume that the 
ship was in an unseaworthy condition at the commencement of the voyage, 
and this inevitably constitutes a presumption of fact in respect of the 
unseaworthiness. In other words, the burden of proof in case of 
unseaworthiness should be based on presumed default on the part of the 
assured, only if the actual cause of the loss cannot be discovered. The burden 
of proof will then shift to the assured who must rebut the presumption of 
unseaworthiness by providing evidence that the loss was in fact caused by a 
peril of the sea insured against. But it should be noted that in each case, it is a 
question of fact, not of law, to draw the necessary inference as to the 
unseaworthiness of the ship.430 This proposition is evidenced in the case of 
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Eridania SPA v Oetker (The Fjord Wind)431 where Moore Bick J took the view 
that a presumption of fact that the ship was unseaworthy soon after sailing 
might be established, even though it was in fact impossible and impractical to 
ascertain the actual cause of the loss which rendered her unfit to perform the 
intended voyage. Additionally, another situation where a ship is presumed to 
be unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage is when the ship sinks in 
calm waters. In such a case, the assured must produce convincing evidence to 
show that the ship was seaworthy at the relevant time.432 
According to the common law rule as to the burden of proof in 
unseaworthiness allegations, even if the insurer fails to establish 
unseaworthiness as a defence, in order for the assured to succeed in his claim, 
he must also prove that the loss was caused by a peril of the sea rather than 
unseaworthiness. This aspect of law has been confirmed in the case of Rhesa 
Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M)433 where the House of Lords ruled 
that the assured must bear the burden of proof to show that the subject matter 
insured was caused by a peril of the sea. Likewise, this approach has been 
reaffirmed in the case of Lamb Head Shipping Co Ltd v Jennings (The 
Marel)434 where the vessel called ‘The Marel’ sank in the coast of Spain. The 
members of the crew claimed that he had heard a bump followed by which sea 
water started to enter into the vessel. Ultrasonic tests had been carried out on 
the shell plating before the vessel commenced its voyage. Despite the fact that 
the insurers had failed to establish unseaworthiness as a defence, the Court of 
Appeal agreed with the decision of the court of first instance and held that the 
owners of the vessel had also failed to prove that the loss was caused by 
collision or that the vessel was lost as a result of a peril of the sea insured 
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against, and that consequently, the assured was held not to be entitled to 
recover the loss from the policy, even though the actual cause of the loss could 
not be ascertained. 
In general, it can be concluded that the common law rules as to the burden 
of proving unseaworthiness have been appropriately adopted by English 
courts. This point of view can be supported by two reasons. The first reason is 
that as the insurer is required to prove that there has been a breach of 
warranty of seaworthiness to deny the assured’s claim, the law on this point 
has been introduced appropriately in accordance with the general principle of 
the law of evidence which specifies that ‘he who alleges must prove’. The 
second reason is that the common law rule as to the presumption of fact in 
unseaworthiness allegations serves as a satisfactory mechanism, as it 
effectively protects the interest of the insurer in cases where the actual cause 
of the loss was uncertain. On the other hand, as far as the current common law 
principle of the burden of proving unseaworthiness is concerned, the assured 
would face a heavy burden to prove that the loss was caused by a peril of the 
sea, even in the absence of clear evidence as to the actual cause of the loss. 
Thus, the law in this area would cause unfairness from the point of view of the 
assured, especially when the dispute is being settled in a court where an 
inference of fact in relation to unseaworthiness is likely to be considered. It is 
for this reason that the current common law position on this issue should be 
altered in order to remove the unfairness. As such, the presumption of fact in 
relation to the unseaworthiness of the ship should be replaced by another 
common law rule. For this reason, it is proposed by the author that the burden 
of proof on the part of the assured should be discharged as long as the 
assured is able to show clear evidence that the ship insured is seaworthy at 
the commencement of the voyage, regardless of whether or not the actual 
cause of the loss can be ascertained. This law reform proposal, if introduced, 
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would apply where the ship insured is lost soon after the commencement of 
the voyage or during the voyage. 
6.5(9) The application of the warranty of seaworthiness in mixed 
policy 
Under the 1906 Act, it is not surprising that the insurer and the assured 
may agree to include both voyage policy and time policy into the same policy 
which generally insures the ship. This type of policy is known as a mixed policy 
which is defined in the second part of section 25(1) of the 1906 Act. A mixed 
policy normally covers the ship, especially the hull of the ship, for a particular 
voyage. In addition to this, it also covers the ship for a certain period of time 
other than the voyage.435 Evidently, in the case of Lombard Insurance Co Ltd 
v Kin Yuen Co Pte Ltd,436 the Court of Appeal used the term ‘mixed policy’ to 
mean a policy in which a vessel is insured in the same policy for a voyage ‘at 
and from’ or from one place to another or others and also for a definite period 
of time. As analysed by the author earlier in this Chapter, the implied warranty 
of seaworthiness has a direct application in voyage policies, but it has a limited 
role to play in time policies. But the issue would then arise as to whether the 
assured is required to comply with the warranty of seaworthiness in mixed 
policies. Such an issue has not been dealt with as a statutory rule under the 
relevant provision of the 1906 Act.  
So far, there have been remarkably very few English authorities settling 
the issue as to the application of the warranty of seaworthiness in mixed 
policies. However, such an issue has been dealt with in Singapore. By way of 
illustration, in the case of Almojil (M) Establishment v Malayan Motor & 
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General Underwriters (Private) Ltd (The Al-Jubail IV),437 a British naval ship 
was used for coastal defence, but in 1975, the ship was completely refitted in 
Singapore. Subsequently, it was insured for a voyage from Singapore to the 
Persian Gulf and 12 months from her arrival. The ship sailed from Singapore to 
Damman on 30th May 1975, and a time policy of a 12-month period of cover 
was also fixed from that date. Despite the fact that the ship intended to 
proceed directly to Damman, she suffered damage as a result of the heavy 
monsoon weather and had to be repaired in Sri Lanka. After a careful survey, 
the ship was certified fit by the government engineer in Colombo and sailed 
again to proceed to Damman. But during the voyage, the ship was capsized 
and became a constructive total loss. The insurer refused to indemnify the loss 
on the ground that the ship was not in a seaworthy state at the commencement 
of the voyage. The contract was considered by the Singapore Court of Appeal 
as a mixed policy. The Court took the view that as far as a voyage policy is 
concerned, as the assured is generally in control and possession of the ship, 
he is capable of making the ship seaworthy, and therefore, he should be 
responsible to provide a seaworthy ship at the commencement thereof. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal held that the warranty of seaworthiness 
should be implied in mixed policies only in respect of the voyage part of the 
cover. In similar vein, in a mixed policy, as far as the voyage stage is 
concerned, it is logical that the voyage part of the cover is subject to the 
warranty of seaworthiness as if the assured must comply with the warranty of 
seaworthiness in an ordinary voyage policy under section 39(1) of the 1906 
Act. 
The decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal in this case has received 
academic attention among scholars. Evidently, according to Dr Soyer’s view, 
the approach adopted by the Singapore Court of Appeal in this case should be 
regarded as satisfactory, in the sense that it draws a clear distinction between 
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the voyage part of the cover and the time part of the cover. The ultimate effect 
of such a distinction is that as far as a mixed policy is concerned, while the 
voyage part of the cover is subject to the warranty of seaworthiness, it has no 
application in the time part of the cover. This approach has also been adopted 
in accordance with section 39 of the 1906 Act. Therefore, it is suggested by Dr 
Soyer that this approach should also be adopted by English courts as a 
common law principle.438  
On the other hand, in the opinion of the author, it is unjustifiable to say that 
the view expressed by Dr Soyer’s is cogent. This is because a mixed policy 
consists of both the voyage part of the cover and the time part of the cover, 
and in a mixed policy, it is patently clear that the insurer should accept the risk 
of loss for a longer period of time than voyage policy or time policy. In a mixed 
policy, as the period of cover has been extended, the subject matter insured 
can also be covered by the policy for a longer period of time. It follows from this 
perspective that a higher standard of obligation should be required for the 
assured to comply with. Thus, it is suggested by the author that apart from the 
warranty of seaworthiness which must be complied with for the voyage part of 
the cover, the obligation to provide a seaworthy ship should also be extended 
to the time part of the cover, so that the risk of the subject matter insured would 
be distributed in a fair manner as between the insurer and the assured.  
As suggested by the author in Section 6.4(6) above, the seaworthiness 
obligation should have a role to play in time policies. In the view of the author, 
a similar law reform proposal should also be advanced in respect of the time 
part of the cover in a mixed policy. But as it would be rather difficult for the 
assured to keep in control of the seaworthy condition of the ship in the time 
part of the cover, requiring the assured to comply with the warranty of 
seaworthiness for the entire time part of the cover would be unreasonable and 
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unfair. Therefore, a less stringent obligation should be complied with by the 
assured as far as the time part of the cover is concerned. In more specific 
terms, it is suggested by the author that in a mixed policy, the time part of the 
cover should be subject to the warranty of seaworthiness only at the 
commencement of each stage of the adventure. This inevitably means that the 
assured should be required to comply with the warranty of seaworthiness with 
regard to the time part of the cover each time the ship leaves the port. 
According to the author’s proposal, if the assured fails to do so, then the 
insurer will not be liable for any loss caused by the unseaworthiness, unless 
the assured is able to deduce evidence that he has exercised due care in 
complying with the warranty. If this law proposal is to be implemented by 
English courts, the commercial interest between the insurer and the assured 
will be balanced in a fair manner. It is thought that this law proposal is also 
introduced fairly from the point of view of the insurer who generally possesses 
less knowledge as to the condition of the ship than the assured. 
 
6.6 The application of the implied warranties in the Chinese 
Maritime Code 1993 
Under section 39 of the 1906 Act, the statutory definition of the term 
‘seaworthiness’ and the statutory rule as to the warranty of seaworthiness 
have been specified in clear terms. This means that the warranty of 
seaworthiness is an important marine insurance warranty which has been 
implied by the operation of law. In contrast, as far as Chinese marine 
insurance law is concerned, the implied warranty of seaworthiness has not 
been recognised in either the voyage policy or time policy. Instead, under the 
Maritime Code and the PICC Hull Insurance Clauses,439 the unseaworthiness 
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of a ship is considered as an exception to the liability of the insurer. So breach 
of the seaworthiness obligation would lead to the termination of the liability of 
the insurer. The insurance contract as a whole, however, remains on foot. This 
means that the implied warranty of seaworthiness does not apply in either the 
Maritime Code or the PICC Hull insurance Clauses. By virtue of Article 244 of 
the Maritime Code, unless otherwise agreed in the insurance contract, the 
insurer shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to the insured ship arising 
from unseaworthiness of the ship at the commencement of a voyage unless 
under a time policy the assured has no knowledge thereof. From the express 
wording of this Article, it is obvious that the breach of the seaworthiness 
obligation on the part of the assured does not provide the insurer with the right 
to terminate the insurance contract.  
It follows from this aspect of law that a clear distinction has been drawn 
between Article 244 and Article 235 of the Maritime Code. While the former 
statutory provision deals with the issue of unseaworthiness as an exclusion 
clause to the liability of the insurer, the latter specifies the statutory rules as to 
express warranties and the legal consequence for the breach. A similar 
contractual provision concerning the exclusion of unseaworthiness can be 
found in Clause 2(1) of the PICC Hull Insurance Clauses 1/1/1986440 which 
states that the insurer is not liable for the loss, damage, liability or expense 
caused by unseaworthiness, including the fact that the ship is not properly 
manned, equipped or loaded, provided that the assured knew, or should have 
known such unseaworthiness when the ship was sent to sea. Accordingly, the 
legal consequence of unseaworthiness under Article 244 of the Maritime Code 
is the same as Clause 2(1) of the PICC Hull Insurance Clauses. 
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6.6(1) The legal standard of seaworthiness in Chinese marine 
insurance law 
As far as Chinese marine insurance law is concerned, the standard of 
seaworthiness of a ship has not been expressly provided in either the Maritime 
Code or the PICC Hull Insurance Clauses like the statutory provision of section 
39(4) of the 1906 Act. As such, there is no legal definition of the term 
‘seaworthiness’ in Chinese marine insurance law. But in Chinese marine 
insurance practice, the seaworthy condition of the ship is generally regulated 
by 5 aspects of rules, some of which are derived from the Maritime Code, 
namely that the ship is properly designed and constructed for the purpose of 
the maritime adventure; the ship is properly manned with qualified master and 
seamen; the ship is equipped with the necessities to enable the normal 
operation of the ship; the holds, refrigerated or cooling equipment and other 
parts of the ship used for carrying the cargo are fit and safe for its intended 
purpose;441 and the dangerous nature of the cargo for transportation must be 
informed to the master before the commencement of the voyage.442 The final 
aspect of law is demonstrated in the case of People’s Insurance (Guangxi) 
Company v Shipping Company Ltd of Tianjin,443 In this case, both the trial 
court and the appeal court took the view that the vessel was unseaworthy for 
the reason that the carrier had not informed the master of the dangerous 
nature of the cargo of zinc concentrate prior to the commencement of the 
voyage, and this resulted the vessel being capsized during the voyage. 
It is suggested by one Chinese scholar that in Chinese marine insurance 
law, the ship concerned also needs to be properly loaded and stowed in order 
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to be seaworthy.444 It can be seen from this point of view that the way by which 
the ship is loaded and stowed will have an impact on the seaworthy condition 
of the ship. 
Apart from the above legal requirements, as far as the Chinese shipping 
practice is concerned, after the rectification of the ISM Code in 2002,445 in 
order to be considered seaworthy, the ship concerned must also have two 
certificates as required by the ISM convention, namely the Document of 
Compliance and the Safety Management certificate. The purpose of having 
these two certificates is to ensure that the ship can be managed in a safe 
manner. The ship insured would be unseaworthy if the ISM Code is breached 
by the assured.446  
In consequence, although the rules concerning the seaworthy condition of 
the ship in Chinese marine insurance law is limited to a certain extent 
compared with the English common law rules, these rules provide a clear 
guideline as to the way by which the seaworthiness obligation can be satisfied 
by the assured. However, other external factors considered by English courts, 
such as the type of the voyage concerned and the different time of year, may 
also affect the seaworthy condition of the ship. Therefore, in order to prevent 
the assured from enhancing his legal position in an unfair manner, it is 
suggested by the author that the external factors mentioned above should also 
be inserted into the relevant provision of the Maritime Code as the statutory 
standard of seaworthiness, and thereby requiring the assured to comply with 
the seaworthiness obligation in a more stringent sense.    
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6.6(2) A critical evaluation of Article 244 of the Maritime Code 
Despite the fact that unseaworthiness of the ship is considered as the 
exclusion of the insurer’s liability under Article 244 of the Maritime Code, this 
statutory rule is subject to an exception which is stated at the beginning of this 
Article. In particular, it reads: ‘unless otherwise agreed in the insurance 
contract…’ It can be seen from this part of the Article that the unseaworthiness 
of the ship, as an exception to the liability of the insurer, can be replaced by the 
parties with another contractual term through clear contractual wording. This 
means that the parties can agree to use a different contractual term other than 
the one provided by Article 244. According to the author’s view, this part of the 
Article can be treated as a sound statutory rule, in the sense that it has 
preserved the parties’ right of choice. 
The subsequent wording of Article 244 of the Maritime Code clearly 
indicates that the liability of the insurer will be discharged for the loss of or 
damage to the insured ship arising from unseaworthiness at the 
commencement of the voyage. Although this part of the Article is considered 
as the exclusion of the insurer’s liability to the unseaworthiness, the legal 
consequence for the breach of the seaworthiness obligation is the same as 
that of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906. Under Article 244 of the 
Maritime Code, in order for the insurer’s liability to be discharged, the ship 
concerned only needs to be unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. 
This statutory rule is also equivalent to section 39(1) of the 1906 Act. 
In addition, under this part of Article 244 of the Maritime Code, the phrase 
‘arising from unseaworthiness of the ship’ clearly indicates that there must be a 
causal connection between the unseaworthiness of the ship and the loss 
claimed by the assured. In other words, if the insurer wishes to deny liability for 
the loss or damage of the ship, he will be required to prove that the loss or 
damage of the ship is proximately caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship. 
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This aspect of law can be contrasted with section 39(5) of the English Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 where, in a time policy, the insurer is not liable for any loss 
attributable to unseaworthiness, provided that the assured is privy to the 
unseaworthiness. If these two statutory provisions are compared with each 
other, it will be obvious that as far as Article 244 of the Maritime Code is 
concerned, the insurer will be under a more onerous obligation in respect of 
the burden of proof to show that the loss or damage of the ship is proximately 
caused by unseaworthiness. Even if the unseaworthiness of the ship is a 
remote cause of the loss, the insurer’s defence as to the exclusion of liability 
will fail. For this reason, according to the author’s view, this statutory rule 
would make it rather difficult for the insurer to discharge the burden of proof. 
As such, the insurer’s commercial interest would be unfairly prejudiced.  
The problem of unfairness in respect of the issue of causation is best 
illustrated in the case of Hainan Yangpu Hengtong Shipping Co v PICC Haikou 
Branch,447  where the assured entered into a contract with PICC Haikou 
Branch to insure the ship ‘Henghai’ on domestic hull clauses for 12 months 
from 25th March 1993. According to the insurance contract concluded by the 
assured and the insurer, the insurer should be liable for the loss or damage 
caused by fire. On 10th June 1993, when the ship was sailing for a voyage from 
Chanzhou to Beihou, a fire was deliberately set on board the ship by the third 
officer, and as a result, the ship was damaged. The assured claimed the 
damage of the ship from the insurer on the ground of the fire which was a peril 
insured against. But the insurer refused to pay and argued that there was no 
master on board the ship, and the first officer was appointed as the acting 
master at the commencement of the voyage. It was also discovered that the 
third officer had an argument with the first officer, the appointment of the first 
officer as the acting master led to the fire which was set by the third officer to 
                                                        
447
 Defu Zhang, ‘Henghai hull insurance dispute’, Zhengjia Jin ed., Maritime Trial, 1997, No. 1, p 41. 
The case was cited in this book. 
228 
 
destroy the ship, and the first officer also failed to take actions to prevent the 
wrongdoing effectively. Accordingly, the insurer contended that the lack of the 
master and the appointment of the first officer as the acting master constituted 
the unseaworthiness of the ship, and that unseaworthiness was the proximate 
cause of the damage. Moreover, due to the fact that the assured was aware of 
such unseaworthiness when the ship was sent to sea, the insurer should not 
be liable for the damage of the ship. 
The crucial issue in this case arises as to whether or not the 
unseaworthiness of the ship was the proximate cause of the damage of the 
ship. Despite the insurer’s defence, the Haikou Maritime court held that the 
damage of the ship was proximately caused by the fire which was an insured 
risk, and there was no causal connection between the arson of the third officer 
and the unseaworthiness of the ship.448 Therefore, the insurer was held liable 
for the damage of the ship. 
On appeal, the High People’s Court of Hainan Province held that the 
insurer failed to adduce evidence to establish the causal connection between 
the damage and the unseaworthiness, and thus the decision of the court of first 
instance was upheld. In reaching this decision, the judges took the view that 
where a particular loss was caused by a number of factors, the proximate 
cause of the loss should be the cause which operated directly or dominantly, 
the remote cause of the loss should not be used by the insurer to deny liability. 
It can be seen from the fact of this case that the fire set by the third officer is 
directly connected with the damage of the ship. The insurance clauses in this 
case clearly provide that the loss or damage caused by fire, including the fire 
caused by the arson of a third party, shall be covered. As the unseaworthiness 
of the ship was not directly caused by the arson of the third officer, the insurer 
was held liable for the damage of the ship which was proximately caused by 
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the fire rather than unseaworthiness. From the author’s point of view, it is 
justifiable to say that although the court in this case has reached a decision 
which was in accordance with Article 244 of the Maritime Code, this part of the 
Article was introduced unfairly against the insurer on the basis that the 
causation requirement in this Article would make it extremely difficult for the 
insurer to prove the proximate cause, especially where several causes are 
involved. Therefore, in order to provide a fair and satisfactory solution to the 
existing problem, it is suggested by the author that the causation requirement 
in this part of Article 244 of the Maritime Code should be abolished.           
In the view of the author, as far as Article 244 of the Maritime Code is 
concerned, treating unseaworthiness of the ship as the exclusion of the 
insurer’s liability may not be the appropriate statutory rule to regulate the 
seaworthiness obligation. The rationale for such a view is that if the assured 
fails to ensure that his ship is in a seaworthy state at the commencement of the 
voyage, he will simply lose his cover on the basis of the express wording of 
Article 244 of the Maritime Code. For this reason, it is suggested by the author 
that the warranty of seaworthiness should be introduced into Article 244 of the 
Maritime Code to replace the exclusion of liability. It follows from this law 
reform proposal that the legal consequence for a breach of the warranty of 
seaworthiness should be introduced in accordance with Article 235 of the 
Maritime Code. This is because according to Article 235 of the Maritime Code, 
in the event of a breach of warranty, there is a high possibility that the insurer 
will keep the cover by charging an increased premium or amending the terms 
and conditions of the insurance contract. As such, the sound argument for 
converting the exclusion clause of unseaworthiness into a warranty is that the 
ship insured will still be covered without the need for the assured to seek an 
alternative cover, even though the warranty was breached by the assured. Put 
another way, if the exclusion clause for unseaworthiness is to be replaced by 
warranty, the possibility for the loss of or damage to the ship will be minimised 
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to a great extent. Taking this advantage into account, it is proposed by the 
author that this part of Article 244 of the Maritime Code should be amended to 
read in the following way: 
‘The insured shall notify the insurer in writing immediately where the 
insured has not complied with the warranty of seaworthiness under 
the contract. The insurer may, upon receipt of the notice, terminate 
the contract or demand an amendment to the terms and conditions 
of the insurance coverage or an increase in the premium without 
unreasonable delay.’ 
Furthermore, the subsequent wording of Article 244 of the Maritime Code 
provides, in relevant terms, ‘unless where under a time policy the insured has 
no knowledge thereof.’ This part of the Article clearly indicates that in a time 
policy, if the ship concerned is unseaworthy, the insurer will still be required to 
cover any loss of or damage to the ship resulting from the unseaworthiness, 
provided that the assured has no knowledge as to the unseaworthy condition 
of the ship when sending the ship to sea. Thus, it is clear that the application of 
this statutory rule is equivalent to section 39(5) of the English Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 where the insurer is not liable for the loss attributable to 
the unseaworthiness if the assured is privy to the unseaworthiness when the 
ship was sent to sea. In a time policy, as the period of cover is normally longer 
than the period of cover in a voyage policy, it would be rather difficult for the 
assured to maintain control over the insured ship and possess relevant 
knowledge as to all the circumstances that would affect the seaworthy 
condition of the vessel. It is probably for this reason, the draftsman of the 
Maritime Code introduced Article 244 of the Maritime Code, such that the 
insurer in a time policy has no right to reject the assured’s claim for the loss or 
damage of the insured ship if the assured has no knowledge as to the 
unseaworthiness of the ship at the commencement of the voyage. Like English 
law, the knowledge of the assured to the unseaworthiness under Article 244 of 
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the Maritime Code would include both actual knowledge and blind-eye 
knowledge.449 As such, the assured is deemed to know the unseaworthy 
condition of the ship if he suspects the truth but deliberately turns a blind eye 
as to the ship’s actual condition. 
Despite the fact that the current Article 244 of the Maritime Code is 
modelled on section 39(5) of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906, in the 
opinion of the author, the current statutory rule in respect of Article 244 of the 
Maritime Code is still unsatisfactory in the sense that requiring the assured to 
comply with the warranty of seaworthiness at the commencement of the 
voyage would render it far too easy for the assured to discharge his statutory 
obligation in respect of the warranty of seaworthiness. Therefore, according to 
the author’s view, the statutory rule under Article 244 of the Maritime Code that 
the seaworthiness obligation will be satisfied as long as the ship is seaworthy 
at the time of the commencement of the voyage should be amended on a fair 
basis. In order to achieve this goal, it is suggested by the author that the 
assured’s obligation to comply with the warranty of seaworthiness should not 
be limited to the commencement of the voyage. Rather, the warranty of 
seaworthiness should be extended to cover certain circumstances during the 
voyage. As such, it is suggested by the author that as far as the Maritime Code 
is concerned, the warranty of seaworthiness should apply to voyage policy. So 
in the view of the author, the new version of section 39(1) of the English Marine 
Insurance Act 1906, as introduced by the author earlier in this Chapter, should 
be regarded as the most appropriate statutory rule which should be inserted 
into Article 244 of the Maritime Code to protect the interest of the insurer in the 
event that during the voyage, the insured ship is lost or damaged as a result of 
unseaworthiness. In consequence, it is suggested by the author that Article 
244 of the Maritime Code should be modified to read in the following manner: 
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In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the 
commencement of the voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the 
purpose of the particular adventure insured. During the voyage, the 
ship must remain its seaworthy state under ordinary weather 
conditions. The insured shall notify the insurer in writing 
immediately where the insured has not complied with the warranty 
of seaworthiness under the contract. The insurer may, upon receipt 
of the notice, terminate the contract or demand an amendment to 
the terms and conditions of the insurance coverage or an increase 
in the premium without unreasonable delay. 
Despite the statutory law reform proposal introduced by the author in 
respect of Article 244 of the Maritime Code, according to the author’s point of 
view, the application of the warranty of seaworthiness and the legal 
consequence for the breach of the warranty of seaworthiness, as two distinct 
statutory rules, should be introduced separately rather than being combined 
together in a single Article. Therefore, taking into account the long provision of 
the new Article 244 of the Maritime Code, it is suggested by the author that the 
new Article 244 of the Maritime Code should be divided into two parts, so that 
the amended version of Article 244 of the Maritime Code will be simplified. The 
ultimate result of such a law reform proposal is that Article 244(1) should 
provide the issue as to when the warranty of seaworthiness would apply, while 
Article 244(2) should specify the legal consequence for the breach of the 
warranty of seaworthiness. 
6.6(3) The application of the warranty of legality in Chinese marine 
insurance law 
In English marine insurance law, the implied warranty is provided in 
section 41 of the 1906 Act which requires not only the adventure insured to be 
lawful, but also the adventure insured to be carried out in a lawful manner. In 
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contrast, the implied warranty of legality is not mentioned in any of the relevant 
provision of the Maritime Code. Nevertheless, in the general contract law of 
China, it has been established as a general principle that the purpose of every 
contract must be lawful, and that the contract must also be performed in a 
lawful manner. In China, as marine insurance contract is a special type of 
contract, it can be argued that some of the relevant provisions of the Contract 
Law of PRC and Insurance Law of PRC, for the purpose of dealing with the 
legality of the contract, can be adopted by Chinese courts and applied into 
Chinese marine insurance law and practice to regulate the issue as to illegality. 
This point is demonstrated by Article 7 of the Contract Law of PRC 1999 which 
specifies the general statutory rules of the parties’ obligation as to the 
formation and performance of the contract. In particular, this Article provides: 
In concluding and performing a contract, the parties shall abide by 
the laws and administrative regulations, observe social ethics. 
Neither party may disrupt the socio-economic order or damage the 
public interests. 
A more detailed provision for the purpose of regulating the legality of the 
contract can be found in Article 52 of the Contract Law of PRC 1999 which 
states: 
A contract shall be null and void under any of the following 
circumstances: 
(1) A contract is concluded through the use of fraud or coercion by 
one party to damage the interests of the State; 
(2) Malicious collusion is concluded to damage the interests of the 
State, a collective or a third party; 
(3) An illegitimate purpose is concealed under the guise of 
legitimate acts; 
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(4) Damaging the public interests; 
(5) Violating the compulsory provisions of the laws and 
administrative regulations. 
Due to the fact that there is no statutory rule as to the warranty of legality 
under the Maritime Code, the statutory rule that the insurance contract must be 
carried out in a lawful manner has been provided in the Insurance Law of PRC 
1995 (2009 amended version). As the Maritime Code is silent as to the legality 
of the performance of the insurance contract, it must be the case that the 
statutory rule as to the legality of the contract and the performance of the 
contract provided under the Contract Law of PRC 1999 and the Insurance Law 
of PRC can be applied by Chinese courts to settle a dispute concerning the 
issue of legality. More specifically, with regard to the Insurance Law of PRC, 
the relevant provision governing the legality of the insurance contract deals 
with the issue of good faith, and this provision specifies that ‘parties concerned 
with insurance activities shall follow the principle of good faith when exercising 
rights and performing obligations.’450 Despite the existence of the provisions 
concerning the legality of the contract and performance of the contract under 
the Contract Law and the Insurance Law, these provisions have failed to 
provide the legal consequence for the breach of the legality obligation. 
However, as far as Chinese judicial practice is concerned, if the insurance 
contract is tainted with illegal purpose, the contract will be considered as 
void.451 In Chinese marine insurance law, as the warranty of legality has not 
been established as a statutory rule, when the Chinese courts deal with 
disputes concerning the issue of legality, uncertainty may occur. This is 
because when settling the disputes like this, the Chinese courts generally have 
a huge amount of discretion. So it is submitted that illegality in Chinese marine 
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insurance does not, in all situations, render the contract void. The termination 
of the insurance contract depends on the seriousness of the illegality. The 
insurance contract can only be terminated when the illegality of the insurance 
is sufficiently serious to damage the public interests of the state or violate any 
legislation or administrative regulations.452 A typical example can be found in 
the Chinese case of The Fu Da453 where the insured vessel sank after a 
collision accident. The assured sought to recover the loss from the insurer. 
The insurer denied liability on the ground that the assured was in breach of the 
Ocean Vessel Registry Regulations of the PRC. In the court of first instance, 
the Maritime Court of Tianjin held that the assured had violated the law and 
damaged the social-economic order in the shipping industry, and therefore the 
warranty of legality was breached. On appeal, the High Court of Tianjin 
reversed the decision of the court of first instance and held that such a breach 
was not sufficiently serious to exclude the liability of the insurer. 
However, as the Maritime Code has failed to introduce the statutory rule as 
to the warranty of legality, it would be difficult for the assured to appreciate the 
importance of the warranty of legality. It follows from this perspective that the 
assured may innocently violate a piece of legislation or administrative 
regulation without noticing the legal consequence of the violation. Under the 
English Marine Insurance Act 1906, the warranty of legality is a very important 
type of implied warranty, and its legal purpose is to ensure that any relevant 
statutes and regulations are complied with throughout the currency of the 
policy.  
Therefore, in order to prevent the parties, especially the assured, from 
violating legislation or administrative regulation, it is suggested by the author 
that a detailed statutory rule as to the implied warranty of legality and the legal 
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consequence for the breach of this warranty should be introduced into Article 
244 of the Maritime Code. It is suggested by the author that section 41 of the 
English Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides an appropriate statutory rule as to 
the implied warranty of legality, such that it should be adopted into Article 244 
of the Maritime Code. Moreover, in order to preserve international harmony, it 
was argued by the author in Chapter 6.3 of the thesis that contravening a 
foreign law should also constitute a breach of the implied warranty of legality. 
Accordingly, it is thought by the author that this law reform proposal should 
also be introduced as a statutory rule of the warranty of legality into Article 244 
of the Maritime Code.  
As proposed in Chapter 6.4(10) of the thesis, the application of the implied 
warranty of seaworthiness and the legal consequence for the breach of this 
warranty should be introduced in Article 244(1) and Article 244(2) of the 
Maritime Code respectively. As the warranty of legality is another type of 
implied warranty, it is suggested by the author that the warranty of 
seaworthiness and the warranty of legality, as two types of implied warranty, 
should be dealt with in Article 244 of the Maritime Code, such that the 
proposed statutory rule as to the warranty of legality and the legal 
consequence for the breach of this warranty should appear in Article 244(3) 
and Article 244(4) of the Maritime Code respectively. All of the above points of 
view provided by the author suggest that the new version of Article 244(3) of 
the Maritime Code should be introduced to read as follows: 
There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful 
one, and that, so far as the assured can control the matter, the 
adventure shall be carried out in a lawful manner. The obligation to 
comply with this warranty applies to Chinese law and foreign laws. 
The new version of Article 244(4) of the Maritime Code should be 
introduced to read in the following manner: 
237 
 
A breach of the warranty of legality shall be subject to the same 
legal consequence as a breach of the warranty of seaworthiness. 
 
6.7: Conclusion 
To conclude, this Chapter has provided a critical comparison between the 
implied warranties in English law and Chinese law. There are 4 types of 
implied warranty in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, namely warranty of 
portworthiness, warranty of cargoworthiness, warranty of legality and warranty 
of seaworthiness. The warranty of portworthiness under section 39(2) of the 
1906 Act requires that at the commencement of the risk, the ship is reasonably 
fit to encounter the ordinary perils of the port. As regular surveys are generally 
carried out by classification society, it is suggested by the author that the 
warranty of portworthiness is deemed to be satisfied if regular surveys in 
respect of the ship are carried out by an approved classification society. 
The warranty of cargoworthiness is regulated in section 40(2) of the 1906 
Act which requires the ship in a voyage policy to be reasonably fit to carry the 
goods to the intended destination. In the author’s opinion, in order to provide 
fairness to the insurer, the warranty of cargoworthiness should also apply to 
time policy when the ship is moored at a port. 
The warranty of legality, as another type of implied warranty, is governed 
by section 41 of the 1906 Act which requires both the adventure insured and 
the performance of the adventure to be lawful. The adventure insured may be 
rendered unlawful if a domestic law is breached. This warranty can also be 
breached if the assured fails to comply with international law. Under the 
second part of section 41 of the 1906 Act, if the assured can control the matter, 
statute or regulation should not be violated during the performance of the 
adventure. Under common law, a breach of the warranty of legality cannot be 
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waived. It was argued by the author that apart from English laws, the assured 
should also be required to comply with foreign laws. 
The warranty of seaworthiness is governed under section 39 of the 1906 
Act. The term ‘seaworthiness’ is defined under section 39(4) of the 1906 Act, 
such that the ship shall be reasonably fit in all respect to encounter the 
ordinary perils of the sea. This statutory definition indicates that the term 
‘seaworthiness’ is relative, so that the issue as to whether a particular ship is 
seaworthy should be determined by external factors and internal factors. 
However, this statutory definition may cause uncertainty and unfairness. So 
the author’s view is that both external factors and the sufficiency of the crew 
should be taken into account to determine whether a ship is seaworthy. 
The term ‘seaworthiness’ was also defined under common law. Under 
common law, in order to be considered seaworthy, the ship must also be fit to 
carry the cargo. But in the author’s opinion, the obligation to provide a suitable 
ship to carry the cargo should be dealt with separately. This means that the 
unfitness of the ship to carry cargo should not be equated with the unfitness of 
the ship to withstand the ordinary perils of the seas. 
The application of the warranty of seaworthiness appears in section 39(1) 
of the 1906 Act which provides that in a voyage policy, the ship shall be 
seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. But this statutory rule may 
cause unfairness to the insurer. So it is suggested by the author that during the 
voyage, the ship must also remain its seaworthy state under ordinary weather 
conditions. 
The doctrine of stages under section 39(3) of the 1906 Act allows the ship 
to call at intermediate ports, such that the warranty of seaworthiness will be 
complied with if the ship is seaworthy at the commencement of each stage of 
the adventure. In the author’s view, this statutory rule was introduced unfairly 
against the insurer, as he must accept the risk of loss for a long period of time. 
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It is suggested by the author that another statutory rule should be introduced 
into this subsection, that is, the ship must also be seaworthy between the 
commencement of the voyage and the first intermediate port. 
In general, there is no warranty of seaworthiness in time policy. But under 
section 39(5) of the 1906 Act, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable 
to unseaworthiness where, with privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in 
an unseaworthy state. It has been established under common law that the 
term ‘privity’ includes positive knowledge and blind eye knowledge, and privity 
is different from negligence. The concept of privity applies to the knowledge of 
the individual assured and the assured’s alter ego. In the case of a company, 
the knowledge of the persons possessing the decision making power should 
be taken into account to determine whether those persons possess the 
relevant knowledge. In order to balance the interests between the assured and 
the insurer, the author proposed that in time policies, the seaworthiness 
obligation should be extended to cover the commencement of the first stage of 
the adventure. 
The phrase ‘attributable to’ in section 39(5) of the 1906 Act covers 
proximate cause and remote cause. To simplify the matter, it is suggested by 
the author that the term ‘attributable to’ should be replaced by the phrase 
‘directly or indirectly caused by’. 
The common law rule as to the burden of proving unseaworthiness is 
connected with the presumption of fact. In order to mitigate the harsh effect as 
to the rule of burden of proof, the author suggested that the presumption of fact 
should be replaced by the rule which requires the assured to prove that the 
ship is seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. 
The current law is silent as to the application of the warranty of 
seaworthiness in mixed policy. The author’s view is that the warranty of 
seaworthiness must be complied with in the voyage part of the cover, and the 
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seaworthiness obligation should apply to the commencement of each stage of 
the adventure for the time part of the cover.  
There is no implied warranty in the Maritime Code. For the benefit of the 
insurance market, the author’s view is that the amended version of section 41 
of the 1906 Act should be introduced into the Maritime Code.  
In Article 244 of the Maritime Code, unseaworthiness is treated as an 
exclusion clause. This law is unfair from the insurer’s point of view. Therefore, 
it is suggested by the author that the warranty of seaworthiness should be 
introduced into this Article, and the legal consequence for the breach of this 
warranty should be the same as Article 235 of the Maritime Code. In order to 
protect the interests of the insurer, the author suggested that the warranty of 
seaworthiness should apply to ordinary weather conditions during the voyage. 
The author also proposed that the application of the warranty of seaworthiness 
and the legal consequence for the breach of this warranty should be placed 
into different parts of Article 244 of the Maritime Code, such that the Article can 
be simplified. 
So far, the author has provided a critical comparison between the law as to 
English marine insurance warranty and Chinese marine insurance warranty. 
Some law reform proposals have also been provided where necessary. 
Therefore, the author will provide some general conclusions for this thesis in 
the next Chapter.   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Overall, Chapter 1 provided a historic review as to the law of marine 
insurance in England. A detailed analysis revealed that in Europe, the practice 
of marine insurance emerged from the Middle Ages. The development of 
marine insurance practice can be traced back to Northern Italy in the late 12th 
and early 13th century. The practice of marine insurance was subsequently 
introduced into England.  
In order to regulate export trade transactions and the business of marine 
insurance, European merchants developed lex mercatoria during the medieval 
times. The doctrine of lex mercatoria was known as the ‘Law Merchant’ in 
England and absorbed into English common law after the 17th century. 
The medieval lex mercatoria has a strong connection with the modern lex 
mercatoria, because the latter, developed by the international business 
community, is a set of trading rules including trade usages, model contracts, 
standard clauses, general legal principles and international commercial 
arbitration. 
The doctrine of lex maritima was developed as part of the doctrine of lex 
mercatoria for customary mercantile law. The doctrine of lex maritima refers to 
a specialised body of oral rules, maritime practice, maritime customs and 
usage in respect of navigation and maritime commerce. 
During the 16th and 17th century, marine insurance disputes were decided 
in the Court of Admiralty and the court of common law, but the practice of 
marine insurance was not regulated by any legislation during this period. 
In early English marine insurance law, the contractual provisions requiring 
the assured to do or refrain from doing something were known as warranties. 
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From the 18th century, Lord Mansfield developed a set of common law 
rules through a number of cases for the purpose of regulating the practice of 
marine insurance. These common law rules include the nature of express 
warranty, the legal consequence for the breach of warranty, utmost good faith 
and so on.  
With regard to the nature of express warranty, Lord Mansfield introduced 
the common law rule that a warranty does not have to be material to the risk. 
Lord Mansfield made a distinction between a warranty and a representation, 
such that a warranty must be inserted into the policy, but a representation can 
be made orally. Lord Mansfield also made it clear that a breach of warranty 
should not be excused, and introduced the common law principle that a breach 
of warranty would make the contract void.  
From the 19th century, the implied warranties were introduced into 
common law. During that period of time, there were two types of implied 
warranty, namely warranty of seaworthiness and warranty of legality. As far as 
the warranty of seaworthiness is concerned, it was established that this 
warranty would apply only at the commencement of the voyage.  
In the early 20th century, the Marine Insurance Act 1906 was enacted. 
Most of the common law rules established by Lord Mansfield were adopted 
into this Act. The statutory rules of warranty, whether express or implied, were 
set out in section 33 to 41 of the 1906 Act. In particular, section 33 and 34 set 
out the legal features of express warranty, section 35 provides the rules for the 
creation of express warranty. With regard to implied warranties, the 1906 Act 
has introduced the warranty of portworthiness and the warranty of 
cargoworthiness. A critical examination as to the statutory rules and common 
law rules of warranties was made by the author in subsequent Chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical analysis as to the nature of express warranty 
in section 33 and 34 of the 1906 Act. There is a clear distinction between the 
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term ‘warranty in marine insurance law and the term warranty in ordinary 
contract law. While the former is regarded as a term with promissory nature, 
the latter is a less significant term which only entitles the innocent party to 
claim damages in the event of breach. A breach of marine warranty will lead to 
the termination of the insurer’s liability, whereas a breach of condition in 
ordinary contract law will lead to the termination of the contract.  
Express warranty in section 33(1) of the 1906 Act can be divided into 
present warranty and future warranty. To comply with present warranty, the 
assured must confirm that certain facts, either past or present, exist or do not 
exist. A future warranty concerns the future promise made by the assured. As 
the legal consequence for a breach of warranty is harsh for the assured, the 
Law Commission proposed that all present warranties should be replaced by 
representations. But the author’s view is that all present warranties should be 
replaced by innominate terms, so that the legal consequence for the breach of 
such a term may vary depending on the seriousness of the breach.454 
It has been suggested by some scholars that warranties should be 
replaced by the concept of alteration of risk which has been applied in some 
civil law countries, so that the harshness of the existing law as to warranty can 
be mitigated. But in the view of the author, the concept of alteration of risk may 
cause uncertainty. The duty to notify the insurer as to an increase of risk would 
be an onerous one for the assured, as he must fulfil the duty even if the 
increase of risk causes no loss. The current law as to the concept of increase 
of risk is unclear as to the way by which the assured can fulfil the duty of 
notification for an increase of risk. These arguments suggest that it would be 
inappropriate to adopt the concept of alteration of risk into English marine 
insurance law.455 
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In English marine insurance law, a suspensive condition temporarily 
suspends the liability of the insurer, but the policy is not voidable. If the breach 
is subsequently remedied by the assured, any subsequent loss will be 
indemnified by the insurer. Therefore, such a clause is different from a 
warranty. In order to prevent uncertainty, the author suggested that if a 
suspensive condition is inserted into the policy, the word ‘suspense’ or 
‘suspensive’ and the legal effect of the breach of this term should also be 
inserted into the policy.456 
A marine warranty has various legal features. One feature is that a 
warranty must be exactly complied with. This feature is provided in section 
33(1) of the 1906 Act. A common law principle associated with this aspect of 
law is that minor defect cannot be accepted as a defence. In the author’s 
opinion, as far as future warranty is concerned, a substantial observance rule 
should be introduced into this subsection if a warranty has no connection with 
the risk, except the warranty to pay premiums. Additionally, the term ‘condition’ 
used in this subsection may cause confusion, because the legal consequence 
of a breach of condition should not be equated with the legal consequence of a 
breach of marine warranty. So the author’s view is that the term ‘condition’ in 
this subsection should be replaced with the term ‘condition precedent’.457 
The statutory rule that a warranty does not have to be material to the risk 
appears in section 33(3) of the 1906 Act. But according to the author’s view, 
the legal purpose of inserting a warranty into the policy should be limited to the 
protection of the subject matter insured.458  
It has been established as a common law principle that there is no defence 
for a breach of warranty, but under section 34(1) of the 1906 Act, there are two 
exceptions to this rule, namely a change of circumstances and when 
                                                        
456
 See Chapter 2.5. 
457
 See Chapter 2.6(1). 
458
 See Chapter 2.6(2). 
245 
 
compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law. In 
the author’s view, due diligence should also be taken into account to determine 
whether a breach of warranty should be excused.459 
Section 34(2) of the 1906 Act provides that a breach of warranty cannot be 
remedied. It is suggested by the author that this statutory rule should be 
replaced by a less stringent one, such that where a warranty is breached but 
subsequently remedied by the assured before loss, the insurer is only entitled 
to charge an additional premium at a reasonable rate without affecting any 
further liability to indemnify the loss.460 
As a common law rule, there is no causal connection between a breach of 
warranty and the loss. This common law rule has received criticisms from 
scholars on the basis that this common law rule may cause unfairness to the 
assured. But according to the author’s view, in order to balance the interest 
between the assured and the insurer, a new subsection, that is, section 33(4) 
should be introduced into the 1906 Act. According to the author’s proposal, this 
subsection should read: where a breach of warranty is followed by a loss, the 
insurer is liable to indemnify the assured for the loss, less any damage caused 
as a result of the breach of warranty, if the loss in respect of which the assured 
seeks to be indemnified was not caused or contributed to by the breach.461 
The legal consequence for a breach of warranty is stated in section 33(3) 
of the 1906 Act which provides that subject to any express provision in the 
policy, the insurer’s liability would be discharged as from the date of the breach 
of warranty. But the remedy for a breach of warranty can be replaced by a 
different remedy, such as a held covered clause, provided that the parties’ 
intention is clear. The automatic discharge rule was clarified in the case of The 
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Good Luck462 where Lord Goff confirmed that compliance with the warranty is 
a condition precedent to the liability of the insurer. The legal consequence of a 
breach of warranty has been criticised by the Law Commission. It is thought by 
the author that a different approach should be introduced into section 33(3) of 
the 1906 Act, that is, if a warranty is breached, then, subject to any express 
provision in the policy, the insurer is entitled to amend the terms of the contract 
on a reasonable basis and claim damages and administrative cost from the 
assured for the assessment of the alteration of risk.463 
By virtue of section 34(3) of the 1906 Act, a breach of warranty can be 
waived. The waiver in this subsection refers to waiver by estoppel. In order to 
constitute waiver, the insurer must have made an unequivocal representation, 
and the assured must have relied upon that representation. However, it can be 
argued that this subsection may cause ambiguity. Such a problem can be 
resolved by modifying this subsection, and in the author’s view, the wording 
‘unequivocal representation’ should appear in this subsection.464 
Chapter 3 provided a historic review of Chinese marine insurance law and 
practice. Historically, although commercial transactions were regulated by 
various legislations, trading activities were controlled and limited by the 
government from the Qin Dynasty. In order to promote trading activities, 
different trading routes were also set up in ancient China, such as the Silk 
Road established in the Han Dynasty. However, as commercial law was not 
regulated on an international standard until the end of the Qing Dynasty, 
ancient Chinese commercial law has no role to play in the context of medieval 
lex mercatoria. But the contemporary Chinese commercial law was deeply 
influenced by German and Japanese law, especially after the Opium Wars. 
                                                        
462
 [1992] 1 AC 233.  
463
 See Chapter 2.6(7). 
464
 See Chapter 2.6(8). 
247 
 
The practice of marine insurance in China emerged from as early as the 
3rd millennia BC. From this period of time, in order to minimise the risk of loss 
or damage to the goods during the inland river transit, ancient Chinese 
merchants agreed to share the potential risk with each other by placing the 
goods on a number of different boats. 
The Chinese insurance industry was not developed until the beginning of 
the 19th century when a number of foreign and domestic insurance companies 
were set up to compete with each other, although foreign insurance companies 
were in a dominant position at that time. All proposal forms, insurance clauses, 
policies or premium rates were drafted by foreign insurance companies. Soon 
after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the government of the National 
People’s Party passed the Maritime Law which also regulated marine 
insurance issues. But the Insurance Company Law drafted by the National 
People’s Party did not come into effect.  
As soon as the People’s Republic of China was established in 1949, the 
PICC was set up by the government. Due to the economic systems reform, 
from the late 1980s, more and more domestic and foreign insurance 
companies entered into the insurance market. Since then, the PICC has 
established international branches in other countries.  
In order to regulate maritime issues, the Maritime Code of the PRC was 
passed in 1993. Marine insurance law was governed by this Code. Relevant 
provisions of the English Marine Insurance Act 1906 were codified into the 
Maritime Code. Subsequently, another piece of legislation governing the law of 
insurance contracts was passed in 1995, namely the Insurance Law of PRC. 
Additionally, the Contract Law of PRC 1999 can also be adopted to settle a 
particular marine insurance dispute.   
As the Chinese insurance industry developed into its mature state, the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission was set up by the State Council as a 
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governmental agency and was authorised to regulate the insurance industry 
from 1998. 
Unlike the English court system, a maritime dispute in China, including 
marine insurance case, must be dealt with in a particular maritime court 
depending on the geographical location of the dispute in question. With regard 
to a marine insurance dispute, the parties’ legal rights and interests can also 
be protected by way of arbitration with the assistance of the CMAC. 
Chapter 4 provided a critical analysis as to the current statutory rule of 
warranty as appears in Article 235 of the Maritime Code. Although some new 
law reform proposals in respect of marine warranty in Article 235 of the 
Maritime Code has been introduced by scholars and the Supreme Court’s 
guidance notes, it is clear that there are still certain defects in the current 
Article 235 of the Maritime Code. At the outset, the problem as to the lack of a 
statutory definition of warranty has been addressed by the author. In the 
absence of a clear statutory definition of warranty, uncertainty may squeeze 
into the law. So according to the author’s view, the new section 33(1) of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 should be adopted into Article 235(1) of the 
Maritime Code as a statutory definition.465 In Chinese marine insurance law, 
warranty is directly associated with the principle of good faith which is only 
provided in Article 5 of the Insurance Law 1995. As good faith is an important 
statutory duty, it is suggested by the author that the word ‘utmost’ and the legal 
consequence for the breach of this duty should be inserted into this Article.    
Under the relevant provisions of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, there are 
three important aspects as to the legal feature of warranty, namely a warranty 
must be exactly complied with, a warranty does not have to be material to the 
risk and a causal connection between a breach of warranty and the loss does 
not have to be shown. It is suggested by the author that the amended version 
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of these three aspects of the statutory feature of warranty should be introduced 
and incorporated into Article 235(2) of the Maritime Code to clarify certain 
issues.466  
Under the current version of Article 235 of the Maritime Code, the assured 
must notify the insurer immediately as to any breach of warranty, but in the 
author’s view, in such a case, the assured should also be required to take 
reasonable measures to protect the subject matter insured. If he fails to do so, 
then subject to any express provision in the policy, the contract will be 
automatically terminated, with the premiums being non-refundable.467 Another 
amendment made by the author is that if the insurer fails to make an election 
immediately upon a breach of warranty, the assured will be entitled to assume 
that the insurer have waived the breach, but if, for the first time, the assured 
committed a minor breach of warranty, the insurer can only issue a warning 
notice to the assured.468 It is believed that these law reform proposals, if 
introduced into the Maritime Code, would bring Chinese marine insurance law 
in harmony with international maritime practice, so that the parties will have a 
better understanding as to the statutory rules of warranty under the new 
version of the Maritime Code. 
In Chapter 5, the author provided a critical examination as to the statutory 
rules of the creation of express warranty under section 35 of the Marine 
Insurance Act 1906. As far as section 35(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
is concerned, an express warranty can be created with any form of words 
without the need for the parties to use the word ‘warranty’ or ‘warranted’. It 
follows from this aspect of law that the creation of an express warranty may 
cause ambiguity and uncertainty. In such a case, the common law rule of 
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contra proferentes will come into play, such that the words will be construed 
against the insurer.  
In addition, the purpose of the warranty is another factor which has to be 
considered by the courts in order to determine whether or not a particular 
clause is a warranty. It is sometimes difficult for the courts to identify a 
particular warranty, especially when the parties’ intention is unclear. Therefore, 
in the author’s view, in order for an express warranty to be valid, the 
importance of the warranty and the legal consequence for the breach must 
appear in the policy to assist the assured to comply with the warranty.469 Such 
a law reform proposal may also assist the court to determine whether or not a 
particular term is a warranty. Another law reform proposal made by the author 
is that an express warranty should also be created with commercial and 
risk-related purpose in order to be valid. These two law proposals should all be 
inserted into section 35(1) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906.470  
According to section 35(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906, an express 
warranty must be set out in writing and included in the policy. It has also been 
established as a common law rule that oral statements and representations 
made by the assured may become express warranties if these statements and 
representations are subsequently incorporated into the policy. But as these 
statements and representations generally involve with past or existing facts, it 
is suggested by the author that they should not be considered as express 
warranties.471 In contrast, the rules as to the creation of express warranties 
were not covered in the Maritime Code. Therefore, it is proposed by the author 
that the amended version of section 35(1) and 35(2) of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 should be inserted into Article 235 of the Maritime Code, but the legal 
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purpose of the warranty must also be taken into account by the insurer when 
creating an express warranty.472 
Finally, the author in Chapter 6 provided a critical comparison between the 
implied warranties in English law and Chinese law. There are 4 types of 
implied warranty in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, namely warranty of 
portworthiness, warranty of cargoworthiness, warranty of legality and warranty 
of seaworthiness. The warranty of portworthiness under section 39(2) of the 
1906 Act requires the ship to be reasonably fit to encounter the ordinary perils 
of the port. As regular surveys are generally carried out for the ship, it is 
suggested by the author that the assured should not be required to comply 
with the warranty of portworthiness if regular surveys in respect of the ship are 
carried out by an approved classification society.473 
The statutory rule as to the warranty of cargoworthiness appears in section 
40(2) of the 1906 Act which requires the ship in a voyage policy to be 
reasonably fit to carry the goods to the intended destination. In the author’s 
opinion, in order to provide fairness to the insurer, the warranty of 
cargoworthiness should also be extended to time policy when the ship is 
moored at a port.474 
The warranty of legality is governed by section 41 of the 1906 Act which 
requires both the adventure insured and the performance of the adventure to 
be lawful. The adventure insured may be rendered unlawful if a domestic law is 
breached. This warranty can also be breached if the assured fails to comply 
with international law. Under the second part of section 41 of the 1906 Act, if 
the assured can control the matter, statute or regulation should not be violated 
during the performance of the adventure. Unlike other types of warranty, 
breach of the warranty of legality cannot be waived. It was argued by the 
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author that in order to promote international harmony, the assured should also 
be required to comply with foreign laws and regulations.475 
The implied warranty of seaworthiness is governed under section 39 of the 
1906 Act. The term ‘seaworthiness’ is defined under section 39(4) of the 1906 
Act which provides that the ship shall be reasonably fit in all respect to 
encounter the ordinary perils of the sea. This statutory definition indicates that 
the issue as to whether a particular ship is seaworthy should be determined by 
external factors and internal factors. However, this statutory definition may 
cause uncertainty for the assured. So the author’s view is that this subsection 
should be altered as follows: 
Taking external factors into account, a ship, with sufficient number 
of crew, is deemed to be seaworthy if she has the ability to 
commence the voyage as contemplated by the policy.476 
The term ‘seaworthiness’ was also defined by common law. Under 
common law, apart from the fitness of the ship to encounter the ordinary perils 
of the sea, the ship must also be fit to carry the cargo. But in the author’s 
opinion, the fitness of the ship to carry the cargo should be dealt with 
separately as another common law principle, so that the unfitness of the ship 
to carry cargo should not be equated with the unfitness of the ship to withstand 
the ordinary perils of the seas.477 
The issue as to when the warranty of seaworthiness applies appears in 
section 39(1) of the 1906 Act which only requires the ship to be seaworthy at 
the commencement of the voyage. But this statutory rule may cause 
unfairness to the insurer. So it is suggested by the author that during the 
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voyage, the ship must also remain its seaworthy state under ordinary weather 
conditions.478 
The doctrine of stages under section 39(3) of the 1906 Act allows the ship 
to call at intermediate ports, such that the warranty of seaworthiness will be 
complied with if the ship is seaworthy at the commencement of each stage of 
the adventure. In the author’s view, this statutory rule was introduced unfairly 
against the insurer, as he must accept the risk of loss for a long period of time. 
It is suggested by the author that another statutory rule should be introduced 
into this subsection, that is, the ship must also be seaworthy between the 
commencement of the voyage and the first intermediate port.479 
Under the first part of section 39(5) of the 1906 Act, there is no warranty of 
seaworthiness in time policy. But under the second part of this subsection, the 
insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness where, with 
privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state. It has 
been established under common law that the term ‘privity’ includes positive 
knowledge and blind eye knowledge, and a clear distinction must be drawn 
between privity and negligence. The concept of privity applies to the 
knowledge of the individual assured and the assured’s alter ego. In the case of 
a company, the knowledge of the persons possessing the decision making 
power should be taken into account. In order to balance the interests between 
the assured and the insurer, the author proposed that in this subsection, the 
seaworthiness obligation should be extended to cover the commencement of 
the first stage of the adventure.480 
The phrase ‘attributable to’ in section 39(5) of the 1906 Act covers 
proximate cause and remote cause. To ensure that the assured understands 
the meaning of the term ‘attributable to’, it is suggested by the author that the 
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term ‘attributable to’ should be replaced by the phrase ‘directly or indirectly 
caused by’.481 
The common law rule as to the burden of proving unseaworthiness is 
connected with the presumption of fact. In order to mitigate the harsh effect as 
to the rule of burden of proof, the author suggested that the rule as to the 
presumption of fact should be replaced by another common law rule, such that 
the assured will only be required to prove that the ship is seaworthy at the 
commencement of the voyage.482 
The current law is silent as to the application of the warranty of 
seaworthiness in mixed policy. The author’s view is that the warranty of 
seaworthiness must be complied with in the voyage part of the cover, and the 
seaworthiness obligation should only apply to the commencement of each 
stage of the adventure for the time part of the cover.483  
There is no implied warranty in the Maritime Code. For the benefit of the 
insurance market, the author’s view is that the amended version of section 41 
of the 1906 Act should be introduced into the Maritime Code as the warranty of 
legality.484  
In Article 244 of the Maritime Code, unseaworthiness is treated as an 
exception to the insurer’s liability. But according to this Article, in a time policy, 
the insurer is not liable for any loss resulting from unseaworthiness, unless the 
assured has no knowledge as to the unseaworthiness. However, this Article is 
introduced unfairly from the insurer’s point of view. Therefore, it is suggested 
by the author that the warranty of seaworthiness should be introduced into this 
Article, and the legal consequence for the breach of this warranty should be 
the same as Article 235 of the Maritime Code. In order to protect the interests 
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of the insurer, the author suggested that the amended version of section 39(1) 
of the 1906 Act, as proposed by the author earlier in this Chapter, should be 
inserted into Article 244 of the Maritime Code to deal with the issue as to the 
application of the warranty of seaworthiness. The author also proposed that 
the application of the warranty of seaworthiness and the legal consequence for 
the breach of this warranty should be placed into different parts of Article 244 
of the Maritime Code in order to simplify this Article.485 
Overall, the author has provided some law reform proposals and 
introduced some new laws as to the current warranty regime between the 
English Marine Insurance Act 1906 and the Maritime Code of PRC 1993. It has 
been argued by a large number of scholars that some statutory rules in respect 
of warranties should be reformed to promote fairness within the current 
insurance market. But in this thesis, these views have been challenged by the 
author on several grounds. The law reform proposals and new laws introduced 
by the author in this thesis should not be regarded as the perfect method to 
modify the existing law. Rather, these law reform proposals and new laws 
should be reviewed and scrutinized by relevant research bodies. However, the 
main purpose of this thesis is to draw the attention of relevant legislative 
bodies to review and make some law reform proposals as to the current 
warranty regime.        
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